Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

2001

From the Shadow of Reagan: George Bush and the End of the
Cold War.
Christopher Alan Maynard
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Maynard, Christopher Alan, "From the Shadow of Reagan: George Bush and the End of the Cold War."
(2001). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 297.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/297

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI fiims
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction..
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if unauthorized

copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

FROM THE SHADOW OF REAGAN:
GEORGE BUSH AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History

by
Christopher Alan Maynard
BA ., Lee University, 1994
M A , Louisiana State University, 1997
May 2001

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number. 3016560

Copyright 2001 by
Maynard, Christopher Alan
All rights reserved.

_ ___

(ft

UMI
UMI Microform 3016560
Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Z eeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

©Copyright 2001
Christopher Alan Maynard
All rights reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank all o f the professors who have taught me over the years. In
particular, this work has been greatly enriched by Professor David Gilbert whose
overall direction of my studies has had a profound impact. John Lasiter and Mary
Finch of the George Bush Presidential Library were particularly helpful and I owe
them a debt of gratitude along with all those at the Bush Library who offered their
assistance. A Peter and Edith O’Donnell Grant from the George Bush Library
Foundation provided financial assistance for my research. Nancy Reagan granted
access to Ronald Reagan’s private collection at the Reagan Library. In addition, I
would like to thank Marlin Fitzwater, Brent Scowcroft, James A. Baker III, Colin
Powell, and Jack F. Matlock, Jr., for giving so generously of their time for interviews
for this study. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Carole Medlin Maynard, whose
career as an editor was instrumental in allowing me to finish my work.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table o f Contents
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................iii
Abstract........................................................................................................................ v
Introduction.....................................................................
Chapter
1

1

Media Image Building:
Reagan, Bush, and the “Wimp” Factor................................................15

2

The Primacy o f the National Security Council:
Beyond Containment in Europe.......................................................... 51

3

Bush and Gorbachev: The Road to Malta............................................ 87

4

Personal Diplomacy:
The Reunification of Germany..........................................................127

5

“When You Lose Your Best Enemy”:
The Collapse of the Soviet Union.....................................................164

6

The Prudent Cold Warrior:
The Foreign Policy Legacy o f George Bush......................................202

Bibliography............................................................................................................ 229
Appendix
A

Marlin Fitzwater Interview................................................................ 241

B

James A. Baker HI Interview............................................................. 248

C

Brent Scowcroft Interview................................................................. 255

D

Colin Powell Interview...................................................................... 262

E

Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Interview........................................................... 267

Vha.......................................................................................................................... 275

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Abstract
George Bush entered the presidency constantly compared and contrasted with his
predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Lacking Reagan’s eloquence and adept use of the media,
Bush was lambasted by the press as Reagan’s “lapdog” and labeled a “wimp.” The
press pushed Bush to establish themes to match policy goals and to use the bully
pulpit to lead the national debate on issues. His refusal prompted journalists to
characterize the Bush presidency as lacking an agenda. Reagan’s success with the
media and Bush’s failure have produced a misconception about the successes and
failures of each president’s policies. Thus, the period usually is referred to as the
“Reagan-Bush years,” indicating that Bush’s term can best be explained as Reagan’s
third term. This distinction is partly a result of the misconception that the Cold War
was basically over by the end of the Reagan administration and that Bush merely
signed agreements Reagan had already negotiated. This ignores the instability of the
Soviet Union, as well as the potentially explosive situation in Central and Eastern
Europe, that still existed when Reagan left office.
This dissertation explores how differences between Ronald Reagan and George
Bush affected the end of the Cold War, examining Bush’s use of the media, the
restructuring of the National Security Council, the subsequent fundamental shift in
foreign policy approach to the Soviet Union, and the use of personal diplomacy in the
reunification of Germany and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Bush led a transition: a
transition from the Cold War to a post-Cold War world. Bush’s diplomatic strengths
proved as great as his media skills and domestic agenda were weak. Bush and his
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advisors managed the end o f the Cold War, helping it end not with a bang, but a
peaceful whimper. This dissertation is funded by a Peter and Edith O’Donnell Grant
from the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and is based on interviews with
Bush administration officials such as Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Colin Powell,
Marlin Fitzwater, and Jack Matlock, plus many recently declassified documents.

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Introduction
The end o f the Cold War has brought about a reinvigoration o f the debate over how
historians examine the Cold War period. John Lewis Gaddis, in particular, has drawn a
distinction between “old” Cold War history and “new” Cold War history. Before the
end of the Cold War, Gaddis suggests, American historians gave the United States
disproportionate attention, wrote a history of a war before they knew the outcome, and
emphasized interests, which they defined in material terms. Gaddis views these as
deficiencies and welcomes the “new” Cold War history, with its multiarchival attempt
to draw upon the records of all major participants, its ability to place the Cold War
within a broader comparative framework because it knows both the beginning and the
end, and its emphasis on ideas—what people believed, or wanted to believe. Elizabeth
Cobbs Hoffman hails the New Diplomatic History as making a “contribution to a
fuller representation of American life by portraying the interaction between the United
States and the rest of the world and then tightly braiding that story together with both
domestic and world history.”1But in many respects, much o f the “new” Cold War
history is a reconceptualization of older approaches to the study of American foreign
relations that have been around since its inception. In reality, there is little that is
methodologically new in the “new” Cold War history approaches. In a rush to produce
a truly international history, behavior of western leaders has been neglected in favor of
revelations from the archives of the former Soviet Union. Although Gaddis hails this
as “affirmative action,” it has distorted the current view o f the Bush administration in

l
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particular, one covered almost entirely by “new” Cold War historians.2 The Cold War
can now be placed in its historical context. Members o f Reagan’s and Bush’s foreign
policymaking apparatus, however, did not know the outcome nor were they privy to
archival information now available. They made their decisions and shaped policies
with the same blinders that Gaddis sees as deficiencies of the “old” Cold War
historians. Modem Cold War historians, whether “old” or “new,” should place the
Cold War within its proper context and examine the decisions made by people at the
highest levels, remembering the perceptions under which the participants at the time
operated. This requires a synthesis of the two approaches. Finally, the importance of
ideas over interests that is advocated by much o f the “new” Cold War history has
produced a distorted picture of the final years o f the Cold War. As Gaddis explains:
The ‘new’ Cold War history will take ideas seriously: here the way the conflict
ended is bound to reshape our view of how it began and evolved. For the
events of 1989-91 make sense only in terms of ideas. There was no military
defeat or economic crash; but there was a collapse of legitimacy. The people of
one Cold War empire suddenly realized that its emperors had no clothes on. As
in the classic tale, though, the insight resulted from a shift in how people
thought, not from any change in what they saw.3
According to this view, the participants were only important in regards to the ideas
that they promoted. That is why Reagan and Gorbachev, who embraced strong
ideological rhetoric, are seen as the major players and why Bush, who, in the words of
his press secretary, “didn’t give a damn about his public image,” was seen as a

1Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a
Global American History,” Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 500.
2 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, vol.
17, no.l (Winter 1993): 9.
3 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), 283.
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non-factor4 This view discounts the type o f practical diplomatic negotiations that led
to the end o f the division o f Europe and neglects the fact that decisions were made for
purely political or economic reasons rather than because of ideology. This is not meant
to diminish the importance of ideology during this period but simply to underscore
that ideology alone does not explain the end of the Cold War. The Cold War was a
process that only came to an end when there was a resolution o f the ideological
differences as well as the material interests of both sides. This study seeks to examine
that process to determine what role the Bush administration played in ending the Cold
War.
The end of the Cold War is a process that has engendered much debate among
specialists in the history o f foreign relations; to the general public it is quite simple. A
political event, the end o f the Cold War is seen as the action of personality. Causation
is thus reduced to the story of Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush:
(1) The defense buildup and Cold War rhetoric of Reagan’s foreign policy
convinced the Soviet Union that it could not win an arms race. Despite
Reagan’s stem talk about the Soviet Union being “an evil empire,” he was
determined to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviets
(2) Gorbachev represented a new generation of Soviet leaders. He set about to
aggressively improve East-West foreign relations in order to free his
energies and financial resources so that he could address pressing domestic
problems
(3) By the time Bush came to office, the Cold War was winding down. A
caretaker president, Bush simply continued the polices set by Reagan,
finished negotiating the arms treaties, and performed some simple “clean
up” diplomacy
Such an explanation distorts the end o f the Cold War. It personalizes complex
situations and processes and obscures the truth that the participants often had
complicated motives and confused, often contradictory, objectives. As a result, such
4 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
3
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symbolic explanation does not adequately portray the process by which the political
actors ended the Cold War.s Historians must, however, examine symbolic language so
that a clear perception o f the end of the Cold War emerges. Some authors rushed
books to press before the Cold War had even concluded.6 Others simply updated
earlier work to include a few new chapters on the last years of the Cold War.7None of
these books examine the Bush presidency carefully. Books that focus on Bush attack
his deficiencies in domestic policy and his inability to deal with the press.8 The books
written about George Bush and foreign affairs centered almost exclusively on the
Persian Gulf War. One of the few exceptions is Michael Beschloss and Strobe
Talbott’s book, At the Highest Levels, which attempts to describe the last few years of
the Cold War.9 It is based entirely on interviews with officials for whom the authors
will neither name nor provide transcripts. Almost a decade after these interviews were
conducted, they remain closed. The one area where there has been a wealth of
5 See for example Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End
o f the Cold War (Columbia: Missouri UP, 1997); Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand:
Gorbachev and the Collapse o f East Germany (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992).
6 William G. Hyland, The Cold War is Over (New York: Random House, 1990); Allen
Lynch, The Cold War is Over—Again (Boulder: Westview, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis,
The United States and the End o f the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations,
Provocations (New York: Oxford, 1992).
7 See for example Raymond L. Gartoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet
Relations and the End o f the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994); Don
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet
Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998).
8 See for example Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status
Quo Presidency o f George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Charles Kolb,
White House Daze: The Unmaking o f Domestic Policy in the Bush Years (New York:
Free Press, 1994); David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency
(New York: S t Martin’s, 1996); Mark J. Rozell, The Press and the Bush Presidency
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
9 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

4
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published material concerning the Bush administration and the end of the Cold War
has come in the form of a multitude of memoirs, diaries, and papers o f Bush
administration officials.10There have also been several memoirs from foreign officials
that figured prominently in the ending of the Cold War.11 Supporting these accounts
has been the release of many official documents from both American and Soviet
archives. This dissertation draws on these sources, plus the author’s interviews with
prominent Bush administration officials, such as James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin
Powell, Jack Matlock, and Marlin Fitzwater, to gain a clearer understanding of the
process that led to the end of the Cold War.
George Bush entered the presidency constantly compared and contrasted with
his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Lacking Reagan’s eloquence and adept use of the
media, Bush was lambasted by the press as Reagan’s “lapdog” and labeled a “wimp.”
The press pushed Bush to be more Reaganesque: to establish themes to match policy
goals and to use the bully pulpit to lead national debate. His refusal to make thematic
addresses and create a “line of the day” for daily news cycles prompted journalists to
10 See for example George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New
York: Knopf, 1998); George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and
Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999); James A. Baker with Thomas M.
DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New
York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1995); Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy On An Empire: The
American Ambassador’s Account ofthe Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York:
Random House, 1995); Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey
(New York: Random House, 1995); Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and
Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times
Books, 1995); Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard, 1995).
11 See for example Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Boris
Yeltsin, The Struggle fo r Russia (New York: Times Books, 1994); Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect o f Germany’s
Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998).

5
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characterize the Bush presidency as lacking an agenda. One difficulty that the Bush
staff encountered in attempts to create a positive media image originated in the fact
that Bush, did not like being “handled.” Unlike Reagan, who would meticulously
memorize entire speeches written by his advisors, Bush rarely stayed faithful to a
prepared text, preferring merely to use it as an outline from which he would ad lib.
This provided ample room for mistakes as well as unfocused messages that did not
make clear the administration’s agenda. Too much access compounded the problem:
Bush held more than 280 twenty-minute press conferences open to questions on any
subject. Bush was more accessible to the media than any other modem president
before him, yet he has been viewed as failing miserably in his relations with the press,
especially when compared to Reagan. The problem lay in how each man viewed the
role of media. Bush felt that it was his obligation to meet with the press, a task to be
endured, a task less important than governing. Reagan, on the other hand, relished the
time he spent in front of audiences and the camera and utilized the media to promote a
positive image of himself and his policies. Reagan’s success with the media and
Bush's failure have produced a misconception about the success and failure of each
president’s policies, especially in foreign policy where most Americans’ opinions are
based on information filtered through the media. Part of Bush’s problem was of his
own making. During his term as vice president, Bush refused to disagree publicly with
President Reagan, even during the Iran-Contra Affair. One of the main drawbacks of
Bush’s quiet loyalty to Reagan was that it did not allow him to establish a strong
image that was distinct and independent of Reagan. His weak image intensified during
the 1988 election when Bush billed himself as the candidate of continuity. The vice

6
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president who had faithfully served an enormously popular president pledged to
continue in his footsteps. Bush won the election of 1988 on the strength of Reagan’s
popularity, along with negative campaign ads attacking his inept Democratic
opponent, Michael Dukakkis. The campaign rhetoric, however, did more than just win
Bush the election—it shaped how the public, and many historians, viewed these years.
Thus, the period is usually referred to as simply the “Reagan-Bush years,” indicating
that Bush’s term can best be explained as Reagan’s third term. This is partly a result of
the misconception that the Cold War was basically over by the end of the Reagan
administration and that Bush merely signed agreements Reagan had already
negotiated. This ignores the instability of the Soviet Union, as well as the potentially
explosive situation in Central and Eastern Europe that still existed when Reagan left
office. This image was compounded by Bush’s poor media skills, a subject central to
this dissertation.
Bush did not merely continue on the foreign policy path set by Reagan. He
made a fundamental shift in foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. Determined to
make his own mark, Bush appointed Brent Scowcroft, a vocal critic of the way the
Reagan administration had managed foreign policy, as his national security advisor.
During arms control negotiations, Reagan emphasized numbers, eliminating certain
kinds of weapons. Scowcroft believed that simply getting rid of certain kinds of
weapons did not achieve the overall goal of arms control, which was to improve
stability. Instead, he wanted to reduce the chances that in a crisis either side would
resort to the use of nuclear weapons for fear of some vulnerability in the nuclear
arsenal. This goal could not be accomplished simply by a shift in numbers. He wanted

7
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to shift the focus from aims control to Eastern Europe, to encourage the Red Army to
leave Eastern Europe. This meant de-emphasizing arms control until the situation in
Eastern Europe unfolded, something that would require a fundamental change in U.S.
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Bush gave Scowcroft the authority needed to
make such a change by issuing National Security Directive I , which reorganized the
National Security Council. Bush’s years of experience in foreign affairs led to a more
hands-on approach markedly different than Reagan’s desire to delegate foreign policy
decision-making authority. Bush enjoyed debating issues with his advisors. He asked
question after question, provoking people to defend their views. This helped him
clarify the issues in his own mind and allowed him to make what he felt were prudent,
well-reasoned decisions. This was a markedly different process than that which
occurred during the Reagan administration. Reagan’s seventh national security
advisor, Colin Powell, described Reagan’s National Security Council as “rudderless,
drifting, demoralized.”12Reagan downgraded the post of national security advisor
shortly after taking office. For the first time since the National Security Council’s
creation in 1947, the national security advisor lost direct access to the president.
Reagan made clear that the State Department would handle foreign affairs decisions in
his administration while the National Security Administration would “integrate”
policies proposed by the State Department. Reagan established a complex web of
planning groups that allowed officials, such as Colonel Oliver North, to establish
personal domains. Lack of cooperation became evident during the Iran-Contra Affair.
Bush’s National Security Council, conversely, was an inner circle of highly
12John Barry and Evan Thomas, “Colin Powell: Behind the Myth,” Newsweek, 5

8
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experienced men who enjoyed Bush’s complete confidence. At the center were Brent
Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, both o f whom, along with the
president, would prove to be the chief architects of Bush’s foreign policy. These three
men, who had been friends since their days working in the Ford administration,
formed an experienced triumvirate that ensured foreign policy decisions would be
made only at the highest levels.
The Bush administration decided to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union. The press interpreted the “pause” as another sign of
Bush’s lack of vision. In 1988-89, as the United States entered a critical period of
foreign policy, many pundits wondered if Bush was the right man to replace Reagan.
Bush had to prove to the press, accustomed to the public, charismatic styles of Ronald
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, that his private, quiet style o f diplomacy could be
effective. Bush spent most of the summer of 1989 addressing the changes that were
taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. He did not urge ferment in Eastern
Europe. Instead, he encouraged incremental reform at a pace not threatening to the
Soviets. Bush hoped to promote change, not direct intervention. Bush made two
European trips to further this goal. The first, in the spring o f 1989, was to Western
Europe and coincided with the NATO summit scheduled to celebrate the
organization’s fortieth anniversary. The second was in the summer o f 1989 and
focused on Eastern Europe, ending with the G-7 economic summit in Paris. These two
presidential trips, along with domestic speeches scheduled for the commencement
season, gave the administration the opportunity to lay out its new policy initiatives and
March 2001 ,36.

9
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put pressure on other governments to respond. This was, in reality, a diplomatic
offensive that finally allowed the new administration to break free from the Reaganera policies and forge a new course more in line with Scowcroft’s goal o f capitalizing
on ferment in Eastern Europe. On November 9,1989, East Germany relaxed its
border-control policy with West Germany. Bush received news o f the fall of the Berlin
Wall with much personal pleasure, but in public expressed caution. He feared that a
Western celebration of the wall’s collapse might encourage a backlash by hard-liners
in East Berlin and Moscow. To a skeptical public, Bush’s actions built upon the
images created by his lengthy foreign policy review and upon his timid reaction to the
Tiananmen Square massacre. This indicated that Bush, as a symbolic leader, could not
follow in the steps of Reagan. What the public did not know was that Bush was acting
on a request sent to him by Gorbachev that very day. Bush hoped that his
acquiescence to Gorbachev’s request would prove fruitful in the meeting the two men
were scheduled to share the following month. In December 1989, during a historic
meeting in Malta, Bush sought to test the intentions of the Soviet Union, to move
beyond the Containment Doctrine that had dominated U.S. Cold War policy, and to
establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Soviet relationship that
was fostered by Malta would be essential in ensuring that reform meant political and
economic progress rather than chaos and disorder. George Bush’s quiet style achieved
what he most wanted—the peaceful transfer of power in Eastern Europe.
President Bush used the new U.S.-Soviet relationship that he had forged at
Malta to gain Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany within NATO. This acceptance
occurred over a period of months involving private meetings, letters, and phone

to
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conversations between leaders from both the East and W est Personal diplomacy
proved decisive. Bush used personal diplomacy to achieve what had seemed
unthinkable. Convincing the Soviet Union to allow a unified Germany to remain in
NATO was an important foreign policy achievement for the Bush administration. To
achieve this goal, the United States created the Two-Plus-Four plan, which provided a
diplomatic process for carrying out rapid reunification in a way that everyone
accepted. The first step was to unite Western leaders. Bush accomplished this through
extensive meetings, letters, and telephone conversations with Western leaders. This
was particularly important in relations with Helmut Kohl. Bush had to make sure that
the Germans would remain in NATO. Bush ensured Kohl’s partnership by offering
him full support for his plan for German reunification. The Bush-Kohl meeting at
Camp David on February 24,1990 proved crucial. Persuading the Soviets to accept
what had been difficult even for some Western leaders to accept proved much more
difficult. America’s strategy depended on Western solidarity and Soviet unwillingness,
or inability, to take decisive action. Persuading a defeated Soviet Union to accept a
major realignment of the European balance of power meant waiting for an opening.
That occurred when Gorbachev simply could not provide an acceptable alternative to
the position taken by the United States. Not having an acceptable solution of his own,
facing increasing domestic problems, and desperately needing foreign financial
assistance, Gorbachev broke with hard-liners and agreed on June 1,1990, at the
Washington Summit, to allow, in principle, a unified Germany to remain in NATO.
Bush persuaded Gorbachev to be more flexible about German membership in NATO;
in return, Gorbachev reached a trade agreement with the United States to help his

ll
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struggling domestic economy. Bush set out to eliminate Gorbachev's remaining
reservations by pushing through a plan for a new NATO structure, which would
change NATO's traditional role to that o f a political alliance. On July 14,1990, during
a meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, Gorbachev agreed to German reunification
within NATO without conditions or reservations in exchange for massive German
economic assistance. The Washington Summit allowed Gorbachev to accept the final
terms without, at least in his mind, appearing to concede to Western ultimatums. The
reunification o f Germany within NATO, in conjunction with the withdrawal of Soviet
troops in Eastern Europe, marked the end of the Cold War.
The new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was
evident during the Persian Gulf War when the Bush administration was able to garner
Soviet support for UN resolutions against Iraq. Soviet support of coalition efforts
against a former Soviet client state could not have taken place during the Cold War.
As former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock suggests, Soviet
support of the United States during the Gulf War proved the Cold War rivalry had
ended.13 Members of the press now accused him of being too loyal to Gorbachev. This
relationship was jeopardized in August 1991, as a coup attempt sought to remove
Gorbachev from power. The Bush administration had always been worried about hard
liners in Moscow. In fact, one of the reasons that the Bush administration had been
slow in embracing Gorbachev was an uncertainty as to whether he would stay in
power. Thanks to determined maneuverings of Boris Yeltsin and George Bush, the
coup collapsed. Yeltsin’s actions made him a force to be reckoned with, and

12
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Gorbachev faced a very difficult political situation. Central Soviet authority declined
at an accelerated rate and the Communist Party was discredited. This did not go
unnoticed by Bush, who switched his support to Yeltsin. The failed coup accelerated
the rise of Yeltsin and the republics and the demise of Gorbachev and the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev urged a union of sovereign states, a confederate state that would
carry out the functions delegated to it by the various republics. Yeltsin wanted a
commonwealth o f fully independent states. The decision was reached during a secret
meeting held by Yeltsin and other republic leaders in the first days of December 1991.
Only after the leaders reached full agreement and called Bush to ask for his support
did Yeltsin call Gorbachev to inform him on what had been decided. A furious
Gorbachev relinquished his duties as president and the USSR came to an end. During
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a long process that began with the August
coup and ended with Gorbachev’s resignation on Christmas day, Bush played a pivotal
role in the peaceful transition of power between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
President Bush was a cautious pragmatist who preferred gradual change to
reckless impatience that might lead to disorder. The result was a foreign policy based
on personal diplomacy and incremental change. This brought criticism from those who
favored bold action. Bush’s preference for quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomatic
maneuvering made for slow newsdays but good leadership. An unflattering media
image, however, affected Bush’s public approval ratings, which steadily declined
following the end o f the Persian Gulf War in early 1991. This, combined with a flawed
domestic agenda, led to his defeat in 1992. No one leader can be credited with ending
13Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of
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the Cold War. Neither Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, or any other
single leader had that much impact But each influenced when and how that end would
occur with both their foreign policy successes and mistakes. Ultimately, the Soviet
Union could not afford to maintain the high level o f defense spending that was
bankrupting the country. In order to achieve domestic economic reforms, the rationale
for the Red Army had to be broken; a “gilded age” of Soviet power ended. This forced
Gorbachev to loosen his grip on Eastern Europe, unleashing forces that he could not
control. Bush, to his credit, skillfully managed the end of the Cold War. It was during
Bush’s administration that the Cold War ended and Germany was reunited. The
United States led the alliance that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi control; and the Soviet
Union collapsed and the former Soviet Bloc countries began the transition to
democracy and market economies. Bush led a transition: a transition from the Cold
War to a post-Cold War world. Bush’s diplomatic strengths proved as great as his
media skills and domestic agenda were weak. This dissertation explains how the Bush
administration managed the end of the Cold War, helping it end not with a bang, but a
peaceful whimper.

American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
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-Chapter 1Media Image Building:
Reagan, Bush, and the “Wimp” Factor
January 21, 1985, was an extremely cold day in Washington, D.C. So cold, in fact,
that the inaugural parade was cancelled; President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural address
was held in the Rotunda of the Capitol rather than on the West Portico o f the Capitol.1
The cold weather outside, however, did not stop the seventy-four-year-old Reagan
from using rhetorical skills honed in nearly forty years of public speaking. He began
with a silent prayer, combining politics with religion. His ability to infuse secular
political events with religious ritual gave his speeches a sacred quality. No president
since Franklin D. Roosevelt had used such spiritually laden rhetoric so effectively.
Reagan combined this rhetoric with an emphasis on heroes such as George
Washington, value-centered appeals to freedom and progress, and repentance and
reformation of the existing order with a prophecy of a God-given destiny for the
United States. This mix entailed heavy use o f anecdotes and examples. Reagan was a
master storyteller; his audiences were treated to simple stories that had at their center a
moral, political, or economic lesson.2
Reagan began his public speaking career in the late 1940s, giving speeches in
opposition to communism while co-chair of the Motion Picture Industry Council and a
board member of the Screen Actors Guild. His early political career was based on
1Ronald Reagan, Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: Ronald Reagan,
1980-1988,1985, Book I- January 1 to June 28, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1988), 55-58.
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strong anticommunist rhetoric. He joined the Republican Party to be in the company
o f other right-wing spokesmen, such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy. The
rhetoric o f Reagan's early career permeated his political terminology, culminating in
his 1987 reference to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” Reagan’s ability as
president to communicate with the American public did not suddenly materialize, nor
was it a natural ability that Reagan possessed from the beginning. The skills he used as
an orator, as well as the themes that he would stress as president, slowly developed
over a long career. At the heart of this process was Reagan’s commitment to oratorical
perfection. Reagan’s orations over four decades were extremely repetitive.3 He loved
stump speeches, given over and over but with slight variation. A former actor, Reagan
knew that the more he practiced his lines the better he would be at delivering them.
Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said that Reagan memorized his briefings so that he
could recite them almost verbatim. He knew how to follow scripts.4 He was not averse
to using someone else’s words. As president he relied on a staff o f skillful
speechwriters. On taking office, President Reagan gave a packet of old speeches to his
new speechwriters, instructing them to imitate his style and substance.3 Reagan’s style
was so predictable that speechwriters, however many came and went, could deliver the
same product.6 To Reagan, careful planning and practice were the keys to gaining the
2 Kurt Ritter and David Henry, Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator (New York:
Greenwood, 1992), xiiv-xvi.
3 Ibid, 119.
4 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade
with Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 112.
5 Paul D. Erickson, Reagan Speaks: The Making o f an American Myth (New York:
New York University Press, 1985), 8.
6 William Ker Muir, Jr., The Bully Pulpit: The Presidential Leadership o f Ronald
Reagan (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992), 50.
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greatest audience approval. This does not mean that Reagan was vulnerable in
unrehearsed question-and-answer sessions such as press conferences. He had collected
more than forty years worth of stories, anecdotes, briefings, and stump speeches that
he could apply to current situations. Reagan also proved adept at anticipating
situations where a well-rehearsed line could have a big impact. In his 1980 debate with
Jimmy Carter, Reagan is remembered for what appeared to be a spur-of-the-moment
put-down of Carter: “There you go again.”7 The “impromptu” line, however, had been
carefully rehearsed to be used in situations when Carter attempted to place emphasis
on potentially dangerous charges against Reagan.8 He would use that same line in a
1984 debate with Walter Mondale.9 Reagan had trouble remembering people’s names
and even the previous day’s office schedule; he could, however, remember the scripts
that he had worked so hard to perfect10
Reagan enjoyed an impressive mastery of the television medium. According to
Peter Hannaford, Reagan’s chief speechwriter, 1974-80, “Ronald Reagan knew that
television is the most personal of the media. He knew that when he looked into the
camera, he was really looking at one person, or one family, seated before a set in the
living room. What he would have with them was a quiet conversation, just as if he was

7 1980 Presidential Debate, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, 28 October 1980,
Cleveland, video footage provided by C-SPAN.
8 J. Jeffrey Auer, “Acting Like A President; or, What Has Ronald Reagan Done To
Political Speaking?,” Reagan and Public Discourse in America, Michael Weiler and
W. Barnett Pearce, eds. (Tuscaloosa, University o f Alabama Press, 1992), 97-98.
9 1984 Presidential Debate, Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale, 7 October 1984,
Louisville, video footage provided by C-SPAN.
10Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 120.
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in the living room with them.”11Reagan himself recalls how he learned how to
communicate with people while working as a sports announcer:
I had a group of friends in Des Moines and we all happened to go to the same
barber. My friends would sometimes sneak away from their offices or other
jobs when I was broadcasting a game and they’d get together at the barbershop
to listen to it; after a while, I began to picture these friends down at the shop
when I was on the air and, knowing they were there, I’d try to imagine how my
words sounded to them and how they were reacting, and I’d adjust accordingly
and spoke as if I was speaking personally to them. There was a specific
audience out there I could see in my mind, and I sort of aimed my words at
them. After I did that, something ftmny happened: I started getting mail from
people all over the Midwest who told me I sounded as if I was talking directly
and personally to them. Over the years I’ve always remembered that, and when
I’m speaking to a crowd—or on television—I try to remember that audiences
are made up of individuals and I try to speak as if I am talking to a group of
friends... not to millions, but to a handful of people in a living room... or a
barbershop.12
This ability to make each audience member feel that he was talking directly to them
served Reagan well during the course o f his political career. In the end, Reagan was
not given the title Great Communicator for his clear speaking or writing. The word
communication is derived from the Latin comunico, which can mean “to share” and
“to unite, to join together.” Reagan’s achievement in communication came from his
view of it as “a unifying process of commitment to the values and beliefs presented by
the communicator.”13By that technical definition, Reagan’s mastery of
communication was unparalleled.
Reagan used all of his polished communication skills during his 1985
inaugural address. He spoke to the American public “as a benign and genial uncle”14
11 Peter Hannaford, The Reagans: A Political Portrait (New York: Coward-McCann,
1983), 296.
12Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 246-247.
13 Erickson, Reagan Speaks, 1.
14 Ritter and Henry, Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator, xiv.
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whose honest advice would reunite America with its God-given role as a chosen land.
He reached them through the common bond of emotion that transcended the
differences found in America. Near the end of his speech, he turned to the issue of
safety and security for the United States. He prefaced his remarks with an affirmation
of the ancient prayer for peace on Earth. Reminiscent o f his earlier attacks on
communism, he blamed the Soviet Union for conducting “the greatest military buildup

in the history of man.” Alluding to ongoing negotiations, he made a statement that
would never have been found in his first inaugural address. Rejecting the principle of
mutual assured destruction (MAD), Reagan proclaimed that the United States was
committed to “the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the
earth.” He expressed his commitment to creating for the American public a security
shield that would destroy nuclear missiles before they reached their target and
promised to work with the Soviets to eliminate the threat o f nuclear destruction.13This
statement had its origins in a speech given almost exactly one year prior in the East
Room of the White House on United States-Soviet Relations. In that speech of January
16,1984, Reagan reversed his foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, marking an
important turning point in the Cold War.16Reagan declared his support of a zero
option for all nuclear arms and declared that his dream was to see the “day when
nuclear weapons will be banished from the face o f the earth.” This would lead to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). He also called for the mutual military
withdrawal from the third world and promised to establish a better working
15Public Papers o f the President ofthe United States, Ronald Reagan 1981-1988,5558.
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relationship with the Soviet Union, marked by greater cooperation and understanding
and built on deeds rather than words. Reagan reminded his audience that the Soviet
Union also wanted to avoid war and reduce the level of arms and that, while the two
countries had differences, they could find common ground. He ended with a story:
Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and
philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life
for people everywhere. Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and an
Anya could find themselves, oh, say, in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter
from the rain or a storm with a Jim and Sally, and there was no language
barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they then debate the
differences between their respective governments? Or would they find
themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a
living? Before they parted company, they would probably have touched on
ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and problems of
making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would
be saying to Ivan, ‘Wasn’t she nice? She also teaches music.’ Or Jim would be
telling Sally what Ivan did or didn’t like about his boss. They might even have
decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.
Above all, they would have proven that people don’t make wars. People want
to raise their children in a world without fear and without war. They want to
have some of the good things over and above the bare subsistence that make
life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that
gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all
borders.17
In one of the most remarkable speeches ever given by a U.S. president during the Cold
War, Reagan demonstrated that, to him, the most potent weapons of all were a welltold story and faith in the inherent goodness of mankind. The moral of the story was
the same as the lessons taught in all of his stories: Good people would do the right
thing. As Marlin Fitzwater recalls in his memoir, this was the core of Reagan’s
political principles.18In this speech, Reagan was telling the world that the President of
16Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
17Public Papers ofthe President o f the United States, Ronald Reagan 1981-88,44.
18Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 117.
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the United States believed that Americans and Soviets alike were, at their core, good
people. It was a tangible gesture in improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
Many historians credit Mikhail Gorbachev with changing U.S.-Soviet
relations. Reagan’s speech, however, came fifteen months before Gorbachev took
office and more than two years before glasnost and perestroika. By 1985, the Reagan
goal of negotiating from a position of strength had been achieved. The Soviets had
returned to the negotiating table under an altered arms control debate that shifted the
focus away from arms limitation talks and toward a new American reliance on
strategic defense.19 Many critics of Reagan charged him with election-year
propaganda. The Democrats charged that Reagan had been drawn back to the center in
an effort to increase his chances for reelection. Reagan had, according to his critics,
abandoned his ideology in favor of pragmatism. The fact that he made his speech the
day before a scheduled Democratic primary debate only served to fuel speculation.
Considering that up to that point the Reagan administration had used a vehement
anticommunist rhetoric, it is easy to see why his sudden change in positions would be

questioned. In order to understand this sudden change, one must look at how these
types of decisions were made in the Reagan administration. Lou Cannon has explained
that Reagan practiced “a delegative style of decision-making.”20 Reagan was a master
communicator to the American public; however, he rarely supplied his subordinates
with clearly defined tasks. This would place increased importance on the fact that both
Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane
19 William G. Hyland, “East-West Relations,” Gorbachev's Russia and American
Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds. (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1988), 441.
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favored a more conciliatory policy approach to the Soviet Union.21 This suggests that
Schultz and McFarlane were responsible for the decision to change U.S. policy toward
the Soviet Union. That explanation, however, does not explain the timing for the
change. Nor does it take into account that although Reagan did practice a somewhat
“hands-off” presidency, he had the ability to focus on an issue that especially
interested him and lead policy making on the issue with little regard to his advisors.22
The threat o f nuclear war was just such an issue. The foundation o f the U.S.-Soviet
policies concerning arms control had been the theory of mutual assured destruction
(MAD) in which safety was achieved as long as each side possessed enough power to
destroy the other. Reagan felt that such a doctrine was morally reprehensible because
o f the unthinkable number of people that would be annihilated in full-scale nuclear
war. Reagan described the MAD policy as “having two westerners standing in a
saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently.”23
Early in his administration, Reagan did not feel that nuclear war was imminent.
To him, the Cold War was first and foremost a war of words. Reagan’s political career
had been based on strident rhetoric; he felt the accusations exchanged between the
Kremlin and the White House were simple political posturing. At some point near the

end of his first term in office, however, Reagan became obsessed with the idea that a
nuclear war would soon erupt if a change was not made in U.S.-Soviet policy. The
cause for Reagan’s change of perspective included an attack by a Soviet jet fighter on
20 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 371.
21 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End o f the Cold War
(Colombia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 74.
22 A clear example o f this is Reagan’s total support for SDI even when the vast
majority of his advisors and experts warned him that it was impossible.
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a Korean airliner that was flying from Alaska to Seoul with 269 people on board,
including 61 Americans.24 The plane had accidentally drifted 360 miles off course
and had twice flown over Soviet airspace. The Soviet Air Defense Command sent a
Sukhoi-15 fighter to intercept the plane. Claiming that he did not recognize the Boeing
747 as a commercial jetliner, the Soviet Pilot locked his radar on the plane. After
receiving the orders to shoot, he fired two missiles at the airliner just as it was exiting
Soviet airspace and about to reenter international airspace. The missiles struck the tail
and tore off half of the left wing, forcing the plane to crash into the ocean at a speed of
several hundred miles an hour. The downing o f KAL Flight 007 in the fall of 1983
occurred thanks to a series of mistakes by the Soviets and a crackdown by Soviet
leader Yuri Andropov, who had instituted a tough new “Law on the State Border.”
The law was meant to address sloppy military discipline, but had the effect of
intimidating Soviet military officers who carried out the law’s requirements like
“unthinking robots.”25 The lack o f communication between the Kremlin and the White
House following the incident worsened the situation. Initially, the Soviets denied that
they had shot down the plane. When it became obvious that the plane had been shot
down, the Soviets claimed that the pilot of the airliner had refused a demand to land at
the nearest airfield. The Soviets finally admitted that they had shot down the airliner;
however, they claimed that it was on a “deliberate, thoroughly planned intelligence

23 Reagan, An American Life, 547.
24 For a complete explanation o f Reagan’s change in thinking see The Reagan
Reversal by Beth A. Fischer.
25 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random
House, 1995), 283-284.
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operation,” directed from the United States and Japan.26 It would not be until the
collapse o f the Soviet Union that the full story would be known. The following year
the hotline between the two capitols would be upgraded radically through the use of a
facsimile machine in an effort to avoid the confusion that had surrounded the tragic
incident. A little over a month after the KAL Flight 007 downing, the president
attended a private screening o f an ABC television movie “The Day After,” which
showed the horrors of nuclear holocaust. Reagan’s diary entry for that day details his
reaction:
In the morning at Camp D. I ran the tape of the movie ABC is running Nov.
20. It’s called “The Day After” in which Lawrence, Kansas, is wiped out in a
nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It’s very
effective and left me greatly depressed. So far they haven’t sold any of the 25
ads scheduled and I can see why... My own reaction: we have to do all we can
to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war.27
Reagan had always been affected most by visual images, stories, and emotions. His
foreign policy advisors even abandoned the usual briefing books in favor o f short
films. The ABC movie brought home the “realities” of a nuclear war to Reagan in a
way that briefing books could never have done. Less than a month after viewing “The
Day After,” Reagan attended his first Pentagon briefing on nuclear war. Having
refused to attend such meetings during the first two years of his presidency, Reagan
participated in what he would later describe as “a most sobering experience.”28 The
Pentagon report detailed a sequence of events that could lead to complete world
annihilation. The sequence of events described in the report bore striking similarities

to the ABC movie. What concerned Reagan even more was the fact that many people
26 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 283.
27 Reagan, An American Life, 585.
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in that meeting still described nuclear war as “winnable.” Reagan recalled thinking
these men were crazy and worried that Soviet generals might also be thinking in terms
o f winning a nuclear war.29 The final event in that sobering sequence of events
occurred in early November during a large-scale NATO military exercise named Able
Archer 83, which sought to test nuclear release mechanisms. The Soviets were
suspicious of the exercise and worried that the NATO war games were really
camouflaging preparation for an actual attack on the Soviet Union. The KGB had
become convinced by the Reagan rhetoric that a nuclear first strike had become a
serious possibility and instituted a system of Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack alerts in
1981.30 Now this system sprang into effect in an effort to counter Abel Archer 83.
Fearing an impending nuclear attack, the Soviets discussed launching a preemptive
nuclear attack. As perhaps the most dangerous Cold War moment since the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962, Able Archer 83 was viewed by the Reagan administration as a
nuclear “near-miss.” As Robert McFarlane would later recall, the “war scare” had a
“big influence” on Reagan’s subsequent approach to the Soviet Union.31
The events o f 1983 had convinced Reagan that nuclear war was a real
possibility. The biblical prophecy of Armageddon permeated Reagan’s thoughts in
1983-84. In response to this threat, Reagan recalled making a conscious decision to
“switch to a more hands-on approach” concerning arms reduction. From then on,
Reagan consulted only with George Bush, George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, and
28 Ibid., 585.
29 Ibid., 586.
30 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 66.
31 Fischer, The Reagan Reversal, 135-136.
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Robert McFarlane to develop a plan for U.S.-Soviet policy.32 Reagan became
committed to the doctrine o f strategic defense and the actual reduction o f nuclear
arsenals. His proposal for a space-based strategic defense shield that would protect the
United States from a nuclear attack was called SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative).
Critics quickly labeled it “Star Wars” and charged that it was unrealistic. Reagan,
however, was determined to bequeath to future generations o f Americans a protective
shield that would allow them to live without fear o f nuclear destruction. As Marlin
Fitzwater recalls, Reagan’s faith in SDI was so great that “Reagan’s staff twice
intercepted a Reagan written speech insert about the prospect of an alien force
threatening the earth from space, thereby bringing all the countries o f the world
together in a Steven Spielberg defense of mankind.”33 Reagan had not given much
thought to the technical specifics of SDI when he introduced it. Unlike Jimmy Carter,
who was a very intelligent nuclear engineer, Reagan was not prone to deep thinking in
the field o f nuclear strategy.34 Consequently, he tended to see the announcement of his
SDI proposal as an end in itself.33 Reagan preferred to say, in short: the problem is
nuclear war, the solution is SDI: “let’s do it.”36 This approach, as one study o f SDI
concludes, “appealed to Reagan’s image of Uncle Sam as an enterprising, selfsufficient, fix-it man with more trust in his own common sense than in what the

32 Reagan, An American Life, 594.
33 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 245.
34 Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, Reagan: The Man and H is Presidency
ffioston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 569.
Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York:
Vintage, 1987), 129.
36 Reagan, An American Life, 547.
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know-it-alls might say.”37 While critics o f the program relied on the fact that SDI was
probably not feasible and would cost more than most taxpayers would be willing to
pay, Reagan relied on his political instincts. To Reagan, the fact that the idea was easy
to understand was more important than whether or not the physics and engineering
would be feasible. SDI could never be fully tested unless there was nuclear war. Even
then the system would have to be 100 percent effective or tens of millions o f
Americans would die.
The Soviets were terrified o f SDI because they assumed that a U.S. president
would not place complete faith in a program unless he was certain that it could be
achieved. Indeed, three-fourths o f the Soviet propaganda budget in 1984,198S, and
1986 was directed solely against SDI.38 What frustrated Soviet leaders even more was
the fact that Reagan refused to abolish SDI in exchange for Soviet concessions of any
kind. As George Schultz recalls, “Whenever we got together with the Soviets in the
Reagan-Gorbachev meetings, SDI was always on Gorbachev’s mind. He seemed
almost ready to concede anything if he could only manage to deep-six that program.”39
As Marlin Fitzwater recalls, another consideration was the sheer economic strength
that would be needed for a Soviet response to SDI:
In all the summit meetings that I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev, everyone
o f them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI. That
was the objective, and the reason was because they always thought it was an
offensive system. President Reagan presented it as a defensive shield, but they
always thought we were going to get up in space, build some platform, and
then launch a nuclear attack on Russia. And their problem was that they felt
they couldn’t afford to match i t And so, they knew . . . that’s when they started
37 Mandelbaum and Talbott Reagan and Gorbachev, 130.
38 Peter Hannaford, ed., Recollections o f Reagan: A Portrait o f Ronald Reagan (New
York: Wiliam Morrow, 1997), 5.
39 Strober and Strober, Reagan: The Man and H is Presidency, 336.
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getting serious about arms reduction. Their view was, we don't have the
money to ever build a space-based system; let's get out o f the arms race. So
they started reducing nuclear weapons.40
This allowed Reagan to have substantial leverage during their arms limitation talks
and allowed him to change the very nature o f these talks. In the past, arms control
talks had focused on limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals. The result had been the
SALT I and the SALT II accords. Reagan, however, wanted to do more than limit the
growth of nuclear arsenals. He wanted to reduce those arsenals, the final goal being
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev, however, demanded that
SDI be abandoned before any arms agreement could be reached. Reagan’s refusal to
make concessions on SDI caused him to turn down arms control proposals at the
Reykjavik summit in October 1986 41 Critics, such as Brent Scowcroft, thought
Reagan’s complete dedication to SDI negated it as a leverage tool:
But my sense is that [SDI] tended rather than to use as leverage to get other
things [the United States] wanted, it tended to stymie the negotiations because
we would never put SDI on the table. So the Russians tended to drag their feet
because of that.
But Reagan never altered his complete faith and commitment to SDI.
Early in his administration, Reagan instituted policies that critics claimed had
“forced the Soviets into a comer from which they might yet lash out in some
unpredictable way.”43 In 1984, Reagan abandoned his confrontational rhetoric,
instituting an extreme modification o f U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. He had
not revised his assessment of communism, which he still felt was a dangerous system
40 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
41 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
42 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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of government. He did soften his image o f the Kremlin, what can be interpreted as the
beginning o f the end of the Cold War. By the time he left the White House, Reagan
had the highest approval rating of any departing president since World War II.44 It
would be up to his successor to bring a final end to the Cold War. Lacking the
rhetorical skills o f his predecessor, George Bush would have to emerge from the
shadow of Reagan and rely on his own strengths to finish the job that Reagan had
begun. As Bush would quickly find out, Reagan would be a tough act to follow.
A New Administration
On January 20,1989, George Bush gave his bicentennial inaugural address at
the West Front of the Capitol.45 Bush began his address the same way he had
conducted his entire vice presidency—by deferring to Reagan: “There is a man here
who has earned a lasting place in our hearts and in our history. President Reagan, on
behalf of our nation, I thank you for the wonderful things that you have done for
America.” With a conviction greater than perhaps any vice president in history,
George Bush believed that his primary role was to be absolutely loyal to the president.
Reagan rewarded this loyalty by including Bush in the policy-making process. Reagan
knew that he could trust Bush completely without fear of leaks to the press or public
disagreements over policy. As a result, Bush was deeply involved in discussions
concerning the Soviet Union during the Reagan presidency. He also was used by
Reagan to meet with new Soviet leaders and provide first impressions. When Soviet
43 Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan (New York: Vintage, 1984), 7.
44 Jane Blankenship and Janette Kenner Muir, “The Transformation o f Actor to Scene:
Some Strategic Grounds of the Reagan Legacy,” Reagan and Public Discourse in
America, Weiler and Pearce, eds., 135.
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leader Leonid I. Brezhnev died in November o f 1982, Reagan sent Bush as head o f an
American delegation to the funeral in Moscow.46 Bush used his meeting with the new
Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to call for change in U.S.-Soviet relations, to seek “a
world o f greater harmony, not only between the two great superpowers, but for all
nations.” He stressed that his visit signified “the desire of the United States to continue
to work for positive relations between our two countries.”47 Improved relations did not
occur under the leadership o f Yuri Andropov. In fact, they steadily declined. Less than
two years later, Bush again traveled to Moscow to attend the funeral of a Soviet
leader, this time Andropov’s. White House officials hoped that Bush’s trip could be
used to signal Reagan’s desire for better relations with the Soviet Union and to
propose a meeting between Reagan and the new leader. Preparations for the trip were
made in Washington during meetings led by Bush. Reagan was on vacation at a
mountaintop ranch, enjoying daily rides on horseback. He was kept abreast of the
situation by periodic calls from Bush.48 This shows that Reagan was comfortable
leaving crucial decisions in the hands of his vice president. Following Andropov’s
funeral, Bush had a 30-minute talk with the new Soviet leader, Konstantin
Chernenko.49 In an official statement following the meeting, Bush stressed Reagan’s
“determination to move forward in all areas of our relationship with the Soviets, and
45 George Bush, Public Papers o f the President ofthe United States: George Bush,
1989-1993,1989, Book I (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1-4.
46 Murray Marder, “Bush, Schultz to Head Delegation to Funeral,” Washington Post,
Saturday, 13 November 1982, sec. A -l.
47 Dusko Doder, “Bush and Schultz Tell Moscow Now Is Time to Repair Ties,”
Washington Post, Monday, 15 November 1982 sec. A-l.
48 Lou Cannon, “Bush to Attend: Reagan Sends Message to Moscow,” Washington
Post, Saturday, 11 February 1984, sec. A1 and sec. A18.
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our readiness for concrete, productive discussions in every one o f them.” Bush insisted
on “deeds and not just words” from the Soviets.50 In March of 1985, Bush represented
the president at Chernenko’s funeral, this time carrying an invitation to the new leader
Mikhail Gorbachev for a summit conference with Reagan. In all, Bush attended the
funerals of three Soviet leaders during the Reagan presidency. Each time Bush was
given the responsibility of being the first representative of the United States to meet
with the new leader, affirming U.S.-policy goals, and reporting his first impressions of
the new leader back to Reagan. Bush had taken an unusually prominent role for a vice
president in forging policies toward the Soviet Union and in taking the lead in meeting
with Soviet leaders. Reagan, however, had complete trust in Bush that was no doubt
solidified by the unquestioning loyalty demonstrated by the vice president.
The “Wimp” Factor
In his inaugural address, Bush shared his view of the changes that were
happening in the world and the opportunities that he would face during his presidency:
“I come before you and assume the presidency at a moment rich with promise.... For a
new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn.... There is
new ground to be broken and new action to be taken.”51 The vast majority of political
observers would agree with the new president that major changes would occur in the
world during the Bush administration. Many of those observers, however, argued that
Bush was not the man for the job. One of the main drawbacks o f Bush’s quiet loyalty
49 Dusko Doder, “Chernenko, Bush Talk 30 Minutes,” Washington Post, Wednesday,
15 February 1984, sec. A l.
50“Bush: ‘We Too Want Deeds’,” Washington Post, Wednesday, 15 February 1984,
sec. A26.
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to Reagan was that it did not allow him to establish a strong image that was distinct
and independent o f Reagan. Consequently, Bush’s bid for the presidency in 1988 was
hampered by his poor image in the media. According to Marlin Fitzwater:
My press strategy was to introduce the vice president to as many reporters as
possible during this period so that by 1988 he would know the press corps.
During the next two years, he gave nearly seventy-five interviews.
Unfortunately, almost every one o f them was bad. The reporters begged him to
criticize President Reagan or tell them the inside story o f the decision-making
process... but he would never oblige. The stories always came out that Bush
was loyal to a fault52
The low point came in 1987 just prior to Bush’s announcement as an official
candidate. Newsweek featured a profile of Bush and pictured him on the cover,
piloting his racing boat with the headline “George Bush: Fighting the ‘Wimp Factor’.”
Even many Republicans conceded that the story by Margaret Garrard Warner was an
in-depth discussion of character, which was a legitimate campaign issue. In the article,
Warner explained that Bush suffered from “a potentially crippling handicap—a
perception that he isn’t strong enough or tough enough for the challenges o f the Oval
Office. That he is, in a single mean word, a wimp.”53 The article, however, did not
really hurt Bush. The real damage came from the picture o f Bush on the cover and the
cover line, which prompted many voters to ask themselves, “Is George Bush a wimp
or isn’t he a wimp?” As Lee Atwater of the Bush campaign explained: “It was not the
story but, guess what, not enough people read Newsweek every week to make any
difference in terms o f national consciousness. But guess what else? I went jogging this
51 George Bush, Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: George Bush,
1989-1993,1989, Book 1,1.
52 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 75.
53 Margaret Garrard Warner, “Bush Battles the ‘Wimp Factor’,” Newsweek, 19
October 1987,29.
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morning and I saw Newsweek on four newsstands. Guess what I saw? The cover.”54
The issue quickly entered the public arena as the cover made its rounds on the weekly
television news talk shows, hosts showing viewers the cover, then debating whether or
not Bush was a wimp. The rest of the media soon chimed in; George Will claimed that
Bush was Reagan’s lap dog; cartoonist Gary Trudeau suggested that Bush’s manhood
was in a blind trust.55 It might seem odd that a former Navy pilot, who received the
Distinguished Flying Cross during World War II, former director of the CIA, and selfmade millionaire Texas Oilman, could be seen as a wimp when compared to a former
actor and radio broadcaster, who never fought in battle.56The real source o f the wimp
label was Bush’s poor media skills. As Bush’s media consultant Roger Ailes
commented: “If everyone in America could just sit down with the guy in his living
room for two minutes, there would be no contest: he would win by a landslide.”57 If
Reagan could play the part of John Wayne, Ailes was confident that Bush could fill
the role of Gary Cooper—strong, silent, slow to anger, and tough in a fight.s8
Unfortunately for Bush, he was being compared to one of the most skillful
communicators in history and the strong, silent type did not play well with the media.
The media made the “wimp” issue a concern for voters by the sheer amount of
attention it received on television and in the press. The public would compare the
54 David R. Runkel, ed., Campaign For President: The Managers Look at '88 (Dover,
Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1989), 63.
55 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency
o f George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 38.
William A. Degregorio, The Complete Book o f U.S. Presidents (New York: Wings
Books, 1993), 632-700.
57 Peter Goldman and Tom Mathews, The Questfo r the Presidency: 1988 (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1989), 191.
58 Ibid.
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would-be president’s strength to Reagan through the joint television appearances that
they made during the Reagan presidency. Reagan was seen as the bold leader; Bush
dutifully in the background. Even Bush’s children admitted that it did not produce a
favorable comparison. Jeb Bush explained that he had “made money betting people
that my dad is taller than Ronald Reagan.”39The simple reality was that “television,
the medium that makes Ronald Reagan larger than life, diminishes George Bush. He
does not project self-confidence, wit or warmth to television viewers. He comes across
instead to many of them as stiff or silly.”60 During his term as vice president, Bush
refused to disagree publicly with President Reagan. Unfortunately for him, it was
probably the one thing that would have established him as his own man and
established for him a separate political identity. But Bush had not publicly disagreed
with Reagan since the two men battled for the Republican presidential nomination in
1980.
The Nashua Debate
One o f Bush’s problems with the media was that he really did not enjoy
campaigning. He viewed it merely as a necessity to get to the more important business
of governing. He did not enjoy having to play to the crowd, and it showed. The fact
that the majority of his public service had been by appointment had allowed Bush to
advance through the ranks without having to learn the painful (at least for modest
types) art o f self-promotion. As his friend Brent Scowcroft explains:
He was much more decisive in moving out in private than he appeared in his
public persona. I think he was deeply affected by his mother who used to tell
59 Warner, “Bush Battles the ‘Wimp Factor’,” Newsweek, 28.
60 Ibid., 30.
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him all the time, ‘George, don’t brag.” And so I think he tended in public to
underplay things.61
Bush was well thought of by his peers, and that was what mattered most to Bush. The
vast differences between Reagan and Bush as far as campaigners can be seen in their
1980 fight for the Republican nomination. Bush and Reagan quickly emerged as the
two favorites in a crowded Republican field. Reagan had refused to participate in the
first debate, held in Iowa. Consequently, many of the voters in Iowa became angry
with Reagan and handed Bush a solid victory in the Iowa caucus, which established
Bush as the frontrunner in a tight two-man race. Heading into the New Hampshire
primaries, Reagan was determined not to make the same mistake. He agreed to debate
the other candidates on February 21,1980, in Manchester, New Hampshire. He
appeared with Representatives Philip Crane and John Anderson, both of Illinois, Texas
governor John Connally, Senator Howard Baker, Jr. of Tennessee, Senator Bob Dole
o f Kansas, and George Bush. The debate was more of a forum discussion; partisan
attacks were not allowed. In other words, it was the kind of political event that only
the most serious political junky would remember. No candidate made any memorable
statements—or blunders.62 Bush seemed especially focused on not making any
statements that might hurt his frontrunner position. Just prior to the debate Bush
admitted: “I don’t think that it [the debate] is something that can be won. I think it is
something that can be lost if someone makes a big mistake.”63 This reluctance to take
chances was typical o f Bush’s political background. Reagan, however, was just
61 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
62New Hampshire Republican Debate, Manchester, 20 February 1980. Video footage
provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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waiting to get George Bush alone. The Reagan campaign team had desperately wanted
to have a head-to-head debate with Bush. The Nashua Telegraph, a newspaper in New
Hampshire, agreed to host the debate; however, the Federal Election Commission had
ruled that such a sponsorship that excluded all but two of the candidates would be an
illegal corporate contribution. The newspaper, in turn, asked the two candidates to
split the $3,500 cost o f the debate. The Bush side declined to pay for their share
because they argued it would push Bush over the legal spending limit for New
Hampshire. The plans for the debate seemed to be at an end. Soon rumors began to
spread that Bush preferred not to risk his front runner status. Reagan aides then agreed
to cover the entire cost of the debate.64 Remembering the damage that Reagan had
suffered when he refused to debate in Iowa, Bush agreed to the debate. The debate was
scheduled to take place in the Nashua Senior High School gym on Saturday, February
22—-just three days before the New Hampshire primary.
Controversy began the afternoon before the debate; Reagan suddenly changed
his mind and decided that the debate should include all challengers. Since he was
paying for the debate, he felt that it was his decision to make. He was neglecting the
fact that he had agreed to pay for the debate in the first place to avoid just such an
occurrence. The Nashua Telegraph could have legally paid for a debate that was open
to all candidates. The situation soon became explosive. While 1,500 people waited in
the gym forty minutes past the scheduled starting time, chanting “We Want Reagan”

63 Martin Schram, “Bush Survives Debate Unscathed,” The Washington Post,
Thursday, 21 February 1980, A2.
64 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Forces to Pay Costs of Debate With Bush,” The Washington
Post, Friday, 22 February 1980, A2.
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and “Bush, Bush,” the real action was taking place in the corridors o f the school.65
Reagan met with four of the excluded candidates, assuring them that he wanted the
debate broadened to include them.66 Reagan’s national political director, Charles
Black, was sent to meet with Bush’s campaign manager, James Baker, to request a
meeting with Bush. Baker rejected the meeting and rejected the idea that the other
candidates, who would come to be known as the Nashua Four, be allowed to debate.
Baker replied that he “wanted to stick with the letter o f the [arrangements originally
made] by the Nashua Telegraph. It wasn’t our call—it was the Telegraph's call.”67 In
fact, Bush handlers had told the Nashua Telegraph that they were willing to open up
the debate; however, the newspaper declined the suggestion. The debate finally began
as Bush walked onto the stage smiling. An obviously angry Reagan stormed onto
stage followed by the four jilted candidates who stood behind the seated Reagan,
Bush, and moderator “like hapless losers in a game o f musical chairs.”68 Bush sat
stiffly in his chair “like a small boy who has been dropped off at the wrong birthday
party.”69 The moderator, Nashua Telegraph executive editor Jon Breen, announced
that the debate would proceed as originally scheduled: a two-man debate. When
Reagan interrupted to explain why he wanted the debate to include the other four
candidates, Breen ordered: “Will you please turn off Governor Reagan’s microphone.”
Reagan grabbed his microphone and shouted back, “I’m paying for this microphone,
65 David S. Broder and Lou Cannon, “A Polite Republican Race Takes turn for the
Bitter,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A l.
66 John Conally was campaigning in South Carolina and chose not to return to New
Hampshire for the debate.
67 Martin Schram and Myra McPherson, “The Night the Grand Old Party Went for Its
Own Throat,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A5.
68 “We Were Sandbagged,” Time, 10 March 1980,15.
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Mr. Green.”70 It did not matter that Reagan had gotten the moderator’s name wrong.
The crowd went wild with applause. People in the audience began shouting things at
the moderator such as “You Hitler!” and “Didn’t you ever hear o f freedom o f the
press?”71 The exchange between Reagan and the moderator would be the only image
that most Americans would have concerning the debate. The debate was not televised
and, other than the few seconds of footage shown on the evening news, no other video
footage exists. During the uproar, Bush stayed in his seat looking flustered and
confused. The four excluded candidates walked off stage and the formal proceedings
began. Reagan debated with an enthusiasm not seen in the previous dates, dominating
the discussion with one-liners that placed Bush on the defensive.72 During the debate,
the four excluded candidates were speaking to the press in the school’s band room,
making it clear that they placed all of the responsibility for their exclusion on the
shoulders of Bush. Dole summed up the mood of the four men when he stated that
“George Bush torpedoed us tonight. . . as far as George Bush is concerned, he had
better find himself another party.”73 All four men vowed to do everything in their
power to assure that Bush would not be the nominee.
The Nashua debate proved to be the turning point in the 1980 campaign for the
Republican nomination. Bush’s frontrunner status disintegrated; Reagan won the New
69 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 253.
70 Reagan-Bush Debate, Nashua, New Hampshire, 23 February 1980. Audio recording
provided by President and Mrs. Reagan. From the Personal Collection of Ronald
Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
71 “We Were Sandbagged,” Time, 10 March 1980,15.
72 Reagan-Bush Debate, Nashua, New Hampshire, 23 February 1980. Audio recording
provided by President and Mrs. Reagan. From the Personal Collection of President
Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
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Hampshire primary with 50 percent o f the vote; Bush finished second with 23
percent.74 Even Bush’s pollster Robert Teeter admitted that many voters defected from
Bush after the dramatic scene in Nashua and supported Reagan.75 A race that almost
everyone thought would be close turned into a landslide victory during the last few
days when Bush walked right into a political trap set by Reagan. James Baker explains
the importance of the Nashua debate:
I think probably it was one turning point. I think it would have been very
difficult for an unknown like George Bush, someone who was not known at all
nationally—even after Iowa—to upset Ronald Reagan who had almost
knocked off an incumbent president for the nomination in ’76. He came very
close to knocking off Gerry Ford. And people don’t remember this but
Governor Reagan started running for president in 1968. So I think that it would
have been very tough for Bush to win in any event, but conceivable, and the
Nashua debate was critical.76
As one reporter accurately noted, the debate reinforced "the very image problem Bush
has fought to overcome: that he is just the sort of preppie, Yalie, Skull and Bones
Society fellow his biography says he is. All of Bush’s Republican opponents were
hollering that he was arrogant, and that is the way it looked.”77 James Baker conceded
“I don’t think there’s any doubt that what happened on Saturday night and after that
hurt us severely.”78 Bush stayed in the fight until the convention; however, he had
essentially lost after that night in Nashua. What Bush had not been able to fathom was
that the instant media images created by the confrontation overshadowed the details
73 Martin Schram and Myra McPherson, “The night the Grand Old Party Went for Its
Own Throat,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A5.
74 Lou Cannon, “Bush Is Crushed By Wide Margin,” The Washington Post,
Wednesday, 27 February 1980, A l.
75 Ibid., A6.
76James A. Baker IE, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
77 Martin Schram, “A Resurrection and, Possibly, an Interment,” The Washington
Post, Wednesday, 27 February 1980, A7.
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such as who played fairly or who had the best positions on the issues. Reagan had
swept aside the doubts o f his vitality and age by becoming a larger than life presence
on the stage. He fed off the emotion of the crowd and turned it to his advantage. Bush
had solidified his public image as an up-tight eastern elitist fighting against a down-toearth Reagan. As Baker recalls, it was pretty much over from that point:
Well it was [over] except that, you know, we won a lot of delegates and the
reason he was put on the ticket. . . Reagan didn’t want to put him on the ticket
because they’d had a fairly contentious primary, and Bush lasted through
Michigan and Pennsylvania, well into May. He didn’t have to get out of the
race until sometime in the first or second week in May, and he had a lot of
delegates at the national convention. And, if you recall, in Detroit, Reagan
tried to go to Ford and that never worked out He really didn’t want to do Bush
but then when that collapsed, when the Ford effort collapsed, there wasn’t
anyplace to go except to Bush because he had delegates.
In actuality, Baker had skillfully placed Bush in the right position to be vice president
in hopes that the Ford nomination would fall apart:
What I’ll admit to, but George never will, is that the Veep thing was always the
fallback. It was always in my mind. That’s why, at every opportunity, I had
him cool his rhetoric about Reagan.80
Second place, however, had never been a goal for Bush and his remarkable
determination and competitiveness was apparent during the 1980 fight for the
Republican nomination. But, the weaknesses so obvious at Nashua were still there
when he ran for president in 1988.
Bush vs. Rather
By the start of the 1988 campaign, Bush’s staff knew that they had to do
something to counter his reserved image of deference to Reagan. Bush knew he was
78 Ibid.
79 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
80 Michael Kramer, “Playing for the Edge,” Time, 13 February 1989,29.
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an unconventional candidate for a post-Watergate electorate. His privileged
background and impressive resume set him apart from Reagan and Carter, whose
populist aura and outsider status appealed to voters. Bush was without question
identified with the establishment Marlin Fitzwater explains the involvement of the
Reagan administration:
We made a conscious effort to stay in the campaign. One of the reasons was
that President Bush was not trying to create a separate identity. I mean, he was
to a small degree, but his challenge was to show that his policies were the same
as Ronald Reagan’s because they had worked together for a long time; they
were both conservatives. People wanted to know if he was going to be loyal to
the Bush, I mean, Reagan’s policies. And the press were always trying to drive
a wedge between he and President Reagan.81
Perhaps equally as damaging were continued questions of Bush’s role in the IranContra Affair. Since the scandal became public in 1986, Bush had refused to provide a
full accounting of his role in the clandestine operation. “I’m not a kiss-and-teller”
Bush would repeatedly explain.82The problem with the Iran-Contra Affair for Bush
was that it attacked his experience in intelligence and diplomacy, his loyal service to
Reagan, and his concern for ethics in government—his greatest assets. The issue came
to a head when Vice President Bush agreed to a live interview with Dan Rather of
CBS Evening News. Bush had insisted that the interview be live so that he would have
a better chance at getting his points across. The interview on January 25, 1988,
represents what media experts label a “defining event” as far as Bush’s image was
concerned.

81 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
82 David Hoffman, “Questions Dog Vice President: Bush Yet to Provide Full Account
on Iran,” The Washington Post, Thursday, 7 January 1988, A l.
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CBS had explained to Bush’s staff that the interview would be the first in a
series o f candidate profiles for the upcoming election. As it drew closer and closer to
time for the interview, it became clear to the Bush staff that the interview would focus
solely on Iran-Contra. After less than three minutes devoted to covering Ronald
Reagan’s State o f the Union address and less than a minute on the polls for the 1988
campaign, Dan Rather presented a five-minute report on Bush’s role in the Iran-Contra
Affair.83 The report was very damaging to Bush and clearly demonstrated that Rather
believed that he was far more involved than he had admitted to this point. The report
showed a picture of Bush’s desk in a dark room with a lamp shining on two file
folders marked “Arms Sales” and “Supplying the Contras.” Rather’s voice ticked off
inconsistencies between Bush’s public statements and the official record:
[Bush] insists he was out of the loop, uniformed about the events and the risks
o f the Iran Initiatives. But the record shows, Mr. Bush attended more than
fifteen meetings in the Oval Office at which the arms sales were discussed.84
The report continued, comparing what Bush “says” and what “the record shows.”
Bush sat in his Senate office at the Capitol, watching the report on a television monitor
(See figure 1.1). Bush’s anger grew as he watched the report. At one point he barked
at the sound technician, “Iran-Contra Affair? . . . I didn’t know this was about the IranContra Affair. Nobody told m e . . . They aren’t going to talk to me about Iran-Contra,
are they? If he talks to me about the Iran-Contra Affair, they’re going to see a

83 Television News Index and Abstracts: A Guide to the Videotape Collection o f the
Network Evening News Programs in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive
(Nashville: Vanderbilt Television News Archive, 1988), 155-156.
“Bush vs. Rather,” CBS Evening News, 25 January 1988. Video footage provided
by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.
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Figure 1.1. George Bush in his Senate office, watching the report on the television monitor while waiting for his live interview with
Dan Rather. His ensuing confrontation with Rather would wipe away the “wimp” label in less than fifteen memorable television
minutes. (Courtesy o f the George Bush Presidential Library.)

seven-minute walkout here.”83 Rather, on the other hand, had spent the entire day
preparing for the interview. The preparation included briefings by associates and
Democratic Party activists, reading through material, and engaging in role playing
activities to anticipate how Bush would respond. It was exactly the type o f preparation
that a candidate would engage in before a live debate. By the time the live interview
began, the scene was set for fireworks to explode. Bush quickly accused CBS of
misleading him concerning the subject of the interview:
Bush: You’ve impugned my integrity by suggesting, with one o f your little
boards here, that I didn’t tell the truth... you don’t accuse me o f it, but
you made that suggestion.... And so, I find this to be a rehash and a
little bit—if you’ll excuse me—a misrepresentation on the part of CBS,
who said you’re doing political profiles on all the candidates, and then
you come up with something that has been exhaustively looked into.86
Rather was quickly put on the defensive; the level of hostility steadily rose as Bush
and Rather interrupted each other:
Bush: May I answer that?
Rather. That wasn’t a question. It was a statement.
Bush: It was a statement and I’ll answer it.
Rather: Let me ask the question, if I may, first.
Later in the interview:
Rather: I don’t want to be argumentative, Mr. Vice President.
Bush: You do, Dan.87

83 Phil McCombs, “In the Studio, Countdown Toward Explosion,” The Washington
Post, Wednesday, 27 January 1988, D2.
86 “Bush vs. Rather,” CBS Evening News, 25 January 1988. Video footage provided
by the
e.
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Bush sent Rather over the edge reminding Dan Rather how he angrily stalked off the
news set in Miami when the start o f his news program was delayed by network
officials to accommodate the end o f the U.S. Open tennis match. The walkout left the
network on black for six or seven minutes. It was a major embarrassment to the
network and showed Rather’s volatility and, some would argue, his immense ego.
Bush: This is not a great night, ’cause I want to talk about why I want to be
president, why those 41 percent of the people are supporting me. And I
don’t think it’s fair to judge a whole career, it’s not fair to judge my
whole career by a rehash on Iran. How would you like it if I judged
your career by those seven minutes when you walked off the set in New
York? Would you like that? I have respect for you, but I don’t have
respect for what you’re doing here tonight88
It did not matter that he named the wrong city. Just as it did not matter in Nashua in
1980 when Reagan called the moderator by the wrong name. Bush had taken control
o f the situation. Rather sat frozen, his anger apparent to every viewer. He had lost
control o f the interview, and of his emotions. Rather returned to Iran-Contra, with a
below-the-belt punch:
Rather: Mr. Vice President, you’ve made us hypocrites in the face of the
world. How could you, how could you sign on to such a policy? And
the question is what does this tell us about your record?
Rather asked Bush if he would hold a news conference before the Iowa caucuses to
answer questions about Iran-Contra. Bush declared that he had already held eighty-six
news conferences on that subject since the story broke in 1986, Rather cut the vice
president off:
Rather: I gather the answer is no. Thank you very much for being with us, Mr.
Vice President90
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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Bush was furious. He slammed down his earphone exclaiming “The bastard didn’t lay
a glove on me.” He then proceeded with an obscenity-laced tirade that was recorded
by the CBS technicians.91 The “wimp” label was over.
Immediate reaction favored Bush. Thousands of viewers jammed the
network’s lines expressing their opinion that Rather was a bully. His interviewing
“style” was deemed rude and disrespectful to the office of vice president. The next day
crowds were waving signs that read “We’d Rather Be for Bush” and “Dan Rather Is a
Democrat.”92 Political cartoons pictured Bush as a gunslinger shooting a television set,
or dressed as the fictional soldier Rambo and holding a machine gun labeled
RAMBUSH. Fitzwater recalls the importance of the confrontation:
I think it helped him considerably.... The confrontation itself was helpful
because simply it did kind of have a symbolic manhood effect if you will. Dan
Rather came out o f it looking really bad. He [Rather] was angry and felt he’d
been humiliated and so forth. So I think on the whole it was very helpful for
President Bush and the campaign. In the long term, it hurt his relationship with
CBS, and that was always a difficult relationship from then on through his
presidency. But the immediate effect was definitely good for President Bush
and bad for Dan Rather.93
Rather, on the other hand, felt like a victim. He blamed others in the media for
debating whether Bush had been badgered and treated with disrespect instead of
following up on questions that he had felt Bush had once again ducked. He claimed
that Bush had been practicing his explosions of outrage in the days leading up to the
interview. As Rather recalls in his memoir:

91 Tom Shales, “Rather, Bush and the Nine-Minute War,” The Washington Post,
Tuesday, 26 January 1988, E l.
92 David Hoffinan, “Bush Revels in Reaction to Face-Off,” The Washington Post,
Wednesday, 27 January 1988, A12.
93 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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The indignation o f Bush was as sincere as that o f Captain Louis Renault, when
he orders the closing o f Rick’s Cafd in Casablanca: “I am shocked, shocked to
find that gambling is going on here,” the captain protests, as he slips into his
pockets the winnings handed him by a waiter.94
He was especially upset with Bush’s charge that he had been ambushed. Going into
the interview, Rather had one lone question that he wanted Bush to answer
Why did we send over two thousand of our best missiles to the Ayatollah, after
241 o f our best servicemen had been blown up on his orders?95
Rather had a highly placed secret source that he trusted telling him that Bush had
eagerly played a major role in Iran-Contra. Bush had publicly denied it. Rather hoped
to catch him in a lie. But, Rather had made no secret of his goal. The promos run by
CBS during the week leading up to the interview clearly stated that the interview
would cover questions concerning the Iran-Contra Affair. Rather himself had
introduced the interview as “a live interview with Mr. Bush on arms to Iran and
money to the Contras.”96 In addition to the charges o f ambush, Rather was upset
because he felt that the jab on the Miami episode was below the belt. When urged by
the Evening News press representative to apologize, Rather angrily responded, “Wait
a minute, I haven’t done anything to apologize for, and I’m not apologizing.”97 In fact,
the only person in the CBS newsroom that felt Rather had done a great job was Tom
Donilon, the paid CBS News consultant from the Democratic party who tried to
console Rather. Even Rather himself was “acutely aware that it [the interview] had

94 Dan Rather with Mickey Herskowitz, The Camera Never Blinks Twice: The Further
Adventures o f a Television Journalist (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 112.
95 Ibid., 101.
96 Ibid., 101.
97 Ibid., 114.
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ended abruptly; it was like a door slamming in someone's face.”98 But, that was the
only mistake Rather was willing to admit. As for an apology, that was out of the
question. Whether Rather apologized or not, whether the Bush campaign had staged
Bush’s response or not, the “wimp” label had been wiped away in less than fifteen
memorable television minutes.
The disintegration of his “wimp” label carried a heavy price as the Iran-Contra
Affair came back into center stage. After the initial post-interview excitement, articles
began to appear with titles such as “Bush Is Not A Wimp. Is He Qualified To Be
President?”99 Questions continued to build throughout the primaries. Lee Atwater,
Roger Ailes, and George Sununu urged the vice president to go on the offensive in
order to deflect attention away from his own faults. Normally, the candidate preferred
to leave the negative campaigning to his advertising and surrogates. The Bush
campaign, however, was low on funds and would not be able to wage an advertising
assault until the fall. They needed to create stories for the news media to cover. Also,
Bush’s handlers wanted to strengthen his image by demonstrating to the public that he
was a fighter. All o f these problems could be resolved by attacking his opponents.
Bush had fought Dan Rather and won. Now it was time to fight for the presidency.
Bush had always been uneasy about negative campaigning and was reluctant to give in
to his advisors. “I don’t like that stuff,” he once told Atwater, “and I don’t want to
hear any more of i t ”100 Eventually though, Bush could no longer ignore the polling
data and reluctantly agreed. Ironically, he would find help from the left when
98Ibid., 111.
99 David Broder, “Bush Is Not A Wimp. Is He Qualified to Be President?,” The
Washington Post, Sunday, 31 January 1988, D7.
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Democratic presidential-hopeful A1 Gore attacked Dukakis on Massachusetts’ record
of permitting “weekend passes” for convicted first-degree murderers who were
serving life sentences without possibility of parole. Bush’s staff seized on this story
and used the case o f one of the convicts, Willie Horton, to destroy Dukakis’ double
digit lead. From that point onward, the Bush campaign became a search-and-destroy
mission, emphasizing Dukakis’ support of high taxes and increased spending, lack of
support for defense, support for abortion, attempting to “disarm the state” through gun
control, and attempting to veto the Pledge of Allegiance. In other words, Dukakis was
the most liberal and thus the most un-American candidate in America. Rather than
promoting reasons why voters should cast their ballots for their guy, the Bush
campaign team was spewing out reasons why the public should vote against the other
guy. Bush’s staff hoped that they could elevate their candidate by destroying the other
in a political zero-sum game of epic proportions.
O f course, George Herbert Walker Bush did win the 1988 election and became
the forty-first president of the United States. His victory seemed impressive at first
glance. Not since Herbert Hoover had a candidate succeeded a retiring president of his
own party and not since Martin Van Buren had a vice president been elected to the
Oval Office. Overcoming a 17-point deficit in July, Bush won an 8-point victory in
November, capturing 40 states. While the comeback was impressive, his victory did
not amount to a landslide. Only 57 percent of the voting age population choose to cast
a ballot, the lowest such turnout since Calvin Coolidge beat John D. Davis in 1924.
This meant that only roughly 27 percent of the adult population had actually voted for
100Peter Goldman and Tom Mathews, The Questfo r the Presidency: 1988,307.
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Bush. Many cynics argued that the 1988 election had been plagued with a growing
sense o f frustration among voters. According to this view, “neither candidate was
addressing the issues that most concerned them. The message, if either man had one,
had got drowned out by the mudslingmg.”101 Bush entered into the presidency with no
clear mandate from the country and with no clear agenda on how to correct the
domestic policy problems that had been created by the deficit spending of the Reagan
years. With Democrats achieving net gains in both houses of Congress, governorships,
and in the state legislatures, Bush would have little chance of pushing forward a
domestic agenda even if he had one.102 Bush turned to an area where he would have
greater freedom to form an agenda and an area where he had considerable expertise:
foreign policy.

101 Ibid., 418.
102Bush was the first president since William Howard Taft to have been elected while
his party suffered net losses in each house of Congress, governorships, and state
legislatures.
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-Chapter 2The Primacy o f the National Security Council:
Beyond Containment in Europe
During the 1988 election, George Bush billed himself as the candidate of continuity. A
vice president who had faithfully served an enormously popular president pledged to
continue in his footsteps. While avoiding specifics, Bush promised that he would build
on the achievements o f his predecessor. Such campaign rhetoric, however, did more
than just win Bush the election. It has shaped how the public, and many political
observers and historians, have viewed these years. Historical interpretation considers
this part of American history as the “Reagan-Bush years,” indicating that Bush’s term
could best be explained as Reagan’s third term. There is some validity to such
attempts at periodization, especially on domestic issues. But too often scholars gloss
over the differences between President Reagan’s and President Bush’s approach to
foreign policy, particularly toward the Soviet Union. This distinction is partly a result
o f a muddled view of the end o f the Cold War. A common misconception is that the
Cold War was basically over by the end of the Reagan administration and that Bush
merely needed to wrap up the agreements that Reagan had already negotiated. This
argument completely disregards the ever-changing realities o f foreign policy and
underestimates the potentially explosive situation in Eastern Europe that still existed
when Reagan left office.
Reagan’s policy o f peace through strength had all but guaranteed that the Cold War
would come to an end. The Soviets simply no longer had the resources to match the
military build-up of the Americans. From its highpoint in the 1950s, the Soviet Gross
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National Product (GNP) had dropped steadily. CIA estimates placed the annual
average rates o f growth o f Soviet GNP at 4.8 percent in 1961-65,3.0 percent in W I 
TS, and 1.8 percent in 1981-85.1The Soviet GNP in 1980 simply could not compete
with the GNP of the United States.2
Table 2.1
Population, GNP per Capita, and GNP in 1980

United States
USSR

Population
(millions)
228

GNP per capita
(dollars)
11,360

GNP (billions of
dollars)
2,590

265

4,550

1,205

When Reagan unveiled his plan for his expensive Strategic Defense Initiative, the
Soviets knew that their economy could not maintain the arms race for much longer. As
Marlin Fitzwater recalls:
In all the summit meetings that I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev, every
one of them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI....
And their problem was that they felt they couldn’t afford to match it. And so
they knew; that’s when they started getting serious about arms reduction. Their
view was, we don’t have the money to ever build a space-based system; let’s
get out of the arms race. So they started reducing nuclear weapons. President
Bush kept the pressure on in the same way when he met with Gorbachev and
then with Yeltsin, after Yeltsin replaced him in ’90, their goal was still the
same. They still focused every meeting on how to get us to back out of SDI. So
President Bush wanted to hold that pressure point out there all through his four
years as well.3

1Measuring Soviet GNP: Problems and Solutions: A Conference (Washington, D.C.:
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1990), 188.
2 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 436.
3 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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Brent Scowcroft agrees with the fact that the Soviets simply could not afford to match
SDI:
I think they were afraid of SDI because. . . not so much because they thought
it would work, but that if we went down that path, they would have to follow
and it was too expensive for them. They didn’t have the resources.4
If SDI had ever become operational, the Soviet defense budget would have the added
pressure of producing even more rockets and warheads. Perhaps even more troubling
for the Soviets was the American advancements in lasers, optics, supercomputers,
guidance systems, and navigation. As one historian has observed:
Russia has always enjoyed its greatest military advantage vis-a-vis the West
when the pace o f weapons technology has slowed down enough to allow a
standardization of equipment and thus of fighting units and tactics—whether
that be the eighteenth-century infantry column or the mid-twentieth-century
armored division.5
With a larger Russian investment needed in advanced technologies, one Russian
spokesman warned of “a whole new arms race at a much higher technological level.”6
Taking into consideration the dramatic shift in each country’s GNP, the Soviets simply
could not maintain the arms race much longer. Critics of Reagan’s approach to arms
control, most notably Brent Scowcroft, have pointed out that SDI tended to stymie
negotiations because Reagan refused to use it as a bargaining tool. Reagan viewed SDI
as too important to use as leverage to get other things the United States wanted from
the Soviets. Consequently, he never put SDI on the table. By the time Reagan left
office, the question for U.S. policymakers had changed from how does democracy

4 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
5 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, 500.
6 Flora Lewis, “Soviet SDI Fears,” New York Times, March 6,1986, A27.
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defeat communism to how does democracy help communism go away in a peaceful
way.
The Bush administration was able to manage the end o f the Cold War so that it
ended with a whimper and not a bang.7 They were able to accomplish this in part by
making a fundamental change in the foreign policy approach that had been used by the
Reagan administration. During arms control negotiations, Reagan had placed the
emphasis on numbers, reducing numbers by eliminating certain kinds of weapons.
George Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft disagreed with that
approach. He had viewed President Reagan’s rush toward disarmament as “a mighty
dubious objective for grown-ups in this business.”8 General Scowcroft believed that
simply getting rid of certain kinds of weapons did not achieve the overall goal o f arms
control, which was to improve stability. Instead, he wanted to reduce the chances that
in a crisis either side would resort to the use of nuclear weapons for fear of some
vulnerability in the nuclear arsenal. That was a goal that could not be accomplished
simply by a shift in numbers. Historically, negotiations between the United States and
the Soviet Union had centered on arms control. General Scowcroft hoped to shift the
focus to Eastern Europe. He wanted to take advantage of the ferment that was growing
in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, to force the Soviet army out of Eastern
Europe, or at least reduce their presence so that Eastern Europeans could develop in a
progressive way. This meant putting arms control on the back burner until the
situation in Eastern Europe unfolded; a move that would require a fundamental change

7 James A. Baker CD, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
8 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.9 For the president who had promised
to continue on the course set by his predecessor, this had the potential for drawing
criticism, especially from the right-wing establishment who had always doubted
Bush’s credentials as a conservative. Rather than make an abrupt change, President
Bush conducted a lengthy foreign policy review at the beginning o f his term in office.
The foreign policy review would allow him to make his own imprint on the nation’s
foreign policy and make sure that there had not been an overly aggressive effort made
by the Reagan administration to conclude a deal with the Soviets before time ran o u t10
The National Security Council
The formulation o f foreign policy in the Bush administration centered on the
National Security Council, an inner circle of men that had the complete confidence of
President Bush.11 Bush’s NSC was markedly different from the one that had existed
during the Reagan presidency. Reagan’s foreign policy advisors were full of suspicion
and mutual mistrust, in the words of James Baker, “a witches’ brew of intrigue,
elbows, egos, and separate agendas.”12 Baker, claims not to “remember any extended
period of time when someone in the National Security cluster wasn’t at someone else’s
throat.”13The fact that Ronald Reagan went through seven national security advisors
during the eight years that he was in office indicates that something was wrong.
9 Ibid.
10James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
11The National Security Council has four statutory members: the president, vice
president, secretary of state, and secretary o f defense. The director o f Central
Intelligence, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national security advisor
also attend NSC meetings and serve as statutory advisors.
12James A. Baker in, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 26.
13Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 26.
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Reagan’s seventh national security advisor, Colin Powell, described Reagan’s
National Security Council as “rudderless, drifting, demoralized.”14That flaw started in
Reagan’s first year as president In an effort to end the rivalry that had existed between
the NSC and the Department o f State during the Carter administration, Ronald Reagan
decided to downgrade the post of national security advisor. To facilitate this objective,
National Security Advisor Richard Allen’s office was placed under the supervision of
Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese III. Thus, the national security advisor lost direct
access to the president for the first time since the NSC had been created in 1947.15
Reagan drove home the point in subsequent public statements by stressing that his
secretary of state was his “primary advisor on foreign affairs, and in that capacity, he
is the chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy for this administration.”16
Reagan made clear that the State Department would handle foreign affairs decisions in
his administration while the National Security Administration would merely be
responsible for the “integration” of the policies proposed by the State Department.
Further changes in the NSC were made at a February 25,1981, meeting, which
established three Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs), chaired by the secretary of
state, the secretary of defense, and the director of Central Intelligence, respectively.
Each SIG would deal with specific issues through a series of assistant secretary-level
Interdepartmental Groups (IGs). That same year Reagan went on to establish the
14John Barry and Evan Thomas, “Colin Powell: Behind the Myth,” Newsweek, 5
March 2001,36.
15The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act o f 1947
and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Later in 1949, as
part o f the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office o f the
President
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Special Situation Group (SSG) and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). It
seemed that policy would be formulated anywhere but in formal meetings o f the NSC;
and Reagan’s first national security advisor resigned within a year. The situation did
not improve as the Reagan administration went on to form an additional 22 SIGs and
55 IGs, which allowed NSC officials such as Colonel Oliver North to establish their
own sub-domains. The role of the NSA became more prominent during the tenures of
William Clark and Robert McFarlane; however, too many people played activist roles
in the management of daily U.S. foreign relations problems. That lack of cooperation
and organization became evident to the public during the Iran-Contra Affair and the
subsequent appointment of the Tower Board that made recommendations for the
reform o f the NSC. During that investigation, Congress found that subordinates would
sometimes ignore the wishes of the president and pursue their own policy schemes.
Ironically, Bush would appoint to his National Security Council two men, John Tower
and Brent Scowcroft, who had served on the Tower Commission that investigated
Reagan’s NSC during the Iran-Contra Affair. The Tower Board would recommend
that the size of the NSC staff be reduced, a legal counsel be appointed, and that the
Crisis Pre-Planning Group be replaced with a Policy Review Committee. The NSC
largely withdrew from its operational roles while the Board’s recommendations were
implemented, maintaining a low profile for the rest of Reagan’s administration.
National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci and his successor Colin Powell would use
the time to implement many of the changes suggested by the Tower Commission. As
Colin Powell recalls:
16“History o f the National Security Council, 1947-1997,” official National Security
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My own view is that, and this is a very self-serving view as you can imagine,
that when Mr. Carlucci took over and I was his deputy we restored a since of
process and discipline to the National Security Council and its functioning.
Then there were some additional changes in personality when Mr. Carlucci
went to the Pentagon and Mr. Weinberger left And a more cooperative
relationship emerged between the Department of Defense and the NSC. And I
would say that it continued into and through the Bush administration.17
By the start o f the Bush administration, the changes in the NSC would once again
allow it to play a constructive role in policymaking without fear of the improprieties
experienced during the Iran-Contra Affair. Ironically, it would be one of the lead
members of the Tower Commission that Bush would entrust to complete the changes
in the NSC.
At the center of Bush’s foreign policymaking team was his national security
advisor Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force lieutenant general. Scowcroft had spent
much o f his time in the Air Force both studying and teaching international relations.
His credentials included a Ph.D. from Columbia University, as well as teaching stints
at West Point, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the Naval War College. He had
worked for the Department of Defense, served as deputy national security advisor
under Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration, and succeeded Kissinger as
President Ford’s national security advisor. After 1976, Scowcroft worked for
Kissinger Associates as an international consultant During the Reagan administration,
Scowcroft served on various committees, including the Tower Commission that was
formed in 1986 to investigate the Iran-Contra Affair. Although he had many close
Mends in the Reagan administration, including the vice president Scowcroft had
privately been one of the fiercest critics of Reagan’s foreign and military policy. He
Council website, www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/htmI/NSChistoryJitml.
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felt that Reagan’s initial hard-line approach was foolish and that his subsequent blind
embrace o f Gorbachev was naive. Scowcroft especially objected to Reagan’s policy
on nuclear deterrence, terming Reagan’s 1986 Reykjavik proposal to eliminate all
ballistic missiles as “insane.”18 Bush’s selection of Scowcroft sent a clear message to
Washington insiders that he intended to change the direction of defense and foreign
policy. Scowcroft’s style also suited Bush’s preference for staying out of the limelight
and working quietly behind the scenes. Scowcroft’s low-profile, self-effacing
approach won Bush’s complete trust. Bush recalled that Scowcroft “worked the
longest hours of anyone in the White House.”19That was the type of loyal dedication
that Bush prized above all other traits and was indicative of the close relationship the
two men developed, going back to 1972. Scowcroft was one of the first people that
Bush asked to join his administration.20 He had considered Scowcroft to serve as the
secretary o f defense or possibly director of the CIA; however, Bush felt that
Scowcroft’s knowledge of foreign policy matters could best be utilized as national
security advisor. Bush also had another motive for selecting Scowcroft:
In selecting him, I would also send a signal to my cabinet and to outside
observers that the NSC’s function was to be critical in the decision-making
process.21
It was clear that Bush intended to rely on the NSC, and Scowcroft, more than anyone
else, would prove to be the chief architect of the foreign policy approach of the Bush
administration. He answered directly to the president and always made sure that a
17Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
18Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 51.
19George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf,
1998), 33.
20 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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third person was present to make a record o f everything that was discussed and agreed
upon, something that was not always the case with the Reagan administration. Even
critics of the administration conceded that the NSC ran more smoothly under
Scowcroft.
Scowcroft was joined on the National Security Council by Bush’s campaign
manager James Baker, who had been offered the position o f secretary of state just two
days prior to the 1988 election (See figure 2.1). Baker was one o f Bush’s oldest
friends, going back to his pre-political days in Texas, where the two met in 1959 at a
cookout when a mutual friend suggested that they become tennis partners at the
Houston Country Club. The two men went on to win two club championships and
form a lifelong friendship. After Baker’s first wife died o f cancer in 1970, it was Bush
who was responsible for getting Baker interested in politics by involving him in his
1970 Senate campaign. In 1975, Bush helped get Baker his first public job when he
persuaded President Ford to appoint Baker as under secretary o f commerce. Baker had
a large ego and could be abrasive if he felt that his time was being wasted. As Baker
has admitted, he and his staff “did not suffer fools gladly.”22 Baker’s critics have
characterized him as a consummate pragmatist and tough politician. His years as a
successful lawyer, however, allowed him to operate in a conciliatory manner when he
wanted to gain an edge over someone. When he adopted this nonconfrontational
technique, he could cleverly guide, or persuade, people to “chose” the option that he
had intended all along. This type of strategy earned him the nickname “the Velvet

21 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 19.
22 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 32.
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Figure 2.1. Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker would prove to be the chief architects of Bush’s foreign policy. (Courtesy of the George
Bush Presidential Library.)

Hammer" and allowed him to refrain from making too many enemies. It was a

technique that he used while running Bush’s campaigns and one that would serve him
well when dealing with foreign leaders. All in all, Baker was tough, very competitive,
a strong negotiator, and someone Bush could count on to state how he felt directly and
forcefully, even when it was not the advice that Bush wanted to hear. Baker recalls
that he often was the recipient o f one of Bush’s favorite jabs: “If you’re so smart, why
am I vice president [or president] and you’re not?”23 This usually indicated to Baker
that Bush was cutting short their discussion because he did not like the advice he was
offered. There were many times when the two men disagreed and became angry with
one another, but neither man would voice his displeasure publicly. In the Bush
administration, friendship and loyalty went hand in hand. That loyalty went with
Baker as he assumed his new position at the State Department. In an interview with
Time magazine following his appointment, Baker stressed that he intended to be “the
president’s man at the State Department, not the State Department’s man at the White
House.”24 Baker was determined to make it clear that President Bush made foreign
policy, not the Foreign Service.
Dick Cheney became secretary of defense after John Tower’s nomination
failed because of allegations of alcohol abuse. Cheney was a close friend o f Scowcroft
and shared his pragmatic, no-nonsense work ethic and lack of ego. His graduate
degree in political science, stint as President Ford’s White House Chief of Staff, and
six terms in Congress were valuable assets. While chief of staff, Cheney routinely
23 Ibid., 20.
24 Michael Kramer and Christopher Ogden, “I Want to Be the President’s Man,” Time,
February 13, 1989,31.
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attended National Security Council meetings. At the time of his appointment, Cheney
was serving as the senior Republican on the Budget Subcommittee of the Intelligence
Committee, which authorized the activities of all intelligence programs. He had,
therefore, a depth o f understanding in very specific areas that come within the general
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and national security in general.25 His
greatest asset, however, was his friendship with key members o f the Bush
administration. The close working relationship that Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, and
Cheney had cultivated during the Ford administration ensured that the national
security apparatus would function smoothly. Friction was handled privately. Baker
was preparing for his first visit to Moscow in May 1989. Just prior to this trip, on
April 29, Dick Cheney agreed to a CNN interview, during which he surmised that
Gorbachev’s push for perestroika would “ultimately fail.” For the secretary of defense
to be predicting Gorbachev’s failure publicly would certainly have cast a shadow over
Baker’s trip to Moscow. Cheney called Baker and agreed with him that he had said
something that was better left unsaid. Baker claims that it was the only major
disagreement with Cheney involving turf during the entire administration.26
The role of the chairman o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone through serious
changes during the Reagan administration. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
gave the chairman of the JCS real power.27 Since its creation in 1949, the power of the
chairman was limited to presenting the secretary of defense and the president with the
25 The President’s News Conference: March 10, 1989,
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89031006.html
26 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 70.
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watered-down consensus recommendations of the chiefs. As head of his own service,
each chief had a separate agenda and a unique perspective of events. Decision papers
from the JCS tended to be guided by the least-common-denominator that “every chief
would accept but few secretaries o f defense or presidents found useful.”28 The 1986
act designated the chairman o f the JCS as the “principal military advisor” who could
give his own advice directly to the secretary of defense and the president. Admiral
William J. Crowe, Jr. was chairman when the 1986 reorganization went into effect.
Bush allowed Admiral Crowe to finish out his term until he retired at the end of
September 1989. When it came time to decide on a replacement, Cheney advised Bush
to consider Colin Powell, who had served as Reagan’s national security advisor during
the last year of his administration. Powell was one of the few people from the Reagan
administration whom Bush had considered for the new team, offering him the job of
deputy secretary o f state or director o f the CIA.29 Powell had declined both offers,
deciding to return to the Army as commander in chief o f Forces Command, a position
responsible for all Army field forces based in the United States and carrying a
promotion to four star general, the Army’s highest rank. Later in the year when Bush
made him the offer to vault to the highest uniformed military post in the land as
chairman o f the JSC, it was too good to pass up. Both men were concerned with the
fact that Powell was the most junior of the IS four-star generals who were legally
eligible for the chairmanship. Despite Bush’s and Powell’s reservations, Cheney was
27The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is commonly referred to as the GoldwaterNichols Act because it had been sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and
Congressman Bill Nichols.
28 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random
House, 1995), 411.
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convinced that Powell’s tenure as National Security Administration as well as his
military command credits had uniquely prepared him to operate between the Pentagon
and the White House with ease. Assuming the position o f chairman on October 1,
1989, Powell became the first chairman to begin his tenure with the added benefit of
Goldwater-Nichols authority. Powell explains the importance of Goldwater-Nichols:
[It helped] to the extent that Goldwater-Nichols did not require me to speak
with the corporate voice. In other words, I can speak in my own right as
principle military advisor. All the other chiefs are military advisors to the
president as well. But, because the chairman is the principle military advisor, I
did not need the chiefs vote on what my advice should be for the corporate
body. That was of enormous help.30
But, as Powell recalls, just as important was the confidence that Bush and Cheney had
in his ideas:
The great influence that I was able to use was the influence given to me by my
superiors. The fact that Mr. Cheney found the ideas that we came up with
useful and that the president found them useful and relevant to the challenges
they had is really what made it work more so than bureaucratic imprimatur of
Goldwater-Nichols.31
The relationship between Powell and Cheney in particular would become quite strong
and add to the cohesion of the National Security Council.
One o f the few hold-overs from the Reagan Administration was William
Webster, who was asked to continue his role as the director of Central Intelligence.
Despite having no background in intelligence or foreign policy, Webster had been
offered the job as DCI upon the death of William Casey and in the aftermath of the
Iran-Contra Affair. Labeled by Newsweek as “Washington’s most successful Mr.
Fixit,” the Missouri lawyer and former federal judge had served as director of the
29 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 388.
30 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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Federal Bureau o f Investigation from 1978 to 1987, helping to reverse the agency’s
image that had been blighted by the legacy of J. Edgar Hoover. As the new DCI,
Webster ended the off-the-books covert operations that had been routinely organized
by Casey. Prior to Webster’s new guidelines, as then deputy director Robert Gates
recalls, covert operations “was a very informal kind of process, [but] now they
actually sit down and debate the issue. They talk about it; they go through a long
checklist of questions.”32 He also dramatically improved the CIA’s relationship with
Congress, something that had been virtually ignored by Casey. But, Webster’s main
priority was to make a firm distinction between intelligence and policymaking. As the
first director of Central Intelligence to be named a member of the Cabinet, Casey had
all but obliterated that line. Refusing to be appointed to that rank, Judge Webster
defined his role as informing and implementing policy, not making it. He even went so
far as to say that it was none of his business what policymakers did with his
intelligence estimates. In fact, Webster wanted to make the relationship between the
director and president “professional and not a political relationship.”33 This matched
President Bush’s concept of the role of the DCI. Having served as DCI himself, Bush
had a very set idea about the role that the director of the CIA should play in an
administration. It was clear that the DCI would provide the president with intelligence
information but otherwise have no role in policymaking decisions.
As vice president, Dan Quayle also served on the NSC. His interest in arms
control involved him in many of the discussions of the NSC; however, his input was
31 Ibid.
32 Russell Watson with Richard Sandza, “Cleaning Up the Mess,” Newsweek, October
12,1987, p. 9.
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usually only considered when it, at least loosely, fell in line with the direction in which
Bush was already leaning. In an administration dominated by people with far more
experience in foreign affairs, Quayle was primarily involved in domestic policy and
congressional maneuvering. Even he admits that his contribution to foreign policy
making during the Bush administration was marginal.34 He was, however, a faithful
observer to the decision-making process. Each morning he attended the president’s
daily national security briefing with Scowcroft and CIA briefers. He would then stay
for Bush’s meeting with the chief of staff to set the agenda for the rest o f the day.
Quayle continued to favor programs from the Reagan era such as SDI and he
continued the strong anti-Soviet rhetoric that was prevalent dining Reagan’s first term.
While this endeared Quayle to the right wing of the Republican party, it made Bush’s
more moderate advisors wary of Quayle’s input Quayle, therefore, was not a
significant contributor to foreign policymaking during the Bush administration. His
many hard-line speeches, however, did help mollify the right wing o f the Republican
party, who never really trusted Bush, and gave Bush some political cover to institute
his own, more moderate, foreign policy decisions. Qualye’s speeches also allowed the
Bush administration to be critical o f the Soviet Union and congressional Democrats
without the criticism coming directly from the president Bush could then distance
himself from the comments using an often-repeated line: “I haven’t seen what he said,

33 Quoted in an interview with Newsweek editors, October 12,1987, p. 29-35.
34 David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, The Man Who Would Be President: Dan
Quayle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 96.
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so I can’t tell you whether he speaks for me. I speak for myself. He speaks for
himself.”35
One final person that should be mentioned is Marlin Fitzwater. Although not
officially a part o f the NSC, Fitzwater attended the NSC meetings, sitting quietly to
one side. He had decided early in his job as press secretary that he needed to attend
National Security Council meetings and other foreign policy discussions in order to
absorb the nuances o f foreign policy and the rationale for policy changes. Reagan had
allowed him this unusual level o f access and Bush, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to
the continuation of this practice. During his six years with Reagan and Bush, he was
never asked to leave a meeting, and his presence paid off with his improved ability to
explain to the public the actions taken by the NSC.36
Together, these men represented a very capable NSC that Bush would rely on
during the dramatic events leading to the end o f the Cold War. That does not mean,
however, that the NSC collectively made the decisions concerning foreign policy. As
Brent Scowcroft recalls, President Bush always made the final decision. Perhaps
because o f his extensive background in foreign affairs, Bush enjoyed debating issues
with his advisors (See figure 2.2). He asked question after question, provoking people
to defend their views. This helped him clarify the issues in his own mind and allowed
him to make prudent, well-reasoned decisions. According to Scowcroft, “Rarely did
35 An example o f this occurred when the Tower nomination failed in the Senate.
Quayle made a blistering speech in Indianapolis that accused Senate Democrats of
using “McCarthy-like tactics” to defeat John Tower. Although Bush privately agreed
with that statement, he could not publicly condemn the actions of Senate Democrats
because he still had several nominations that needed to be confirmed in the Senate.
36 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade
With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 144.
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Figure 2.2. Bush enjoyed debating issues with his advisors, a process markedly different than under President Reagan.
Clockwise around the room: Bush, Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, Sununu, Cheney, and Baker.
(Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

[Bush] make major decisions without a lot of back and forth with his advisors in order
to set things in his own mind.”37 This was a markedly different process than that
which occurred during the Reagan administration. As Colin Powell, who served on
both President Reagan’s and President Bush’s NSC, recalls:
President Reagan relied more on his advisors to shape issues for him, and
President Bush got a little more deeply involved in the shaping of the issues
but didn’t constrain his staff. And he wanted to hear more of the in and out, up
and down and dialogues over the various issues than President Reagan.
In the final analysis the NSC during the Bush administration was better qualified, was
more stable, had more clearly defined roles, and played a greater part in the decision
making process than it had under President Reagan.
The National Security Review of the Soviet Union (NSR-3)
With its foreign policymaking team in place, the new administration was ready
to assess the improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship that occurred during
Reagan’s second term. Unlike Reagan, who was often seen as detached from the
process, Bush’s knowledge and interest in foreign affairs placed him at the center of
policy-making discussions. Out of this close-knit group emerged a consensus
characterized by both skepticism of Gorbachev and criticism of Reagan’s anti-nuclear
weapons enthusiasm. A foreign policy review finally got underway weeks after the
inauguration. It quickly became clear to those conducting the review that it was a
waste of time and manpower. Many of the senior bureaucrats throughout the
government were holdovers from the Reagan administration, and as one frustrated
official exclaimed, “If we had any better ideas than the ones we had, we would have
37 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
38 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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used them.”39 The process drifted on for over three months. Privately, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze begin to refer to the policy review as the pauza—the pause. Even Bush
officials, such as Robert Gates, began to refer to it as “the pause.”40 Many observers
outside o f the administration criticized Bush for not seizing what they felt was a clear
course of action inherited from Reagan. Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the
Soviet Union, angrily explained to colleagues at the State Department, “Our marching
orders are clear: ‘Don’t just do something, stand there!'”41 Matlock argues that the
Bush administration was slow in recognizing that Gorbachev understood that the Cold
War was coming to an end and was ready to make concessions. According to this
view, the Bush administration was slow in testing Gorbachev’s words. Matlock also
sees practical considerations for the pause. He believes it was intended by the Bush
administration to reassure the right wing of the Republican party and to allow time for
a complete overhaul of the government in terms o f personnel:
[Bush] purged almost everybody from the top ranks o f the government. At one
point, I know Baker had told me in a private meeting, when he asked me to
stay on in Moscow, that, well, you know, they had run three political
campaigns and he’s got a lot o f people that he has to take care of. Now clearly
he didn’t consider the people who had worked for Reagan their people. So I
think they did look at their own backers as distinct from the Reagan backers.
And their political task was not having the Reagan backers defect Since many
of the right-wing Republicans had thought Reagan had gone soft his last year
or so, you know Bush had to sort of stand up and, I think, show that he was
tougher.42

39 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 333.
40 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, M the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 28.
41 Beschloss and Talbott, A t the Highest Levels, 34.
42 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
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Matlock, therefore, criticizes the foreign policy review as taking place largely for
political reasons rather than necessitated by foreign policy concerns, which he felt
warranted decisive action. James Baker argued that these critics were missing the main
goal behind the lengthy foreign policy review:
Any new administration, even if it’s one of the same party, has got to put its
imprint on foreign policy, and you needed to have a Bush imprint on the
nation’s foreign policy. Also, you needed to make sure there had not been an
overly aggressive effort to conclude a deal just, you know, just before time ran
out with the Soviets. Nothing had been concluded. Also, you had to, you know
. . . Vice President Bush had not really been in those meetings with Gorbachev.
He had to satisfy himself that Gorbachev was for real. The Cold War still was
on. You have to remember that. They were still supplying weapons through
Cuba to Nicaragua. There was still the Angola problem. We had major arms
control negotiations going on, and many of them were stuck. Chemical
weapons was stuck. Sea launch cruise missiles and the linkage with START
was a sticking point. We had a lot, there’s still a lot of problems.43
Those problems could not be addressed adequately by simply continuing Reagan’s
emphasis on reducing numbers o f weapons. Bush needed to know if Gorbachev was
actually prepared to fulfill his promises for fundamental change. Baker felt that
Gorbachev’s strategy depended on his ability to split the alliance in Western Europe
by appealing to Western publics rather than Western governments. This strategy
would also elevate his own authority and stature within the Soviet Union. The only
way to keep Gorbachev from gaining the advantage over the United States, according
to Baker, was to “attack his strategy head-on and to craft initiatives that he would feel
obliged to embrace.”44 After making such bold promises, Gorbachev could not easily
say no to any positive initiatives from the West

43 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
44 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 70.
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When the formal report from the strategic review on the Soviet Union (NSR-3)
was presented to Bush on March 14,1989, it was a big disappointment As Brent
Scowcroft recalls:
The chief problem with the policy reviews is that they didn’t produce anything.
They were sort of bureaucratic exercises, and it’s not surprising that the
bureaucracy thought everything was going well because they had designed the
policy. So mostly we got back studies that said do more of the same. That was
the principal problem, and as a result, we just fashioned policies ourselves
within the NSC and then debated them in the NSC.45
The “big picture” document did not provide the kind of specific initiatives that were
needed, and Bush simply was not satisfied with the approach suggested by the review
that was quickly labeled “status quo plus.” He and his team wanted policies that could
cope with the radical change that was taking place in Eastern Europe. The Bush
administration wanted “to signal the bureaucracy, the Congress, the media, and the

public at large that it was time for a reassessment of old assumptions.”46 The review
did not further that goal. As Baker explains:
Unfortunately, we made two mistakes in the way we set up the review.
First.. .the review was run by Reagan administration holdovers. Since they
were responsible for the development and articulation of the previous policy,
these officials naturally had a personal and psychological investment in the
status quo. It was pretty much like asking an architect to review his own work;
he might change a door here or a window there, but it would be unlikely for
him to question the basic foundations on which the structure stood. Needless to
say, these officials found themselves incapable of truly thinking things anew.
Second, instead o f asking for ideas and suggestions from sources without a
vested interest in established policy, we asked the bureaucracy itself to produce
the papers. This resulted in Ieast-common-denominator thinking, with every
potentially controversial—that is, interesting—idea left out in the name of
bureaucratic consensus. In the end, what we received was mush 47

45 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
46 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 68.
47 Ibid.
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Another disappointing aspect concerning the review was that it was ambivalent about
whether or not Gorbachev could succeed in bis efforts at reform. The report on the
Soviet Union had suggested that Gorbachev had about a 50-50 chance at overcoming
his domestic problems and succeeding with his reforms and that because of the
uncertainty surrounding Gorbachev’s ability to maintain power, U.S. policy should not
be designed to either help or hurt Gorbachev. This was unacceptable to Bush. He
needed to know that Gorbachev was a true reformer and that he could trust that
Gorbachev would be successful. Bush needed to determine if perestroika was a
breathing space (peredyshka) designed to overcome the stagnation and technological
backwardness of the Brezhnev era and to revive the Soviet economy for further
competition with democracy and capitalism into the twenty-first century, or if it was a
fundamental shift (perekhod) in Soviet policy ushering in a new era of socialism.48
The review offered no clear answers to these questions.
The End of “the Pause”
Scowcroft explained how the NSC shifted its focus: “we worked instead with a
‘think piece’ on Gorbachev’s policies and intentions, drafted by an NSC team headed
by Condoleezza Rice.”49 Rice’s memo laid out a four-part approach that Scowcroft
used as a blueprint to guide the development of an overall strategy.50 First, the
administration needed to work on the domestic side to strengthen the image of
America’s foreign policy as driven by clear objectives. Second, it needed to send a
clear signal that relations with its allies was the top priority. A unified NATO was key
48 Ibid., 69.
49 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40.
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to arms reduction talks. Third, the United States should undertake initiatives,
particularly economic assistance, with Eastern Europe, a potential weak link in the
solidarity o f the Soviet bloc. Fourth, the United States should promote regional
stability around the world.51 Rice’s memo eventually led to the end of the pause. Until

then, however, the Bush administration continued to be criticized for its foreign policy
review. Marlin Fitzwater recalls the problems created by the lengthy foreign policy
review at the beginning of Bush’s term in office:
The press is always an impatient group. I mean, a day is forever in the news
business. And you promise a policy review and they expect to have it
tomorrow or the next day. And if it drags on for six or eight months, something
like that, that seems like a long time and you’ve got to expect you’re going to
start getting editorials and others saying, “Where’s that policy review?” So,
you always have to deal with media impatience.52
The Bush administration started to see attacks from the press. One article in the
Washington Post even reported that Ronald Reagan was telling close friends that he
had an “uneasy” feeling about Bush’s “foreign-policy indecisiveness” and felt that
Bush’s hesitancy was allowing Gorbachev to regain the momentum in public opinion:
The Reagan view when he left office was that Bush had a clear advantage in
dealing with the Soviets because he had inherited policies he had helped shape.
Instead o f plunging ahead with negotiations, however, Bush opted for the
delaying tactic o f a policy review, behaving the way new presidents do when
replacing someone from the opposing party with different views.53
Reagan had been trying to avoid public criticism of Bush because he did not want to
undermine him; however, it was clear that Reagan was starting to lose his patience
50 Rice’s memo would eventually evolve into National Security Directive 23, which
was finally signed by Bush on September 22,1989.
51 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40.
52 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
53 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Is Concerned about Bush’s Indecision,” The Washington
Post, Saturday, May 6,1989, A21.
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with his successor. George Kennan, creator of the policy o f containment, also
criticized Bush. While testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Kennan blamed Bush for failing to respond to Soviet initiatives. Margaret Thatcher

sent Bush a message complaining that the policy review was taking too long.54 When
Gorbachev announced on April 7, 1989, that he was halting production of weaponsgrade uranium and closing two plutonium plants, reporters pressed Bush for a
response. Bush snapped back at reporters: “We’U be ready to react when we feel like
reacting.”55 Bush knew that he had to announce his new policy goals soon. The Bush
administration also knew that the press, as well as the public at large, were expecting
some kind of climax to the policy review. After eight years of Reagan, people had
come to expect grand speeches and dramatic press conferences. Certainly something
as important as a fundamental shift in policy toward the Soviet Union would have
required a prime time televised report to the nation in the Reagan era. Typical of
Bush’s press style, his staff put together a series of four speeches that read more like
position papers, and that would constitute the conclusion of the review: one speech
each on Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and defense and arms
control. None were televised nationally.
Commencement Season
Originally, all four of the speeches were to be given at university
commencement ceremonies. A historic agreement forced the speech on Eastern
European policy to be moved up to April, well before the commencement season
began. The opportunity to launch the new policy of encouraging reform in the
54 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 49.
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governments o f Eastern and Central Europe suddenly developed with the successful
completion of ongoing talks between the Polish government and Solidarity, the first
independent trade union behind the Iron Curtain. That agreement, signed on April 5,
1989, legalized Solidarity, created a new and powerful office o f president along with a
new 100>seat senate, and allowed for the opposition to compete for seats in the senate
as well as for 161 of the 460 existing seats in the Sejm, or parliament.56 The event
required an American response. The Polish Communist Party had maintained a fortyfive-year monopoly of power. Now Poland was apparently moving outside of
communist control and would be allowed autonomous political development. It was
exactly the sort o f reform that the Bush administration intended to promote all over
Eastern Europe and provided an ideal opening for Bush’s speech. White House
planners chose Hamtramck, Michigan, as a good place to hold a speech on Eastern
Europe. The Detroit enclave had an unusually high concentration of blue-collar
families with ties to Poland, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Only two problems
existed: the new policy still had not been clarified and the speech itself still needed to
be written. Even after the long policy review, it had not been decided what kind of
assistance the United States could afford to offer Eastern Europe. In the post-Reagan
era, the huge federal deficit forced budgets to be extremely tight Bush had committed
that new programs would not be approved unless funds could be diverted from other
parts of the budget. Bush, however, knew that his plan required economic aid if it had
any chance of working and instructed his planners to find the money somewhere.
Perhaps the more difficult problem was deciding who would write the speech. The
55 Ibid., 50.
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controversy, one of the few reoccurring disputes within the foreign policy apparatus of
the administration, was between the NSC, who felt that they should be responsible for
national security policy speeches, and the president’s speechwriters, who felt that they
should write all of the president’s speeches. In the end, the two sides reached an
uneasy compromise; however, as Brent Scowcroft recalls, “It remained a major
irritant, with a negative impact on the quality o f many of the President’s foreign policy
speeches throughout the Administration.”57 The speech was finally given by President
Bush on April 17 at Hamtramck City Hall:
My friends, liberty is an idea whose time has come in Eastern Europe.... The
West can now be bold in proposing a vision of the European future: We dream
o f the day when there will be no barriers to the free movement of the peoples,
goods and ideas. We dream of the day when Eastern European peoples will be
free to choose their system of government and to vote for the party of their
choice in regular, free, contested elections. And we dream of the day when
Eastern European countries will be free to choose their own peaceful course in
the world, including closer ties with Western Europe. And we envision an
Eastern Europe in which the Soviet Union has renounced military intervention
as an instrument of its policy—on any pretext We share an unwavering
conviction that one day, all the peoples o f Europe will live in freedom.... Let
us recall the words o f the Poles who struggled for independence: “For your
freedom and ours.” Let us support the peaceful evolution of democracy in
Poland. The cause of liberty knows no limits; the friends of freedom, no
borders.58
In that speech, Bush promised new American trade and credits to countries
experiencing economic and political reforms. This established a link between help
from the West and significant political and economic liberalization. The Bush team
hoped that by offering economic rewards, they could keep reform going in Eastern
56 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 47.
57 Ibid., 51.
58 Remarks by the President to Citizens o f Hamtramck, April 17,1989, George Bush
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89 - 2/90, Box #13.
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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Europe. They also hoped to eventually extend the link between aid and reform to the
Soviet Union itself. Unfortunately, the speech at Hamtramck also showed that the
United States did not have the resources to provide the level of rewards that could
genuinely stimulate the troubled economies of Eastern Europe. The administration,
however, had finally taken a position on Eastern Europe. As Brent Scowcroft recalls:
It was only a beginning, but it was a crucial move to try to capitalize on the
signs of thaw in the communist states of Europe and to steer events in
productive directions, but at a speed Moscow could accept. It was a serious
effort to address the central questions of the Cold War.59
The speech was covered in full detail by the press in Europe and the Soviet Union, but
at home Bush’s first foreign policy address received very little attention.
Administration officials would later admit that part of the problem was of their own
making. The White House did very little advance work with the press, and many of the
Washington reporters simply refused to believe that Bush would make any important
announcements at Hamtramck. Marlin Fitzwater explains the problems behind using
the series of speeches to unveil the new policies:
No, they weren’t nationally televised. Well, the problem was, first of all, we
had to have some way to put it out. And secondly, the review that took place
was a more informal one between the president, the national security advisor,
Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary o f Defense Cheney, and
so it was, ya know, it didn’t lend itself to kind of being published in a book.
This review really was, amounted to a lot o f private discussion, a lot of
meetings they had had and so forth. So they needed some way to kind of say to
the American people, “Here’s what my policies are going to be.” And the
speeches simply were a, seemed to be, the most effective tool for producing
three or four documents on three or four different areas o f foreign policy that
outlined where he intended to go from here.60

59 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 52.
60 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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The first speech, which should have been a dramatic beginning to Bush’s plan for
foreign policy, was an easily forgettable event Bush’s preference for
compartmentalization and behind-the-scenes discussions kept the American public
uninformed during the first months of his presidency. Now, his failure to learn the
nuances o f image management, something his predecessor had mastered, left much of
America still unsure about the direction he wanted to pursue. The second speech
would be equally as undramatic.
The president’s commencement speech at Texas A&M University in College
Station on May 12, 1989, announced his strategy for future policy toward the Soviet
Union (See figure 2.3). Drawn primarily from a decision memorandum written by the
NSC staff and based on an earlier memo written by Condoleezza Rice, the speech
called for a fundamental transformation o f the U.S-Soviet relationship. It recognized
that the Soviet Union was in the midst of change; however, it challenged the Soviet
Union to action to demonstrate their commitment to Gorbachev’s principles. Bush’s
policy, called “beyond containment,” was explained in National Security Directive 23:
The character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union leads to the
possibility that a new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move
beyond containment to a U.S. policy that actively promotes the integration of
the Soviet Union into the existing international system .... But a new
relationship with the international system can not simply be declared by
Moscow. Nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned through the
demilitarization o f Soviet foreign policy and reinforced by behavior.... We are
in a period o f transition and uncertainty. We will not react to reforms and
changes in the Soviet Union that have not yet taken place, nor will we respond
to every Soviet initiative. We will be vigilant, recognizing that the Soviet
Union is still governed by authoritarian methods and that its powerful armed
forces remain a threat to our security and that o f our allies. But the United
States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue and
institution by institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that
the Soviet leadership itself has enunciated.... The goal o f restructuring the
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Figure 2.3. Bush’s commencement speech at Texas A&M University on May 12, 1989, called for a fundamental transformation of
the U.S.-Soviet relationship that would move “beyond containment.” (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

relationship o f the Soviet Union to the international system is an ambitious
task. The responsibility for creating the conditions to move beyond
containment to integrate the Soviet Union into the family o f nations lies first
and foremost with Moscow. But the United States will do its part, together
with our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while maintaining
our strength, to work to place Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more
cooperative course than has heretofore been possible.61
The speech given by President Bush mirrored the language o f the NSC memorandum:
The Soviet Union says that it seeks to make peace with the world, and
criticizes its own postwar policies. These are words that we can only applaud.
But a new relationship cannot simply be declared by Moscow, or bestowed by
others. It must be earned. It must be earned because promises are never
enough.62
Bush challenged the Soviets to reduce their conventional forces, abandon the
Brezhnev Doctrine, and allow self-determination for all o f Eastern and Central
Europe, in the process removing the Iron Curtain. He urged diplomatic solutions to
regional conflicts, respect for human rights, and for the Soviet Union to work with the
United States to solve drug-trafficking and environmental dangers. Bush resurrected
Open Skies, a plan first introduced during the Eisenhower administration that allowed
unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over the territory
o f the other country opening military activities to regular scrutiny. Many considered
Open Skies as proof that the Bush administration could not come up with anything
new. After months of delay, the Bush administration simply dusted off a plan thirty
years old. Unlike Eisenhower in the 1950s, Bush could rely on satellites to do the type
o f surveillance work that could be done by unrestricted flights over the Soviet Union.
61 National Security Directive 23: United States Relations with the Soviet Union,
George Bush Presidential Library.
62 Remarks by the President at Texas A&M University, May 12,1989, George Bush
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89 - 2/90, Box #13.
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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Certainly, the Open Skies proposal was outdated. Even a protective Brent Scowcroft
admitted that the proposal “smacked of gimmickry.”63 Bush thought that the Open
Skies proposal would show that his administration was acting boldly. He was wrong.
The speech on Western Europe was delivered at Boston University on May 21,
1989. Bush had just spent a weekend at his home in Kennebunkport, Maine, with
French president F rancis Mitterrand. Reagan and Mitterrand had never been close.
Reagan had been greatly troubled by Mitterrand’s promise in 1981 to place
communists in his government. Mitterrand felt that Reagan was too obsessed with
communism and that he wrongly categorized all communists as aggressive Stalinists.

Bush hoped that the relaxed setting in Maine would allow him to get to know
Mitterrand on a personal basis. The salt air and waves pounding against the rocks
provided a setting that was very different from the protocol and formalities of the
Reagan years. It was Bush’s style o f personal diplomacy at its very best, and it helped
establish a deep level of trust and personal rapport between the two presidents. So it
was that Mitterrand accompanied Bush to Boston and followed Bush’s speech with
one o f his own. Afterwards, the two leaders gave a joint press conference. In his
address, Bush delivered a warning to those who would rush blindly into Gorbachev’s
proposals for Europe:
We must never forget that twice in this century, American blood has been shed
over conflicts that began in Europe. And we share the fervent desire of
Europeans to relegate war forever to the province of distant memory. But that
is why the Atlantic Alliance is so central to our foreign policy. And that’s why
America remains committed to the Alliance and the strategy which has
preserved freedom in Europe. We must never forget that to keep the peace in
Europe is to keep the peace for America. NATO’s policy of flexible response
keeps the United States linked to Europe and lets any would-be aggressors
63 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 54.
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know that they will be met with any level o f force needed to repel their attack
and frustrate their designs. And our short-range deterrent forces based in
Europe, and kept up-to-date, demonstrate that America’s vital interests are
bound inextricably to Western Europe, and that is an attacker can never gamble
on a test o f strength with just our conventional forces. Though hope is now
running high for a more peaceful continent, the history o f this century teaches
Americans and Europeans to remain prepared. As we search for a peace that is
enduring, I’m gratefhl for the steps that Mr. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets
advance solid and constructive plans for peace, then we should give credit
where credit is due. And we’re seeing sweeping changes in the Soviet Union
that show promise of enduring, o f becoming ingrained. At the same time, in an
era of extraordinary change, we have an obligation to temper optimism—and I
am optimistic—with prudence.... it is clear that Soviet “new thinking” has not
yet totally overcome the old.64
Stressing that the Soviet Union still kept a formidable military machine in Europe,
Bush pledged his determination to negotiate a less militarized Europe:
I believe in a deliberate, step-by-step approach to East-West relations because
recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it’s not
yet complete. The Warsaw pact retains a nearly 12-to-one advantage over the
Atlantic Alliance in short-range missile and rocket launchers capable of
delivering nuclear weapons; and more than a two-to-one advantage in battle
tanks. And for that reason, we will also maintain, in cooperation with our
allies, ground and air forces in Europe as long as they are wanted and needed
to preserve the peace in Europe. At the same time, my administration will
place a high and continuing priority on negotiating a less militarized Europe,
one with a secure conventional force balance at lower levels of forces. Our
aspiration is a real peace—a peace of shared optimism, not a peace of armed
camps.65
Bush made clear in his speech that a strong NATO became more important, not less,
with the changes occurring within the Soviet Union. It certainly was not the time for
the West to be overcome by complacency or division.

64 Remarks by the President at Boston University Commencement Ceremony, May 21,
1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches,
4/89—2/90, Box #13. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential
Library.
65 Ibid.
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The fourth and final speech was delivered at the Coast Guard Academy
commencement, May 24,1989, focusing on defense strategy and arms control. Bush
emphasized his commitment to maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent but
promised to seek arms reductions that would allow stability with the lowest number of
weapons that the administration felt was prudent Any advance in arms control,
however, would have to be prefaced by a Soviet move away from an offensive
military strategy:
The USSR has said that it is willing to abandon its age-old reliance on
offensive strategy. It’s time to begin. This should mean a smaller force—one
less reliant on tanks and artillery and personnel carriers that provide the
Soviet’s offensive striking power. A restructured Warsaw Pact—one that
mirrors the defensive posture of NATO—would make Europe and the world
more secure.66
Thus, the series of speeches that had been designed to announce the conclusion of the
administration’s long foreign policy review came to a conclusion and the “pause” was
now officially over. Brent Scowcroft summed up the new strategy that was unveiled
with the four speeches:
It was cautious and prudent, an appropriate policy in a period of turbulence and
rapid change, but it proved surprisingly durable and established a valuable
framework for the conduct of policy. We were shifting policy from the old and
narrow focus on strategic arms control to a wider dialogue designed to reduce
the threat of war and bring real peace—including progress in Eastern Europe,
CFE (conventional forces in Europe), and regional issues. All this was aimed
at encouraging a “reformed” Soviet Union, ready to play a trustworthy role in
the community o f nations—one far less threatening to the United States and its
allies.67

66 Remarks by the President at the Coast Guard Academy Graduation Ceremony, May
24,1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches,
4/89—2/90, Box #13. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential
Library.
67 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 55-56.
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The new strategy was a major departure. After serving as a loyal vice president
for eight years, Bush was determined to make his own mark on foreign policy distinct
from his predecessor. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had
claimed that the NSC had entered its “mid-life crisis” during the Reagan years.68
Restoring the NSC to its former importance would be Bush’s first order of business.
To facilitate this goal, he issued the first National Security Directive of his presidency,
NSD I, which reorganized the National Security Council. Along with making
fundamental changes in the NSC machinery, Bush appointed a trusted friend in Brent
Scowcroft to be his national security advisor, thereby elevating the authority of the
position. Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, and Cheney would make all of the important foreign
policy decisions. Bush’s years of experience in foreign affairs necessitated a more
hands-on approach that was markedly different than the complex system of SIGs and
IGs that had been used by Reagan to delegate authority. The long policy review and
the anti-climactic speeches that laid out the new policy helped provide a period of
gradual transition that protected Bush from charges from the Right that Bush was not
loyally following in Reagan’s footsteps. By the summer of 1989, however, it was clear
that the White House rather than the State Department would be in charge of foreign
policy and that Bush, along with his close advisors, would bear the responsibility for
reacting to the incredible change that was happening in Central and Eastern Europe
and within the Soviet Union itself. It would be up to this small group of men to
manage the end o f the Cold War and make sure that it ended with a whimper and not a
bang.
68 “The History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997,” official NSC website.
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-Chapter 3Bush and Gorbachev: The Road to Malta
December 7,1988: it was sunny as Mikhail Gorbachev rode the ferry to Governors
Island in New York’s harbor. He had just come from delivering an important speech at
the United Nations announcing massive unilateral military cuts. He was the first
Soviet leader to speak at the United Nations since Nikita Khrushchev in 1960. Now he
was on his way to his fifth and final meeting with Ronald Reagan and his first meeting
with George Bush since the president-elect’s victory in November. As Colin Powell
recalls:
The meeting was really as a result of a request from President Gorbachev. I
was national security advisor and we were not expecting to have any more
summits or meetings. Really, it was not a summit. In fact, we carefully did not
call it a summit But we were not planning to have any more meetings with
Gorbachev, and suddenly he said, “Well I’m going to be in the United
Nations.... and would like to meet and have one final go at i t to talk.” And so
it was hard to say no at that point.... he initiated it and, o f course, we accepted
i t No reason not to accept it. We made clear to the Soviets, however, that we
were not looking for a substantive exchange. It was a good way to say goodbye
Reagan-Gorbachev and also say hello to President Bush.1
The White House team selected the U.S. Coast Guard station on Governors Island for
the sight of the luncheon. Security would be relatively simple to maintain; the Statue
o f Liberty served as the dramatic backdrop for what was sure to be a historic
opportunity for photographs. One last meeting between old friends, however, masked
underlying motives behind the meeting. Gorbachev wanted to size up the new
president and receive assurances that there would be continuity in the relationship
between the two countries after Inauguration day on January 20,1989. Even though
1Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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the two men had met at the Chernenko funeral and the Washington summit,
Gorbachev wanted to see for himself if President Bush, now free to make his own
decisions, would be different than Vice President Bush, who always supported
Reagan’s policies. As Colin Powell recalls, the proposed meeting was a difficult
situation for Bush:
There was nervousness on the part of President Bush and his associates that
perhaps the Soviets might try to throw some proposal at us that they would
have to deal with before they had even come into office.2
It was a difficult position for Bush. He was officially there as Ronald Reagan’s vice
president. Bush decided to finish out his job as vice president. He refused to bring
James Baker, his nominee for secretary of state, lest it give the wrong signal to
Gorbachev. When Reagan walked out to meet Gorbachev as his car pulled up, Bush
dutifully stayed inside until the two men had exchanged greetings and only then
nonchalantly walked outside (See figure 3.1). Just prior to the luncheon, Reagan was
asked by a reporter to respond to Gorbachev’s announcement to reduce troops. His
response: “I heartily approve.” The reporter then turned to Bush who awkwardly
replied, “I support what the President said.” It was clear that Bush was not ready to
announce what his policy would be as president Later, Bush quietly told Gorbachev
that he looked forward to working with him “at the appropriate time.”3 The
appropriate time, however, would be a while in coming. Bush and his foreign policy
team had not yet decided how they were going to proceed. At least, they were not
ready to announce their plan to the world because it would be markedly different from
2 Ibid.
3 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United State and the Soviet
Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 321-322.
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Figure 3.1. The meeting at Governors Island on December 7,1988, was the last official one between Reagan and Gorbachev.
More importantly, it was the first between Gorbachev and President-elect Bush since his victory in November. (Courtesy of the
George Bush Presidential Library.)

that o f Ronald Reagan. Bush’s loyalty to Reagan made his transition from vice
president to president a slow and difficult process.
Bush’s change in foreign policy was orchestrated by his closest advisor, one of
the Reagan administration’s critics, Brent Scowcroft Scowcroft was convinced that
the Cold War could only be brought to a conclusion if it ended where it had begun: in
Central and Eastern Europe. More specifically, the Cold War had begun in Germany
after World War EL The United States and the Soviet Union split Germany in two,
creating spheres of influence that would pit the two sides against each other. In order
for the confrontation to end, the German question would have to be tackled. As
Scowcroft recalls:
I wanted... to focus on Eastern Europe. There was ferment in Eastern Europe,
especially in Poland. And I wanted to take advantage of that ferment to try and
get the Soviet army out o f Eastern Europe, or at least reduce their presence to
allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a progressive way.4
This might seem like an obvious decision; however, Reagan strongly disagreed.
Reagan was obsessed with reducing nuclear weapons and more concerned with arms
control discussions with Gorbachev than substantive proposals to reshape Central and
Eastern Europe. As for the German question, Reagan’s assistant secretary of state
Rozanne Ridgway summed up the administration’s position by arguing that the
existing situation was stable and a source of peace and that renewed debate over the
reunification of Germany would be premature and unwise/ Despite the
recommendations o f the outgoing Reagan officials, many o f whom worked on the
Bush foreign policy review before leaving office, Scowcroft was committed to shifting
4 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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American policy. He recommended that “the goal o f U.S. policy should be to
overcome the division of the continent through the acceptance of common democratic
values.”6 The Bush administration, however, was careful not to make the same
mistakes that had started the Cold War in the first place. Scowcroft, and particularly
Baker, wanted to make sure that their initiatives would not give the impression that the
United States and the Soviet Union were getting together to carve up Eastern Europe.
They also did not want to bring about reckless change at a pace that might end in
violence. As Scowcroft recalls:
We did not stimulate ferment in Eastern Europe. We had done that earlier in
the '70s and indeed in the ’50s when we helped stimulate the Hungarian revolt
and so on. That turned out to be counter productive because when we turned
people out in the streets, we weren’t prepared to support them. So what we
tried to do was encourage reform at a level that we thought would be below
that that the Soviet Union would think they would have to crush it. So we
wanted to keep it going but we didn’t want it smashed, as was usually the case
with revolt in Eastern Europe with all the leaders killed or put in prison. And
that’s what we tried to do and it turned out, you know, because o f our skill or
because of luck it turned out that that was very effective in this case.7
To facilitate this type of change, the administration hoped to provoke change but never
direct intervention. Bush made two European trips to further this goal. The first, in the
spring of 1989, was to Western Europe and coincided with the NATO summit that was
scheduled to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the alliance. The second was in the
summer of 1989 and focused on Eastern Europe and ended with the G-7 economic
summit in Paris. These two presidential trips, along with the speeches scheduled for
the commencement season, gave the administration the opportunity to lay out its new
5 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A
Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 26.
6 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 28.
7 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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policy initiatives and put pressure on other governments to respond. This was, in
reality, a diplomatic offensive that finally allowed the new administration to break free
from the Reagan-era policies and forge a new course, which even though still
somewhat fragmented, was more in line with Scowcroft’s goal to capitalize on the
ferment in Eastern Europe.
The NATO Summit
The NATO summit presented the Bush administration with some interesting
challenges. Gorbachev had undertaken an intense public relations campaign. His
speeches about peace and democracy in Eastern Europe were well publicized, placing
pressure on the West to respond. His message resonated with many European political
leaders who questioned the need for defense spending at current NATO levels. At a
time when Gorbachev seemed to be moving beyond the Cold War, the United States
was still “dourly debating tanks and missiles.”8 This, coupled with Gorbachev’s
dramatic arms control announcements in his speech to the United Nations in
December, had placed the West on the political defensive. Both Baker and Scowcroft
were determined to use the NATO summit to establish Bush as the sole leader of the
alliance and gain the initiative. The two topics that needed to be addressed at the
summit were the reduction of conventional (non-nuclear) forces in Europe (CFE), and
the modernization and possible reduction of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The
general public tended to perceive these issues as boring; however, Scowcroft knew
that the Cold War would continue as long as the U.S. and Soviets maintained opposing
armed camps in Europe. The Bush administration needed to find a way to reduce the
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hundreds o f thousands o f Soviet troops, which they pinpointed as the true source of
Europe’s insecurity. This type of fundamental change had not been included in
Gorbachev’s flashier, yet less meaningful, arms control proposals. The way for the
United States to affect change was to have an alliance in full agreement on the
solutions and united behind President Bush. To reach this goal, the Bush
administration began working on proposals to present at the NATO summit.

The SNF problem was made difficult because of West Germany. NATO
needed modem nuclear forces to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw
Pact In West Germany, however, Chancellor Helmut Kohl faced increasing public
resistance because short-range missiles, with a range of 300 miles, would in all
likelihood be directed at targets within Germany or Poland. The Germans even had a
sardonic maxim: “The shorter the missile, the deader the German.”9 Understandably, a
strong anti-nuclear movement in the Federal Republic began to call for the elimination
o f the current 88 SNF launchers (as opposed to around 1,400 for the Soviets!).10In
1987, NATO had agreed to delay the decision on modernization until a comprehensive
plan could be formulated, scheduled to be finished by the 1989 summit. The United
States, supported by most of the alliance, felt that the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in
conventional forces had to be addressed before major changes in NATO’s nuclear
weapons could be discussed. The Bush administration faced increasing pressure to

8 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998),
57.
9 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992,85.
10Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 58.
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create both a CFE proposal and a SNF proposal before the NATO summit As
Scowcroft recalls:
From our perspective, resolving the differences in time for the summit, and
doing so in a way that would strengthen NATO unity and put us out in front of
Gorbachev, presented the first test of President Bush’s alliance leadership.11
In March 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had agreed to a proposal presented by
Baker of unequal CFE reductions to create and equal level of forces at about 5-10
percent below the current NATO levels. The proposal was criticized as insufficient;
Bush pushed for larger cuts. Less than two weeks before the summit, Bush sat down
with his most trusted advisors to discuss a CFE initiative. Scowcroft and Baker pushed
for bold cuts; Crowe and Cheney voiced objections. President Bush had the deciding
vote: “I want this [more radical proposal] done. Don’t keep telling me why it can’t be
done. Tell me how it can be done.”12The result was President Bush’s Conventional
Parity Initiative, which proposed a 20% cut in U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe and
establish a ceiling of approximately 275,000 each. This would force the U.S. to
withdraw and demobilize 30,000 troops and would require the Soviets to reduce their
600,000-strong Red Army in Eastern Europe by 325,000. In addition, President Bush
proposed a reduction to parity of all tanks, armored troop carriers, artillery, and landbased combat aircraft and helicopters to a ceiling of 15% below the current NATO
totals; weapons removed were to be destroyed. The president proposed that this
reduction to parity be negotiated within 6 months to a year and that it be implemented

11 Ibid., 60.
12Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 94.
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by 1993 at the latest13 Bush knew that he would need the support of the major NATO
leaders for his idea to work and sent Deputy Secretary o f State Lawrence Eagleburger
and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to Europe to win the support of
Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Kohl.
The NATO summit took place on May 29-30,1989, in Brussels (See figure
3.2). Bush knew that his public image in regards to foreign policy rested on the
outcome o f the summit. President Bush presented his CFE proposal in the formal
session. Margaret Thatcher praised Bush’s initiative, claiming it would promote unity
within the alliance. Mitterrand then asked to speak. He offered his full support:
...good for the alliance because we can’t give the impression of merely
standing in place.... We need innovation. The president o f the United States
has displayed imagination—indeed, intellectual audacity o f the rarest kind....
Those advising me said ‘no’ to aircraft.... But I told them they were wrong. I
told them we must be bold, as the American president wants us to be. President
Bush, I again congratulate you.14
Bush had scored the public victory that he had sorely needed. The alliance agreed that
SNF negotiations leading to a partial reduction would begin, once implementation of
conventional force reductions was underway. One London newspaper said that Bush
had ridden “to the rescue like the proverbial U.S. cavalry, at the last possible
moment”15Reporters in the United States would now have trouble accusing the Bush
administration of lacking vision.

13 A full description of the Conventional Parity Initiative can be found in President
Bush’s “Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe,” Current Policy No. 1179,
published by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C.
14Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, A t the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 79.
15 The London Guardian, 31 May 1989.
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Figure 3.2, Baker and Bush at the NATO Summit in Brussels, May 29, 1989. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

Bush traveled to Germany to make one o f the most important speeches o f his
presidency. In his address in the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, Chancellor Kohl’s home
turf, Bush linked the end o f the Cold War to an end of the division of Europe:
For 40 years, the seeds o f democracy in Eastern Europe lay dormant, buried
under the frozen tundra of the Cold War. And for 40 years, the world has
waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade, time after time, the
flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression. And
again, the world waited. But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever.
The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and
free.16
He went on to issue an ultimatum:
The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe
is whole. Today, it is this very concept o f a divided Europe that is under siege.
And that’s why our hopes run especially high, because the division of Europe
is under siege not by armies, but by the spread o f ideas.... It comes from a
single powerful idea—democracy.... As President, I will continue to do all I
can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination
for all o f Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax and we
must not waver.... But democracy’s journey East is not easy.... Barriers and
barbed wire still fence in nations.... There cannot be a common European
home until all within it are free to move from room to room.... The path of
freedom leads to a larger home—a home where West meets East, a democratic
home—the commonwealth of free nations.17
Bush made clear that the Cold War would not end until the division o f Europe ended.
His reference to the “commonwealth o f free nations” was a deliberate response to
Gorbachev’s call for a “common European home.” In essence it was a direct challenge
to the proposals made by Gorbachev. He argued that even though glasnost was a
Russian word, openness was a Western concept. To that end, Bush called for free
elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe, cooperation in addressing
16Remarks by the President at Rheingoldhalle, May 31, 1989, George Bush
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89—2/90, Box #13.
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
17Ibid.
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environmental problems in the East, and a less militarized Europe. Perhaps his most
dramatic proposal, especially considering the venue for the speech, came when he
noted that Hungary was tearing down its barbed wire fence along its border with
Austria:
Just as the barriers are coming down in Hungary, so must they fall throughout
all o f Eastern Europe. Let Berlin be next! Let Berlin be next! Nowhere is the
division between East and West seen more clearly than in Berlin. And there
this brutal wall cuts neighbor from neighbor, brother from brother. And that
wall stands as a monument to the failure o f communism. It must come down.18
Bush’s statement lacked the drama and showmanship o f Reagan’s 1986 speech in
Berlin. But the message was clear: the division o f Berlin and Europe must end.
Tiananmen Square Massacre
Immediately following his return from Europe, Bush had to deal with a crisis
in China that swept away many of the gains in Bush’s public image. On June 3-4,
1989, armed units of the People’s Liberation Army poured into Tiananmen Square in
Beijing, brutally dispersing thousands of student demonstrators with bullets and tanks.
The demonstrators had been gathering in the square since April IS to mourn the death
o f Hu Yaobang, former general secretary of the Communist Party. Hu, who was
removed from office in 1987 for excessive liberalism, was considered by many to be a
sincere reformer. Hard-liners within the government reacted harshly to the
demonstrators and sent police to breakup the demonstrations, beating students in the
process. Soon, the mourning of Hu transformed to protests against the government,
with calls for increased democratic freedoms, improvements in university living
conditions, a crackdown on corruption, and other political reforms. Adding to the
18Ibid.
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tensions was the scheduled visit of Mikhail Gorbachev on May 15,1989. Western
television crews had already arrived in Beijing to set up their cameras for the event
and were able to cover the protestors. The international attention only fueled the
students’ protest and placed more pressure on the Chinese government. Many of the
events planned for Gorbachev’s visit had to be cancelled, as the ranks of the
demonstrators swelled to almost a million. The government declared martial law and
sent in the troops. The ensuing massacre was broadcast live to audiences around the
world and created a problem that, as the following account by James Baker proves, the
Bush administration had not anticipated:
The morning of Saturday, June 3, 1989, dawned clear and sunny in
Washington. It was perfect golf weather.... On the spur of the moment, I called
the Chevy Chase Country Club, then telephoned my eldest son, Jamie, at his
home in suburban Alexandria, Virginia. It was about 9:30 A.M.
“I’ve got a great deal for you,” I told him. “I’ve got a tee time at Chevy
Chase in forty-five minutes. Grab your sticks and come on over right now and
we’II play some golf.”
“I don’t think you’re going to be playing any golf today,” Jamie
replied.
“What do you mean?”
“Well, I’m sitting here watching tanks rolling through Tiananmen
Square on CNN.”
“You’re kidding me.”
“No.”
After a few startled seconds of silence, I understood he wasn’t. “Okay,”
I said. “I’ve got to go.”
As I hung up, my other phone line rang. It was a duty officer at the
State Department Operations Center, informing me that heavily armed unites
of the People’s Liberation Army had indeed begun firing on demonstrators in
the heart o f Beijing. Casualties were expected to be heavy, I was told.19
Thanks to CNN, the American public knew about the crisis before the secretary of
state. Public outrage in the United States was intense. Bush, however, was reluctant to
upset the process o f normalization that had been initiated by Nixon in 1972. President
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Bush had a personal understanding of one o f America’s greatest Cold War strategic
successes, having turned down ambassadorships in Paris and London to accept the job
as chief of the United States Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974:
I wanted a measured response, one aimed at those who had pushed for and
implemented the use of force: the hard-liners and the Army. I didn’t want to
punish the Chinese people for the acts of their government I believed that the
commercial contacts between our countries had helped lead to the quest for
more freedom. If people had commercial incentives, whether it’s in China or in
other totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes inexorable. For this
reason I wanted to avoid cutting off the sales and contacts. It was important
that the Chinese leaders know we could not continue business as usual and that
the People’s Liberation Army realize that we wanted to see restraint. What I
certainly did not want to do was completely break the relationship we had
worked so hard to build since 1972.... While angry rhetoric might be
temporarily satisfying to some, I believed it would hurt our efforts in the long
term.20
Angry rhetoric was exactly what the American public wanted. Although it might have
been a solid diplomatic decision to show restraint, and although the United States was
the first major government to impose sanctions on China after Tiananmen, what the
public really wanted was to see a little righteous indignation from their president.
Having failed to accommodate the public mood, Bush was heavily criticized by the
press and Congress. It was on this note that President Bush embarked on his trip to
Eastern Europe. It should have been a victorious follow-up to his successful NATO
summit; however, Tiananmen and the criticism of Bush’s restraint cast a shadow over
his trip to Poland.
Bush's Trip to Eastern Europe
Ironically, the first round of parliamentary elections in Poland occurred the
same day as the Tiananmen massacre. Solidarity’s Civic Committee won 92 of 100
19Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 97-98.
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seats in the first round o f Senate elections and 160 of the 161 Diet seats that were open
for competition. In stark contrast, the governing coalition was only able to fill 5 of the
299 seats reserved for them. Only five of the Communist's candidates were elected. It
was totally humiliating for the government because it was so completely unexpected.
The result was the legitimization o f Solidarity.21 Coupled with the surprising election
results was Gorbachev’s public rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine:
The political and social order in one country or another has changed in the past
and can also change in the future. Still, it is exclusively up to the peoples
themselves. It is their choice. All interference, whatever its nature, in the
internal affairs of a state to limit its sovereignty of a state, even from a friend
or all, is inadmissible.22
The elections in Poland and Gorbachev’s rhetoric accentuated the polarization within
the Warsaw Pact that pitted the USSR, Poland, and Hungary against Romania, the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The closed-door meetings of the Warsaw Pact
heads of state and Party leaders in Bucharest, July 7-8, 1989, were filled with tension.
Leaders such as Nicolae Ceausescu and Milos Jakes criticized Gorbachev’s
perestroika and called for action to put an end to the “counterrevolutionary” process
that was occurring in Poland. It was becoming increasingly clear that the destruction
o f socialism’s conquests through the policies of Gorbachev had the potential of
turning violent That made Bush’s trip to Eastern Europe even more imperative. The
situation in Poland became more complicated. The gains by the Solidarity had placed
in jeopardy the election of General Jaruzelski, whose election was one of the central
20 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 89.
21 Jacques Ldvesque, The Enigma o f1989: The USSR and the Liberation o f Eastern
Europe, translated by Keith Martin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997),
117.
22 Ibid., 118n. (Translated from Pravda, 7 July 1989).
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elements o f the Roundtable agreements. Also, Poland was informally asking the
United States for $10 billion in assistance over the next three years. It was under these
conditions that Bush arrived in Warsaw on July 10,1989. It was important for
President Bush to show that he was backing the political and economic reform efforts
in Eastern Europe. Due to its own huge deficit, however, the United States could not
deliver substantial aid. A fact acknowledged by NSA Scowcroft:
The days were over when the United States could pick up the check for
everything: a new Marshall Plan was not possible.
The United States sought to share the economic burden with Western Europe. The
proposal by Bush called for the rescheduling of Poland's $39 billion foreign debt, a
request for $325 million in new loans from the World Bank, and $100 million from
the United States. The package was inadequate for the needs of Poland. At a joint
session of the newly elected Polish parliament, President Bush voiced his support of
the momentous changes in Poland’s political system:
The elections which brought us—all of us—together here today mean that the
path the Polish people have chosen is that of political pluralism and economic
rebirth. The road ahead is a long one, but it is the only road which leads to
prosperity and social peace. Poland’s progress along this road will show the
way toward a new era throughout Europe, an era based on common values and
not just geographic proximity. The Western democracies will stand with the
Polish people, and other peoples o f this region.24
Bush wanted a gradual process that encouraged change while maintaining order. His
preference for a controlled process led him to support Jaruzelski over the Solidarity
candidates. Jaruzelski, who was considering not even running for president because of
23 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 113.
24 Remarks by the President at Joint Session o f Parliament, the Sejm, Warsaw,
Poland, July 10,1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy
Speeches, 4/89—2/90, Box #13.
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Solidarity’s victory in the parliament election, asked for Bush’s advice during a
private conversation. Bush urged him to run for election:
It was ironic: Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior
Communist leader to run for office. But I felt that Jaruzelski’s experience was
the best hope for a smooth transition.23
Later, General Jaruzelski would write in his memoirs that President Bush’s support
played a crucial role in his election to the presidency.26
From Poland, Bush traveled to Hungary, the first American president to do so.
Bush stepped to the podium, waved off an umbrella, and dramatically ripped up his
speech. The crowds cheered him on as he spoke briefly of his support of the reform
efforts being undertaken in Hungary. Near the end of his speech he noticed an elderly
women who was standing near the podium, soaked from the rain. He quickly took off
his raincoat and wrapped it around her shoulders. The crowd erupted and Bush walked
into the crowd, shaking hands and wishing them well. It was a dramatic moment and
one that showed the people of Hungary that the United States was committed to
establishing a partnership with Hungary to promote lasting change. Bush then flew to
Paris for the G-7 summit in hopes of convincing them to share the burden of helping
Eastern Europe’s economic distress. He did just that, achieving the aims that he had
promised to both Poland and Hungary and making the trip to Eastern Europe a very
successful one. Energized and growing more confident, Bush decided that it was time
to consider a meeting with Gorbachev.

25 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 117.
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Collision Course
At the same time as Bush’s trip to Poland and Hungary, Gorbachev was
making a highly publicized trip to West Germany, calling for immediate cuts in shortrange nuclear missiles in NATO. The proposals had gained Gorbachev attention in
Germany; however, the proposals were designed to disrupt the gains that Bush had
made at the NATO summit and create rifts within the alliance. Tactics such as this
confirmed Bush’s decision to move cautiously in regard to Gorbachev. Bush and
Gorbachev traveled Europe with competing messages: whether or not the West needed
to wait for concrete actions by the Soviet Union. The ferment that was growing in
Eastern Europe, however, was not going to wait for the West to decide between the
competing views. The Bush administration knew that, as the changes in Eastern
Europe accelerated, Gorbachev would face increasing pressure from hard-liners to
intervene. After all, Eastern Europe was a buffer zone that separated the Soviet Union
from the W est If its once-reliable allies began to slip away, the Soviet Union would
lose much of the security that it had depended upon. It became increasingly unclear
whether or not the Cold War would end with violence. The Bush administration knew
that “dying empires rarely go out peacefully.”27 Bush became even more determined
that the cataclysmic changes in world structure that were about to occur would take
place without a shot being fired:
The dangers were ahead, and I would have to respond with even greater care as
the Eastern Europeans pushed their own way to the future. We could not let the
people down—there could still be more Tiananmens.28
26 Ldvesque, The Enigma o f1989,123.
27 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
28 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 131.
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Realizing the growing need for a face-to-face meeting between the two men, Bush
started the first draft o f a letter on the flight home from the G-7 meeting in Paris that
suggested just such a meeting:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the
United States. My mind is frill o f the fascinating conversations that I had with
people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in
Paris for France’s bicentennial. Let me get quickly to the point o f this letter. I
would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to
the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our
shoulders, without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about “who’s
winning,” “what agreements have been reached,” or “has our meeting
succeeded or failed.” Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to
produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my
thinking is changing. Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or
perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and
Germany—whatever the cause—I just want to reduce the chances there could
be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more
personal basis....29
Bush felt that the negotiations for a proposed meeting between the men should be
done secretly as to avoid any outside pressures or competing public agendas.
Consequently, he decided to bypass the normal channels of communication. Only
Scowcroft, Baker, and Chief of Staff John Sununu knew of the letter. The final draft
was presented to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Gorbachev’s principal military advisor,
at the end o f July when he was visiting Washington, D.C. to discuss arms control.
Akhromeyev could be trusted to deliver the letter in absolute secrecy. Gorbachev
responded within days of receiving Bush’s letter. His messenger delivered
Gorbachev’s approval of the proposal, suggesting that the two leaders could meet as
early as September. The only problem was finding a location. The two sides wrangled
29George Bush, A ll the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings
(New York: Scribner, 1999), 433.
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over location for weeks before President Bush’s brother, William “Bucky” Bush
suggested the island of Malta. Malta would have two benefits. Gorbachev had already
planned a state visit to Italy at the end of November and could easily adjust his
schedule to include a trip to the island. Also, Bush, as an old Navy man, liked the idea
o f holding the conference at sea, recalling the Roosevelt-Churchill shipboard meeting
in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in 1941. A meeting aboard a ship limited the number
o f press and staff that could attend. Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft
recalls:
It was primarily more of a trust-building meeting. He [Bush] had wanted from
the onset of his administration to talk with Gorbachev and I and I think Dick
Cheney had held him back because historically the Soviet Union always
profited by summits because there was an atmosphere that, you know the Cold
War was over; we didn’t have to worry. And that always made it harder for us
to get appropriations through Congress and so on. So we didn’t want—I didn’t
want, and Cheney didn’t want—a summit until we had something specific to
get from it, that is an arms control agreement or something else. And early in
the administration we didn’t have anything yet. So the president acquiesced in
holding off a summit Then in the summer o f ’89, as a result o f his trip through
Eastern Europe and what he saw there and his meeting with his European allies
at the G-7 summit he decided that he had to talk with Gorbachev, that things
were moving too fast, that there was too much danger of misunderstanding,
and so he had to talk with Gorbachev. But he, in fact he didn’t even want to
call it a summit He wanted to call it an exchange of views, not to make
agreements, which is what summits usually are, but just to exchange views.
And he was delighted with the idea of a summit out away from everybody
where the press couldn’t be hovering around and where there would be little
pressure for either side to try to make negotiating points or debating points.30
Both Gorbachev and Bush looked forward to the Malta conference as a potential
breakthrough in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Soon, however, events in Europe would
add an even greater importance to the meeting in Malta.

30 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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Gorbachev faced a crisis not on the agenda for Malta. Nationalists in the
Baltics were calling for independence, claiming that the 1939 agreement between
Hitler and Stalin which led to the annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had
been illegal. Baltic nationalism threatened the integrity of the Soviet Union itself. It
also had the potential to spread throughout the Soviet Union where Gorbachev’s
strategies for political and economic reforms had made it increasingly difficult to
maintain order. The United States had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the
Baltic states. The risk of breaking a 50-year-old precedent of U.S. policy made it
difficult for Bush to call for gradual change in the Baltics. Yet Bush worried that
separatism could lead to a civil war that could end disastrously for the United States if
nuclear weapons fell under uncertain control. Gorbachev seemed receptive to greater
autonomy for the Baltics; however, if they pushed for separation, Gorbachev might
feel pressure to resort to force. Separatism was spreading to other parts of the Soviet
Union. In Ukraine, nationalists had marched in Kiev in support of independence. No
matter how much he believed in perestroika, Gorbachev could not lose the Soviet
Union’s second-largest republic, its primary source of food. A meeting between
Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher demonstrates just how delicate of a situation the
outbreak of separatism in the republics had become:
Over luncheon with Thatcher, Gorbachev dismissed the problem of
nationalism with the sweep o f his hand. Recalling Charles de Gaulle’s remark
on how difficult it was to preside over a country that manufactured more than
120 different kinds of cheese, he said, “Imagine how much harder it is to run a
country with over a hundred and twenty different nationalities.” “Yes!”
interjected Leonid Abalkin, a deputy prime minister who served as economic
advisor to Gorbachev. “Especially if there’s no cheese!”31
31 Beschloss and Talbott, A t the Highest Levels, 108.
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Even Gorbachev could not continue to gloss over the mounting problems that his
political and economic reforms were causing in the Soviet Union.
The Fall of the Berlin Wall
Another problem was the situation in East Germany. In May 1989, Hungary
dismantled the barriers along its border with Austria. “Vacationing” East Germans
could slip across into Austria and make their way to West Germany. When Hungary
officially opened their borders on September 10, over 10,000 East Germans poured
across and made their way to the West. It was a public humiliation to the Warsaw Pact
and threatened its cohesiveness. It was even a worse situation for the East German
government. The rising discontent forced a series of resignations within the
government. Repression was now seen as an unlikely option by the government.
Gorbachev claimed that what was occurring in East Germany did not directly affect
the Soviet Union and ordered the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany not to get
involved. This, in effect, demonstrated the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which
asserted the Soviet right to provide assistance, including military assistance, to any
Communist nation where Socialism was in jeopardy. As Secretary of State Baker

recalls, the Bush administration could no longer doubt that Gorbachev’s deeds
matched his words:
What it proved to us was that the Soviet leadership had, in fact, as they had
told us they had, ruled out the use of force to keep the empire together. That
was the critical factor. They told us early on they weren’t going to use force to
keep the empire together. And when they didn’t that proved that they were
telling us the truth and that they could be trusted and that we could do business
with them.32

32 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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East German leader Egon Krenz made a frantic call to Gorbachev asking for
instructions. Gorbachev told him that the Soviets would not get involved and
suggested that he open his borders. East Germany announced on November 9,1989
that it was relaxing its border-control policy with West Germany. Citizens of East
Germany could now leave the country without having to obtain special permission.
Ironically, several mistakes were made by the East German government that allowed
for the historic change. The announcement did not mention the city of Berlin, which
usually received separate status and had stricter exit visa requirements. Also, the new
policy was not meant to take place until after it had been presented to the legislature;
however, GQnter Schabowski, a Politbiiro member and reformist Communist, took it
upon himself to announce the policy at the end o f his daily press conference. As two
Bush officials would later conclude:
The truth of the matter is that the hapless East German government had opened
the Berlin Wall by mistake. In one of the most colossal administrative errors in
the long, checkered history o f public bureaucracy, the Krenz government
abdicated responsibility of the most important decision in its history to the
people in the street.33
Confused officials and observers did not understand exactly what was meant; rumors
began to spread that all travel restrictions were dropped. Crowds formed along the
Berlin Wall as border guards waited for instructions that would not come. Finally,
guards gave in to the crowds and people crossed over into West Berlin. The
atmosphere turned electric as jubilant crowds from both sides of the wall began a
celebration o f the wall’s collapse.

33 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 101.
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T m not going to dance on the Berlin Wall”
In Washington, President Bush watched the celebration on television.
Bewildered, he remarked to his aides:
If the Soviets are going to let the Communists fall in East Germany, they’ve
got to be really serious—more serious than I realized.34
Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater knew that the president needed to give the
press his view on the historic changes taking place in Germany:
When the wire stories began coming in that people were breaking down the
wall, I saw it the same way the White House press corps did: as a big news
story to be handled immediately. I took the wire stories to the president, who
was sitting in his study off the Oval watching on CNN as people climbed the
wall and toppled over to the other side. He read the wires slowly, as if making
an independent determination of their truth. “Do you want to make a
statement?” I asked. “Why?” the president said. He knew me well enough to
know that my question was really a recommendation. “Why?” I repeated.
“This is an incredibly historic day. People will want to know what it means.
They need some presidential assurance that the world is OK.” The president
just looked at me. He understood the historic point, of course, but his vision
was taking him into a future o f German reunification, diminished communism,
and a new world order to be established. “Listen, Marlin,” he said, “I’m not
going to dance on the Berlin Wall. The last thing I want to do is brag about
winning the cold war, or bringing the wall down. It won’t help us in Eastern
Europe to be bragging about this.” “I understand that, sir,” I said, “but we have
to show that we understand the historical significance of this. You don’t have
to brag.” I paused to let him formulate a message in his mind, then added, “We
can just bring the pool into the Oval Office, you will sit at your desk, and the
whole thing will be very dignified and presidential.” “OK,” he said.35
Reporters were herded into the Oval Office where President Bush was discussing the
situation with Baker, Scowcroft, and Sununu (See figure 3.3). Bush sat at his desk
with briefing books stacked on his desk, one opened to a map of Germany. Reporters
huddled around the desk to record a brief statement from the president Speaking
34 Beschloss and Talobott, A t the Highest Levels, 132.
35 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade
With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 261-262.
-
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Figure 3.3. At bis press conference in the Oval Office following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Bush urged
caution, labeling the momentous occasion as simply “a good development.” (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

matter-of-factly and without any enthusiasm, Bush labeled the fall o f the Berlin Wall
as “a good development” He went on to add:
I don’t think any single event is the end o f what you might call the Iron
Curtain. But clearly, this is a long way from the harshest Iron Curtain days.
Our objective is a Europe whole and free. Is it a step towards that? I would say
yes. Gorbachev talks about a common home. Is it a step towards that? [with a
shrug of his shoulders] Probably So.36
When asked by a reporter if there was a danger that things were accelerating too
quickly, Bush responded:
We are handling it in a way where we’re not trying to give anybody a hard
time. We’re saluting those who can move forward with democracy. We’re
encouraging the concept of a Europe whole and free. And so we just welcome
it.37
Lesley Stahl of CBS challenged his less than enthusiastic response:
Stahl:

In what you just said, that is a sort of victory for our side in the
big East-West battle. But, you don’t seem elated.

Bush:

I’m elated. I’m just not an emotional kind of guy.... We’ll have
Some suggest more flamboyant courses o f action for this
country. But, I think we are handling this properly... and so, the
fact that I’m not bubbling over, maybe it’s getting along
towards evening because I feel very good about it.38

While the president was responding to the criticism that he was not elated, he was
leaning back in his leather chair, looking down into his lap and fiddling with a pen.
Fitzwater stood in the background, leaning against the wall, knowing that the president
was not doing well:
From the beginning, he seemed uninspired. As he continued, the president did
the one thing that made every Bush staffer start to sweat He started sliding
down in his chair. It was the absolutely ironclad signal that he didn’t like what
36 Press Statement on Berlin Wall, 9 November 1989, video footage provided by the
George Bush Presidential Library.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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he was doing, didn’t want to be there, and probably going to show it. Soon he
was talking in a monotone, his head bowed and hands folded across his chest39
To the American public, Bush seemed distracted and disinterested. He was out of
touch with the dramatic changes that they watched on television. At a time when he
could have used a strong public performance to lead the nation in its celebration of the
end of the Cold War, President Bush seemed to be asleep on the job. Even Bush
admitted that the press conference did not go well:
It was an awkward and uncomfortable conference. The press wanted me to
give a summation of the historic moment. O f course, I was thankful about the
events in Berlin, but as I answered questions my mind kept racing over a
possible Soviet crackdown, turning all the happiness to tragedy.
Bush knew that the Cold War was still far from over. As Fitzwater recalls, Bush was
more concerned with ending the Cold War than with his image:
First of all, he didn’t give a damn about his image. And I specifically raised it
’cause I went to him and said, you know, the wall is coming down and you
need to say something here that’s going to be strong and show that the
president recognizes what’s happening and it’d be good for your image and so
forth. And he said to me he didn’t care about image. That this was not a time to
be worrying about that sort of thing. And that he wanted to respond in a way
that Gorbachev would understand and that would be supportive o f moving
ahead in the future relationship. I mean, it’s one of Bush’s more admirable
traits in the sense that he had enormous discipline in order to do what he
thought was right for the country even at the personal risk of bad press and bad
publicity and image consideration. And he wouldn’t do it41
Secretary o f State James Baker also defended Bush’s decision:
I still think that history will prove that he was absolutely right in not trying to
stick it in the eye of the Soviets, not trying to goad them or, as everyone put it
at the time, “dance on the wall.” That would have been a terrible mistake
politically and diplomatically.42
39 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 262-263.
40 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 149.
41 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
42 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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Certainly, Bush had very sound reasons for reacting in the cautious manner that he
did. He feared that a Western celebration o f the wall’s collapse might encourage a
backlash by hard-liners in East Berlin and Moscow. But to a skeptical public, Bush’s
actions built upon the images created by his lengthy foreign policy review and his
reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre to show that Bush, as a symbolic leader,
did not live up to his promise to follow in the steps of Reagan. What the public did
not know was that Bush was acting on a request sent to him by Gorbachev that very
day. As Bush recalled:
On the day the Wall opened, Gorbachev sent messages to Kohl warning him to
stop talking of reunification, and cabled me urging that 1 not overreact. He
worried that the demonstrations might get out of control, with “unforeseen
consequences,” and he asked for understanding. This was the first time
Gorbachev had clearly indicated genuine anxiety about events in Eastern
Europe. Heretofore he had seemed relaxed, even blase, about the accelerating
movements in the region away from communism and Soviet control. It was if
he suddenly realized the serious implications o f what was going on.43
To go against the wishes o f Gorbachev would have seriously jeopardized the gains
Bush hoped to accomplish at the upcoming Malta meeting. James Baker explained
Bush’s fear:
He feared that it would make it tougher for us to continue to move forward
positively with Gorbachev. You don’t stick it in somebody’s eye when
something is fundamental and as big and important as that happens. You
celebrate it but you do so in a more statesman like way. Because, that would
have been counter productive for us to start. . . even today when we talk about
winning the Cold War, and I see Gorbachev today, and even today when we
talk about winning the Cold War, he takes offense at that. He says, “You didn’t
win the Cold War; we came to an understanding, a peaceful resolution of our
differences.”44

43 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 150.
44 James A. Baker in , telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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Even with Bush’s acquiescence to Gorbachev’s request, there was no denying that
change was taking place at an unprecedented rate and that the fall o f the Berlin Wall
demonstrated that change to the world. As Brent Scowcroft recalled:
I think that what it did is mostly underscore the importance o f the two leaders
talking because unexpected events could turn into a crisis very easily.
Gorbachev was very frightened by the fall of the Berlin Wall.45
The Malta Conference
Bush met with his National Security Council on November 30, 1989, in the
Cabinet room of the White House.46 It would be the last meeting before his departure
for Malta:
I don’t want to be begrudging. I don’t want to seem halfhearted. The purpose
o f what I’m going to be doing over there is to show Gorbachev that I support
him all the way.4
The private statement by the president expressed his desire to use the Malta
conference to act boldly and shed his public image. He did not mind being labeled as
cautious, but he could not stand being called timid. Up to this point, Gorbachev had
been the one to propose bold new initiatives and Bush had been the one who was seen
as timid. He wanted to use Malta to reverse that situation. Bush was determined not to
be “out proposed” this time. To that end, the Bush team had been working diligently to
prepare a list of twenty possible initiatives that Bush could use in his initial
presentation to Gorbachev. In the end, the list was trimmed to seventeen specific
proposals. As newspapers began to observe, the goals for the meeting were changing:
45 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
46National Security Council Meeting, November 30,1989—List o f Participants,
Condoleezza Rice Files, National Security Council Files, Malta Summit—December
2-3,1989, George Bush Presidential Library.
47 Beschloss and Talbott, A t the Highest Levels, 150.
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“The Malta meeting is indeed a summit No one any more on the U.S. side talks about
a ‘get acquainted’ meeting.. .”48 Gorbachev, on the other hand, had purposefully not
come up with a list of proposals, taking Bush at his word that there would not be an
agenda at the meeting. In past meetings, such as Reykjavik and Baker’s meeting with
the Soviet leader earlier in the year, Gorbachev had been accused of diplomatic sneak
attacks. Gorbachev was determined not to receive the same criticism at Malta. Dating
back to his UN address the previous year, Gorbachev had spent the past year
proposing bold initiatives. Now, he needed to attempt to consolidate whatever
progress he had already made. He knew that any further arms control proposals at this
point might create a backlash from hard-liners in the Soviet Union. He also knew that,
even though the Bush administration was beginning to overcome the earlier doubts
concerning Gorbachev’s sincerity, there was still strong doubt as to whether or not
Gorbachev could remain in power. Nervous over the dissettling pace of events in
Eastern Europe and the increasing uncertainty of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev
desperately needed the United States to reaffirm the superpower status of the Soviet
Union and his own status as Bush’s equal.49 One French newspaper described the
Soviet leader’s mission at Malta: “Mr. Gorbachev is racing against time to preserve
the USSR’s great-power interests.”50It was becoming increasingly evident with the
unfolding o f events in 1989 that Gorbachev was the leader of a superpower in decline.
He hoped to use Malta to portray to the world a U.S.-Soviet partnership that was based
48 Foreign Media Reaction to Malta Summit, December 3,1989, Heather Wilson Files,
George Bush Presidential Library.
49 Beschloss and Talbott, A t the Highest Levels, 153-54.
50Foreign Media Reaction to Malta Summit, December 3,1989, Heather Wilson Files,
George Bush Presidential Library.

116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on mutual understanding and mutual respect between equals. A letter to Bush from
former president Richard Nixon cautioned him that Gorbachev’s actions masked a
political necessity:
There is no question but that he is a remarkable new kind of leader of the
Soviet Union, and we welcome the initiatives at home and abroad that he had
already taken. But when you examine the evidence, it is clear that what he is
doing is making a virtue o f necessity. This does not make him a virtuous
leader.51
Bush knew that Gorbachev was fighting for his political survival:
I worried that we were dealing with a ticking bomb. We could not see what
inside pressures were building against Gorbachev and his programs. We were
getting hints from Moscow that one o f Gorbachev’s objectives at Malta was to
gain some sort of “understanding” for his situation and for the measures he
might take to crack down. I could not give him that, and if I did, it would have
a lasting historical, political, and moral price.52
Bush also knew, however, that it was in his own best interests to publicly support
Gorbachev in order to bring a stabilizing influence to the dramatic changes that were
taking place. He made clear his support in his departure statement before leaving for
Malta:
America understands the magnitude o f Mr. Gorbachev’s challenges. And let
there be no misunderstanding: We support perestroikaP
Bush’s eight and a half-hour flight from Andrews Air Force Base to Valletta, Malta,
did not provide him with the rest he would need for the meeting. His sleep was
interrupted with phone calls from Washington, D.C., concerning a military coup
51 Letterfrom Richard Nixon to President Bush regarding comments on upcoming
M alta summit, (6pp.), 11/16/89, Condoleezza Rice Files, National Security Council
Files, Malta Summit Paper (Preparation) December 1989 [3], George Bush
Presidential Library. Also quoted in James Baker HI, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 170.
52 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 155.
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attempt in the Philippines that attempted to oust President Cory Aquino. By the time
they reached Malta the next morning, the Bush team was a little worn down. During
the Malta conference, Bush would stay on a guided missile cruiser anchored in
Valletta harbor, the USS Belknap—the flagship o f the Sixth Fleet (See figure 3.4).
Also anchored in the harbor was a Soviet missile cruiser, the Slava, where the first
meeting was scheduled to be held. The third ship that was scheduled to be involved in
the talks was a large Soviet cruise ship, the Maxim Gorky, which was berthed at the
dock and thus, the most secure and the place where Gorbachev would be staying (See
figure 3.5). Bush spent the first day taking care of protocol with a visit to Malta’s
prime minister, a visit to the USS Forrestal, and some time settling in aboard the
Belknap. By the next morning, the weather had made a turn for the worse with twentyfoot waves and gale-force winds pounding the ships in the harbor. The venue for the
first meeting was changed to the Maxim Gorky, which was in a far more protected
position at the dock. Scowcroft recalls the feeling o f “anticipatory tension” in the
room as both sides greeted each other across a long table (See figure 3.6).54 Before
leaving for Malta Bush had announced in his departure statement that:
My discussions with president Gorbachev will enable us to become better
acquainted and to better understand each other’s views. We will not be
negotiating. We will be talking about our hopes and concerns for the future.55

53 Remarks by the President upon Departure to Malta and Brussels, The Rose Garden,
November 30,1989, Susan Koch Files, George Bush Presidential Library. Video
footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
54 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 162.
55Memo to Scowcroft concerning departure and arrival statementsfo r Malta with
attached statements fo r President’s use, Susan Koch Files, George Bush Presidential
Library.
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Figure 3.4. During the Malta conference, Bush stayed aboard the USS Belknap (right), which was anchored near a Soviet SLAVA
class missile cruiser (left). (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

p

Figure 3.5. Gorbachev preferred to stay on the more luxurious cruise ship, the Maxim Gorky, berthed at the dock. Because of the bad
weather, the meetings were held on the Maxim Gorky. (Courtesy o f the George Bush Presidential Library.)
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Figure 3.6. The first meeting of the Malta conference aboard the Maxim Gorky, December 2, 1989. (Courtesy of the George Bush
Presidential Library.)

Despite his public announcement, Bush began his presentation o f the seventeen
proposals that his team had prepared. An hour and ten minutes later, Bush finished
talking.56 After presenting his avalanche o f proposals, Bush joked to Gorbachev, “This
is the end of my non-agenda.”57 Gorbachev, o f course, did not have any proposals of
his own. Instead he talked passionately about his desire to achieve a new U.S.-Soviet
relationship in which each side would work to help the other overcome its problems.
As Fitzwater recalled, Bush then leaned across the table and inteijected that he had
already begun to move in that direction of mutual support:
“I hope you noticed that I didn’t dance on the wall when it came down.” And
Gorbachev said, “I did and I appreciate it very much.” And they talked then
about the language they would use to describe the new relationship in a postBerlin Wall situation.
The only real tense moment of the first meeting came when Gorbachev brought up the
fact that the Bush administration had been using the phrase “Western values” in
speeches and public statements to describe successful reform efforts in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. As James Baker recalled, Gorbachev felt that the term portrayed
him as a loser and the USSR has having no values, or at least, not good ones:
Gorbachev felt Western implied that reformers in the Soviet Union had not
embraced or subscribed to some sort of those values, when in fact he felt they
had. In his concern, I saw the classic Russian tension between the Slavophiles
and the Westemizers, “Why not call them ‘democratic values’?” I asked.
“That’s fine,” said Gorbachev, and with that understanding, we had forged a
new degree of cooperation, at the level o f both personalities and principles.59
After the morning meeting, Bush went back to the Belknap to have lunch with his
advisors before meeting with Gorbachev over dinner. But, as the weather continued to
56 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 259.
57 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 163.
58 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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worsen, it became apparent that the evening meeting would have to be cancelled. At
the end o f the next day’s meeting, Gorbachev asked Bush to share in a joint press
conference:
We did gain a deeper understanding of each other’s views. We set the stage for
progress across a broad range o f issues. And while it is not for the United
States and the Soviet Union to design the future for Europeans or for any other
people, I am convinced that a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship can indeed
make the future safer and brighter.60
The joint press conference and Bush’s statements provided Gorbachev with the
symbolism of a new unity that he desperately needed. It was a dramatic symbol of the
new relationship that the men had been able to achieve in the two-day meeting.
Certainly, the Malta meeting turned out to be very successful for both
Gorbachev and Bush. More importantly, it was a key event in the ending of the Cold
War. As Bush’s press secretary argued, it was the pivotal point in the change of the
U.S.-Soviet relationship:
I would say that [Malta] was the pivotal point at which the West first
recognized that Communism was changing and may collapse. And we met
with the purpose o f trying to define how that could happen, what our role
would be, and how we could help guide the future of whatever Russia
emerged.... And I remember a memo from General Scowcroft to President
Bush... for Malta that laid out three different scenarios o f what might happen
in the Soviet Union. And one was that Gorbachev was killed or thrown out of
office by hard-line Communists. The other was that Gorbachev did actually
change things but it created so much chaos and corruption that the whole
country fell apart Another one was that it kind o f worked moderately
well—they changed the politics and so forth, but the economy slipped away,
and he would be eventually replaced by somebody else who might be able to
run the country. But the point is not how well those three scenarios reflected
what actually happened, but the point is that that memo indicated that that was
59 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 171.
60 Statements by and Question and Answer Session with President Bush and Chairman
Gorbachev Aboard the Maxim Gorky, Marsaxlokk Harbor, Malta, December 3, 1989,
Cooper Evans Files—Cabinet Affairs, Box 3 of 6, George Bush Presidential Library.
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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the point at which we recognized as a country, as a president, that Communism
was gone or on its way and were making plans for the post-Cold War world.61
Brent Scowcroft agreed that Malta changed the relationship between the two
countries; however, he saw the affect that the meeting had on the Bush-Gorbachev
relationship as being just as important:
I think the relationship between the two leaders changed. That was the most
dramatic . . . that they got comfortable with each other, and from that time o n .
.. there was a rough patch the spring of 1990 over the Baltic states. . . but the
two knew each other as individuals. They would occasionally call each other
on the phone and so forth. So the personal relationship changed, and that was
very beneficial.62
At Malta, Gorbachev told Bush that he did not consider him an enemy anymore and
actually wanted the United States to maintain a presence in Europe. Secretary of State
Baker considered that statement to be the most important statement of the meeting
because, it “showed that the relationship had moved from confrontation to
cooperation.”63 And, even though no agreements were signed at Malta, the meeting
was important because it built trust between the two sides, the two leaders:
There were not a lot of specifics that were accomplished there, but it was a
very good trust-building meeting. And remember that I had been having
meetings with Sheverdnadze before Malta at which I had become convinced
that the Soviet leadership was real when they were talking about reform and
when they were talking about renouncing the use of force. President Bush
needed to hear that and see that and experience that himself with the head of
the Soviet Union.64
From Malta, Bush flew to Brussels, Belgium to speak at NATO Headquarters. It was
important for Bush to brief his allies about the meeting that he had just finished with
Gorbachev. He certainly did not want them to feel that they were being left out of
61 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
62 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
63 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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discussions that directly affected their countries. It would also be the Bush
administration’s first opportunity to put their spin on what was achieved at Malta. To

that end, the three senior advisors that traveled with Bush to Malta all appeared on
U.S. television while Bush continued to brief the Alliance. Brent Scowcroft appeared
on ABC’s “Good Morning America”; James Baker gave an interview to “CNN
Headline News,” and John Sununu made an appearance on “CBS Morning News.” All
insisted that the Malta meeting had been a great success.65 The new understanding
became even more important as the revolution that was taking place in Eastern Europe
took a bloody turn. Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of Romania who criticized
Gorbachev’s reform efforts and brutally crushed dissent in his own country, was
toppled by a national uprising and executed, along with his wife, on Christmas Day. It
was a symbolic act that the communist domination of Eastern Europe was at an end
and a reminder o f how quickly incremental reforms could give way to violent change.
The U.S.-Soviet relationship that was fostered by Malta would be key in insuring that
reform meant political and economic progress rather than chaos and disorder. The
revolutions o f 1989 had begun a transformation in the geopolitical landscape that
would continue to shape the future of Europe.
At the beginning of the year, President Bush had decided to make a
fundamental change in the foreign policy approach he had inherited from his mentor,
Ronald Reagan. By the end o f 1989, he was satisfied with his choice:
64 Ibid.
65 Interview o f Secretary o f State Baker by CNN Headline News, Interview o f Brent
Scowcroft by ABC Good Morning America, Interview o f C hiefo f S ta ffJohn Summu by
CBS Morning News, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 4,1989,
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I think we followed the right course from the outset, even if we had no way of
anticipating what was to happen in the Soviet bloc. We had chosen to switch
our focus from Moscow to Central and Eastern Europe in part to test the limits
o f Gorbachev’s commitment to reform, openness, and “new thinking” in
foreign policy. It was fortunate that we began the Administration with this
change. By concentrating on Eastern Europe and delaying engaging the Soviets
on arms control, we were able to pick up immediately on the promising
developments in Poland. We were in on the ground floor and could encourage
and take full advantage of the wave of liberalism as it moved through the
region.66
Bush, who had begun 1989 with intense criticism from the press over his long
strategic review, had ended the year on a high note. The next step, however, would be
perhaps more difficult. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which had symbolized the
changing face o f Europe, also vaulted the question of German reunification to the
center o f the world’s attention. It would not only test the new U.S.-Soviet relationship,
it would also be a test for NATO and the leader of that alliance, George Bush.

Cooper Evans Files—Cabinet Affairs, Box 3 o f 6, George Bush Presidential Library.
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
66 Bush and Scowcroft, .4 World Transformed, 180.
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-Chapter 4Personal Diplomacy:
The Reunification of Germany
In September 1983, Vice President Bush made a trip across North Africa and through
Central Europe. Bush, as was often the case, served as President Reagan’s diplomatic
surrogate. From the safety of Vienna, Bush offered a vitualistic denunciation of the
Iron Curtain:
Can a wall, can guard dogs and machine guns and border patrols deny
hundreds of years o f European history? Can they create and enforce this
fictitious division down the very center of Europe?... We [the United States]
recognize no lawful division of Europe. There is much misunderstanding about
the substance of the Yalta conference. Let me state as clearly as I can: There
was no agreement at that time to divide Europe up into “spheres of influence.”
On the contrary, the powers agreed on the principle of the common
responsibilities of the three Allies for all liberated territories. The Soviet Union
pledged itself to grant full independence to Poland and to all other states in
Eastern Europe and to hold free elections there. The Soviet violation of these
obligations is the primary root of East-West tensions today.1
More unequivocally, President Reagan made a similar point challenging Gorbachev at
Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate in September 1987:
General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this
gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!2
Those words were o f speechwriters, not foreign policy advisors. In practice, Reagan
did not want to jeopardize his goals o f nuclear arms reduction with a direct clash over

1“Vice President Bush Visits North Africa and Europe: Address at the Hofburg,
Vienna, September 21,1983,” Department o f State Bulletin, vol. 83, no. 2080,
November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 19-21.
2 “Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, June 12,
1987,” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 19801988,1987, Book I—January 1 to July 3, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987), 635.
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the political division o f Europe, something the Soviets had fought fiercely to protect.
Reagan’s strong rhetoric was never matched by action. The contradiction between
Reagan’s rhetoric and his actual policies mirrored that o f other western leaders who,
while feeling the obligation to support publicly German reunification in the abstract,
actually supported the status quo. As former British Prime Minister Edward Heath put
it in 1989, “Naturally we expressed our support of German reunification because we
knew it would never happen.”3 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agreed with
Heath: “although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany’s
aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive.”4 According to this
argument, the Four Powers agreement of June 5,1945, which divided Germany, was
actually a stabilizing influence on Europe. On the evening of November 9 and early
morning o f November 10,1989, this argument lost relevance; the status quo collapsed
with the wall. This new reality created enormous problems for both the East and the
West; however, most observers still viewed reunification in terms of years, not
months. There were simply too many unsolved problems. Some feared that dramatic
changes taking place in Germany would lead to violence or possibly a new phase of
the Cold War. The problems seemed multifaceted. The German Democratic Republic
(GDR) and German Federal Republic (FRG) were two separate German states with
markedly different systems of government; Soviet and American troops occupied East
and West Germany, respectively. Many East Germans liked socialism and feared
being “second-class” citizens; West Germans condemned the shaky East German
3 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A
Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 96.
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economy.5 Internationally, there was a fear o f new German nationalism: Britain and
France still had vivid memories o f two devastating world wars. America worried that a
unified Germany would abandon NATO; the Soviet Union considered East Germany
the heart o f the Soviet security system, an important trading partner, its most loyal
ally, and its most visible “spoil of war” that continued to be an important symbol to
protect against political decline. Both the East and West seemed to have more to lose
than to gain by German reunification. Yet in just 10 months, the partition of Germany
would end and a 45-year-old problem would be resolved. As historian Timothy Garton
Ash put it, “More happened in 10 months than usually does in 10 years.”6 The rapid
and peaceful process toward reunification was a testament to skillful leaders using
behind-the-scenes personal diplomacy, plus a bit of good timing.
This process was in its embryonic state when President Bush and Chancellor
Helmut Kohl talked via telephone on November 10,1989:
Kohl: I’ve just arrived from Berlin. It is like witnessing an enormous fair. It
has the atmosphere of a festival. The frontiers are absolutely open. At
some points they are literally taking down the wall.... I hope they will
continue to be calm and peaceful.7
During the conversation, Kohl expressed concerns about East German refugees and
West German financial support for the GDR. Kohl did not mention reunification; he
did not have to. Both men knew that it would have to be discussed. But for now, Bush
4 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993),
792.
5 A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press), 208n.
6 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New
York: Random House, 1993), 343.
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was content to let events take their course. He needed to wait for Soviet reaction to the
events in Berlin before he made any decisions. Focused on his upcoming meeting at
Malta with Gorbachev, now less than a month away, Bush told Kohl that they needed
to stay in contact via telephone in order to decide what to tell Gorbachev concerning
the German question. The call was remarkable. In the middle o f reacting to one of the
most momentous events in German history, the German Chancellor had called to give
a report of the situation to the American President and ask his advice. Kohl told Bush
to tell the American people that “without the U.S. this day would not have been
possible.”8 President Bush could have used this call as the centerpiece of a dramatic
press conference now that it was clear that the wall had been permanently opened. It
certainly would help answer the criticism o f his guarded press conference in the Oval
Office, during which he reacted tentatively to the initial reports o f the wall’s collapse.
Instead, the report of this call appeared in a brief statement by Press Secretary Marlin
Fitzwater.9 As two o f Bush’s NSC staff members later admitted, “This was
characteristic of Bush and his national security staff—often well reasoned on
substance but inattentive to the ceremonial dimension of the presidency.”10Though
attentive to his diplomatic responsibilities, Bush ignored his duties to the American
press.
7 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Helmut Kohl and George Bush,
10 November 1989, Telcons and Memcons—Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential
Library.
8 Ibid.
9 “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President’s Telephone Conversation
with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, November 10,1989,” Public Papers o f
the President o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1992,1989, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1498.
10Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 105.
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Bush would not have to wait long for the Soviet response. Later that evening,
the White House received a cable from Gorbachev, who wanted an immediate meeting
o f the Four Powers to address the German situation.11 Gorbachev warned that the
“chaotic situation” could have “unforeseen consequences.” President Bush recalls
Gorbachev’s reaction:
The Soviet reaction to the opening of the wall was one of outright alarm....
Gorbachev sent messages to Kohl warning him to stop talking o f reunification,
and cabled me urging that I not overreact. He worried that the demonstrations
might get out o f control, with ‘unforeseen consequences,’ and he asked for
understanding. This was the first time Gorbachev had clearly indicated genuine
anxiety about events in Eastern Europe. Heretofore he had seemed relaxed,
even blasd, about the accelerating movement in the region away from
communism and Soviet control. It was as if he suddenly realized the serious
implications o f what was going on.12
Bush and his advisors felt that the Four Power conference was a bad idea. But, before
a response was sent to Gorbachev, it was important that the West agreed on a common
approach. As the leader of the Western alliance, Bush assumed the responsibility for
orchestrating the response. Scowcroft phoned Kohl’s advisor, Horst Teltschik to get
his opinion. Secretary of State James Baker then called West German Foreign Minister
Genscher and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. All agreed to reject
Gorbachev’s demand for a Four Power conference. Bush proposed a response that (1)
ignored Gorbachev’s warnings, (2) welcomed his public support o f the East German’s
decision to open their borders, (3) reaffirmed the desire to maintain public order, (4)
and voiced confidence that the West German government was committed to
11 Unofficial translation o f Gorbachev letter to President Bash, National Security
Council/Brent Scowcroft Files-9000 APNSA Chrons: Gorbachev, George Bush
Presidential Library.
12George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf,
1998), 149-150.
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incremental change that would not destabilize Eastern Europe. For the time being,
Bush chose a passive policy, which supported self-determination but with a tone that
would not further alarm the Soviets. He would not yield to Gorbachev’s insistence on
Four Power intervention, nor would he jump to premature conclusions on
reunification. Margaret Thatcher, F rancis Mitterand, and Kohl agreed with the
statement that Bush sent to Gorbachev on November 17,1989.13 The reply would give
all sides time to properly evaluate the events in Germany and crystallize their view
concerning what would take place next
The issue of German reunification was problematic. As leader of NATO, it
was Bush’s responsibility to create a consensus among the members of the Alliance.
His greatest challenge would be convincing Great Britain to go along with German
reunification. Britain had traditionally felt that they had a “special relationship” with
the United States and was the leading supporter of the U.S.-led NATO framework,
which gave Britain greater authority than its economy and military strength
warranted.14Margaret Thatcher had been the most vocal supporter of this “special
relationship” during the Reagan administration. When Bush took control of the White
House, however, as Thatcher noted in her memoir, “for... partly personal chemistry
and partly genuine differences of policy—that relationship had become somewhat

13Records of calls between Bush and foreign leaders found in Presidential Telcons
Notebook (July-December, 1989), National Security Council Files, George Bush
Presidential Library. Records o f letters between Bush and Gorbachev found in
Presidential Memcons Notebook (January-December, 1989), National Security
Council Files, George Bush Presidential Library.
14Robbin F. Laird, The Soviets, Germany, and the New Europe (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1991), 79-80.
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strained.”15Thatcher realized something that many Americans did not: George Bush
had markedly different policies than his predecessor Ronald Reagan. For her part,
Thatcher preferred Reagan. She was uncomfortable with the astonishing pace of
change, warning that “times of great change are times o f great uncertainty, even
danger.”16 Germany certainly was seen as a source of danger by Thatcher, who felt
that aggression and self-doubt were an intrinsic part o f Germany’s national character.
Thatcher’s foreign policy was animated by an anti-German prejudice common among
persons of her generation. This deep-seated feeling was evident in her remarks to one
o f her foreign policy advisors in 1989 while watching the collapse o f the Berlin Wall:
You know, there are things that people of your generation and mine ought
never to forget We’ve been through the war and we know perfectly well what
Germans are like and what dictators can do and how national character
basically doesn’t change.17
Thatcher’s fears, however, were not simply based on painful memories from her
youth. She was worried about how a united Germany would affect the power balance
in Europe:
A reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player
within Europe.... Germany is... by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a
stabilizing force in Europe.18
She worried that the reunification o f Germany would undermine Gorbachev, leading
to demands for border changes throughout central Europe. She was even more worried
about Germany’s economic expansion. Thatcher preferred a truly democratic East
Germany to formal reunification. To that end, she sent Bush a message urging that the
15Thatcher, The Dawning Street Years, 810.
16Ibid., 360.
17Quoted in Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism (London: Routledge, 1997),
104.
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priority should be to see genuine democracy established in East Germany and that
“German reunification was not something to be addressed at present”19
France was also be a problem for Bush. France hoped to strengthen the
Alliance via Europeanization, which encouraged European cohesion through
conventional military cooperation with the West Germans and cooperation with the
British on nuclear weapons. This framework emphasized gaining greater
independence from the hegemonic power of the United States, which certainly infused
Europeanism with an anti-American undercurrent. The Bush administration would not
give into this line of thinking. As Brent Scowcroft insisted, the United States would
continue to be a European power:
The United States intends to remain engaged in Europe with a substantial
military and political presence. We are a European power, with an abiding and
permanent interest in European security.20
Parts of France’s position could be used by Bush to push for a consensus. Even though
it undercut Atlanticism (American hegemony), the goal of France was a more
independent West European power center. The source of stability for Western Europe
was threefold: NATO (defense), the European Community (economic), and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (political). The source of stability
for the East was imposed from the outside—the monopoly o f power by the
Communist party and the readiness o f the Soviet Union to use force to maintain its
appointed leaders in power. With that system o f coercion quickly crumbling, stability
18Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 791.
19Ibid., 793.
20 “Speech by Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to President Bush for National Security
Affairs, Wehrkunde Conference, 3 February 1990,” transcript in Europe Transformed:
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in Eastern Europe, and by means of proximity, Western Europe, was in doubt. Both
Thatcher and Mitterand accepted the Germans’ right to self-determination, but they
did not believe that the Germans had a right to upset the political realities o f Europe.
Bush focused on stability in Europe, noting that NATO, unlike the Warsaw Pact,
provided a solid framework for cooperation in an integrated Europe. This brought
protests from Thatcher who, for largely economic reasons, did not want Germany to
be part of an increasingly integrated European Community. She wanted to keep both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact intact in order to maintain part of the old order.
Consensus within the Alliance was not Bush’s only problem in respect to
German reunification. East German dissident groups were demonstrating to reform the
Communist regime while keeping a separate state. In West Germany, Chancellor Kohl
did not yet have a mandate for reunification because of fear that a union would disrupt
the economy. An opinion poll taken the month before the fall o f the Berlin Wall
showed that only 56 percent of West Germans favored reunification.21 Given the lack
of consensus inside Germany, Bush needed a plan that left domestic concerns to be
worked out between the two German states. There were also fears from countries
surrounding Germany, particularly Poland, that feared a unified Germany would try to
alter the Helsinki Accords, which guaranteed its post-World War II borders. East and
West Germany could not be disentangled from any of their international treaty and
occupation status before assurances could be worked out to the satisfaction of
neighboring countries. The most difficult job for Bush, however, would be convincing
Documents on the End o f the Cold War, Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St.
Martin’s, 1990), 452-457.
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the Soviets to allow a reunified Germany that remained within NATO. The Soviet
position on reunification came from concern for their security arrangements. East
Germany, with its approximately 370,000 Soviet troops, was the center o f the Warsaw
Pact. Rather than a mutual defense system, the Warsaw Pact was in essence a series of
bilateral agreements between each member and the Soviet Union. If reunification
resulted in a united Germany within NATO, it would mean an impossible disparity
between NATO and the remainder of the Warsaw Pact.22
Before each side had a chance to develop its own policies, Chancellor Kohl
surprised everyone with a speech before the Bundestag on November 28, in which he
outlined a 10-point plan for German unity:
1. Establish measures to provide unhindered travel between East and West
Germany.
2. Expand technological cooperation with the GDR.
3. Expand economic aid to the GDR if ‘fundamental change of the political
and economic system in the GDR be agreed upon and put irrevocably into
effect’ This would require free elections without SED (Socialist Unity party)
monopoly of power and the dismantling o f centralized economic planning.
4. Establish a “contractual community” with the GDR to cooperate
institutionally on a variety of common problems.
5. Proceed, after free elections in the GDR, to develop “confederate structures
between the two German states and, eventually, a federal system for all
Germany, which would include joint governmental committees and a common
parliament
6. Embed the development o f inter-German relations in the pan-European
process and in East-West relations.
7. Strengthen the EC (European Community), encourage European integration,
and allow Eastern European countries entrance into the EC once they have met
certain prerequisites.
8. Speed up development of the CSCE (Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe), including new institutions for East-West economic
cooperation and environmental relations.
21 Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context, (University Park,
Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 315n.
22 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism in
Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 183.
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9. Support rapid progress in arms control.
10. Peacefully overcome the division of Europe and support reunification
through a policy of self-determination by the German people.23
The 10-point plan was actually a modest proposal that was only meant to establish an
outline for reunification, not speed up the process. What it did, however, was
encourage all sides to take the issue of reunification seriously. The speech had been
made without consultation with any NATO countries, something particularly upsetting
to Mitterand who had met with Kohl just three days earlier. The Soviets immediately
dismissed the 10-point plan as unrealistic.24 From that point on, each side suggested
corrections and alternatives to Kohl’s plan. Soviet officials suggested, at various times
throughout this period, the following counterproposals:
(1) The dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by
permanent all-European security structures.
(2) A European-wide referendum on the international and security aspects of
German unification.
(3) The neutralization and demilitarization of Germany.
(4) A military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France.
(5) Continued, though modified, exercise of four-power occupation rights in
Germany.
(6) The formation of a center in Berlin to control all military forces in
Germany.
(7) Membership of Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(8) Membership of the Soviet Union in NATO.
(9) Membership of the FRG in NATO and associate status for the eastern part
of Germany in the Warsaw Pact.25

23 “Speech by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag on Intra-German Relations, 28
November 1989,” Europe Transformed: Documents on the End o f the Cold War,
Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 372-376.
24 “Soviet Spokesman G. Gerasimov on Soviet Reaction to Kohl’s Ten Points, 29
November 1989,” Europe Transformed: Documents on the End o f the Cold War,
Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 377.
25 David H. Shumaker, Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet-West German
Relations, 1985-1990 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 135.
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The dramatic differences in these proposals demonstrate the vulnerability of the Soviet
Union. Even when reunification took on the aura of inevitability, Gorbachev did not
want to give the appearance of acceding to Western demands. The initiatives proposed
by the various sides quickly began to fall into three broad categories: (1) a major
conference that would be comprised of all CSCE members and convene to negotiate
the final peace settlement of World War n, (2) a Four Powers conference to resolve
what had been agreed on at Potsdam in 1945 as provisional arrangements, (3) or a
German-only solution that left the FRG and the GDR to handle matters without any
outside interference.26
The Bush administration developed a plan that combined the German-only
approach with the Four Powers meeting demanded by the Soviets. This “Two-plusFour” plan would give the two German states control over internal matters while
allowing the Four Powers to oversee the external aspects of reunification. The plan
provided a diplomatic process for carrying out rapid reunification in a way that all
countries involved might accept. Most importantly, it gave Moscow a chance to
participate in part of the process toward reunification as it was happening rather than
after the process finished—an important point for Gorbachev, who did not want to
appear as caving into Western demands. Not all of Bush’s advisors initially embraced
the Two-pIus-Four approach. There was disagreement between the NSC, who had
reservations about the plan, and the State Department Scowcroft did not like the idea
of involving the Four Powers because he feared that the Soviet Union might end up
dominating the process. There was a greater concern, however, that the FRG and
26 James A. Baker HI with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
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Moscow might work out a private deal, as had happened in the past27 In the end,
Baker was allowed to begin negotiations on Two-plus-Four. The administration
undertook an intensive campaign of personal diplomacy to convince others that the
Two-plus-Four approach was best. Baker explained the plan to Hans-Dietrich
Genscher who, realizing that it would give great-power legitimacy to reunification,
agreed with the plan as long as the “Two” preceded the “Four.” As he indicates:
It was important to me that the two German states, the ones most concerned
with unification, discuss foreign-policy aspects with the Four, rather than the
other way around. Any appearance of the Four negotiating about Germany
must not be allowed to arise. This consideration dictated the order in the name
given the conference: Two plus four, not four plus two.28
This talk along with Bush’s conversation with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd
on January 29 and Scowcroft’s conversation with Kohl’s assistant Horst Teltschik on
February 3 meant that the Two-plus-Four plan had been explained to both the British
and Germans, both of whom seemed favorably disposed. Baker traveled to Moscow to
present the plan to the Soviets, stopping along the way to discuss matters with French
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. Baker met with Shevardnadze on February 7 and
Gorbachev on February 9. Baker recalls that although German reunification was still
“a very tough topic” as far as Shevardnadze was concerned, he felt that Gorbachev
might be willing to at least consider the American proposal:
I don’t think he had a real problem with the process. I think they were
interested in a treaty of peace. I think they were interested in seeing Germany
Revolution, War & Peace (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 196-198.
27 For example, the agreements of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Rapallo in 1922, and the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Accord in 1939.
28 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect o f
Germany’s Reunification, translated by Thomas Thornton (New York: Broadway
Books, 1998), 339-340.
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unified outside of NATO, at least with respect to the eastern part of
Germany.29
Baker paved the way for Gorbachev’s meeting the following day with the West
Germans.
On Saturday, February 10,1990, Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher flew to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. Kohl’s preparation
for the meeting included help from the Americans. Baker had given him a summary of
his discussions with Gorbachev, including Gorbachev’s concerns about a united
Germany and indicating that Gorbachev might accept the Two-plus-Four plan. Baker
urged Kohl to calm Soviet fears by stressing that Germany’s borders were permanent.
Bush also sent Kohl a letter, pledging America’s full support and asking him to make
it clear to Gorbachev that the neutralization of Germany was out of the question and
that all of a united Germany would remain in NATO:
I was deeply gratified by your rejection of proposals for neutrality and your
firm statement that a unified Germany would stay in the North Atlantic
Alliance.... Even if, as we hope, the Soviet Union withdrawals all its troops
from Eastern Europe, it will still remain far and away the most powerful single
military power in Europe. U.S. troops in Germany, and elsewhere on the
continent, backed by a credible deterrent, must in my view continue to help
preserve the security of the West as long as our allies desire our military
presence in Europe as part of the common defense. As our two countries
journey together through this time of hope and promise, we can remain
confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of freedom. Nothing Mr.
Gorbachev can say to Jim Baker or to you can change the fundamental fact of
our deep and enduring partnership.30

29 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
30Excerpt of letter from Bush to Kohl can be found in Bush and Scowcroft, A World
Transformed, 240-241.
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Kohl was ecstatic over the letter, hailing it as “one of the great documents in GermanAmerican history.”31 By giving Kohl the strongest possible guarantee of American
support, Bush lessened the chance that West Germany might abandon NATO in order
to hasten reunification. In a phone call soon after the meeting, Kohl reassured Bush
that he had made it clear to Gorbachev that neutralization was out of the question. He
also relayed his belief that Gorbachev could be persuaded to agree:
Kohl: I told Gorbachev again that the neutralization of Germany is out of the
question for me.
Bush: Did he acquiesce or just listen? How did he react?
Kohl: My impression is that this is a subject about which they want to
negotiate, but that we can win that point in negotiations. The modalities
will be important, but I do believe we can find a solution.32
The historic meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl was important because Gorbachev
finally accepted that German reunification would be decided by the German people.
He still, however, was not ready to relinquish his right to shape the external aspects of
reunification or accept a unified Germany in NATO. As Kohl told Bush in the
telephone conversation, this still needed to be negotiated.
NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in Ottawa, Canada, in February
1990 to discuss arms control matters, including Bush’s Open Skies proposal. While
arms control was the official agenda, unofficial private meetings centered on
Germany. Bush had sent Baker to reach agreement on Two-plus-Four. Gorbachev,
meanwhile, had sent Sheverdnadze with a mandate to wrap up a CFE (conventional
forces in Europe) agreement Baker, Hurd, Dumas, and Genscher reached agreement
31 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Bush and Kohl, February 13,
1990, Telcons and Memcons- Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential Library.
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and decided to present the plan to the Soviets. Baker handed the Two-plus-Four
announcement to Sheverdnadze, who agreed to forward it to Gorbachev. Gorbachev
gave his consent, provided that it did not mention the mid-March East German
elections and that the announcement promised to deal with issues of security for
neighboring states. These demands were meant to placate his allies in East Germany
and Poland. Baker was delighted with the agreement Especially when Sheverdnadze
informed him that Gorbachev had dropped his demand of symmetrical force levels in
Europe, thus clearing the last hurdle for a CFE treaty. In Ottawa, when the joint
statement on Two-plus-Four was made to the press, the NATO foreign ministers that
had been left out of the ad hoc meetings were furious. They were not the only ones
infuriated by the announcement. Hard-liners in Moscow were upset that Gorbachev
had made this agreement before resolving the West’s demand that Germany remain in
NATO. Kohl, however, was overjoyed, declaring that Germany was “jumping with a
single leap” toward reunification: “We have never been so close to our goal, the unity
of all Germans in freedom, as we are today.”33 The Ottawa announcement was
important symbolically. It demonstrated that there was a certain degree of consensus
that German reunification would happen and a process was now in place to manage it.
Reunification had now moved to the planning stage. There were still significant
problems. As one Bush administration official noted, “the road to unification still led
through Moscow.”34 Despite Gorbachev’s eagerness to accommodate Baker and Kohl,
the Soviet hierarchy was still not ready to accept reunification. Many officials in the
32 Ibid.
33 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 190.
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Soviet Union and East Germany wanted to retain influence by channeling the process
through a German confederation, something that would require a victory by the
Communists and Social Democrats in the upcoming March elections in East Germany.
According to polls, this seemed likely.35
Helmut Kohl met with President Bush at Camp David on February 24,1990.
Bush wanted a relaxed atmosphere in which he could talk openly with Kohl (See
figure 4.1). Their many phone conversations had established good rapport. Bush now
wanted to capitalize on the relationship that he had so carefully fostered in order to
coordinate the path to reunification, keep Germany committed to NATO, and renew
German commitment to the Oder-Neisse line as its permanent eastern boundary. As
for the border issue, Kohl proposed that the United States should mediate the dispute.
Bush accepted Kohl’s offer, resolving the Polish-German border issue by the end of
March, largely thanks to private mediation between Kohl and Polish Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The NATO issue was a bit more complex. Kohl agreed that a
united Germany should be a member of NATO; however, the precise definition for
Germany’s NATO membership was not yet clear. Should Germany’s membership be
similar to France’s and not participate in NATO’s military structures? Should there be
a transition period? Should NATO forces and nuclear weapons be prevented from
being stationed on East German soil? These questions had clearly not been resolved by
Kohl, something that truly concerned President Bush. Bush did not want another
France in NATO. He wanted Germany to remain in NATO, felt that U.S. troops and

34 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 196.
35 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 245.
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Figure 4.1. Bush practicing personal diplomacy during a walk with Chancellor Kohl at Camp David, February 25, 1990. (Courtesy of
the George Bush Presidential Library.)

nuclear weapons should remain in Germany, and believed that the territory of the
former East Germany should have a “special military status” that would allow its
integration into NATO. Bush also made it clear to Kohl that Soviet opposition to full
German membership in NATO would not be tolerated:
The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with
NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell
with that! We prevailed, they didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory
from the jaws of defeat36
Bush’s strong words showed that this point was not up for negotiation. Kohl suggested
that the Soviets might acquiesce for the right price and that convincing the Soviets
about membership might “end up as a matter of cash. They need money.”37 He went
on to say that the trick would be to get the Soviets to tell the West the real price for
agreeing to German membership in NATO. The Camp David meeting was
instrumental in allowing the United States to coordinate the objectives and procedures
for the upcoming Two-plus-Four negotiations. Following the Camp David meeting,
the NSC staff prepared a blueprint for the talks to limit their scope. The United States
circulated the following plan to its allies so that the position of the West would be
clear:
• Four Power rights, including the fate of Berlin: decide in Two-plus-Four.
• Borders: decide in Two-plus-Four with sovereign German voice.
• NATO’s obligations toward the former GDR: sovereign German decision; no
discussion in Two-plus-Four.
• German forces in GDR: sovereign German decision; could be discussed in
Two-plus-Four.
• Soviet troops in GDR: sovereign German decision and subject for bilateral
German-Soviet agreement; could be discussed in Two-plus-Four.
• Nuclear weapons in FRG: to be decided by Germany or in arms control
negotiations; no discussion in Two-plus-Four.
36 Ibid., 253.
37 Ibid., 253.
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• German NATO membership: sovereign German decision; no discussion in
Two-plus-Four.
• Prohibition of German nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons: sovereign
German decision; could be discussed in Two-plus-Four.
• Size of the Bundeswehr: to be decided by Germany or in arms control
negotiations; no discussion in Two-plus-Four.38
This plan would be used at the Two-plus-Four meetings and for future consultations
with allies. It is clear by the clarity and level of detail in this list that the Bush
administration was setting down the law to its allies in order to ensure Western
solidarity, something on which the U.S. strategy depended. The belief that Soviet
compliance was a matter of money proved important as the United States and West
Germany began work on an “incentives package” for the Soviet Union. In the press
conference following the Camp David meeting, the United States and West Germany
appeared to be in full agreement. Bush called Thatcher, Mitterand, and Gorbachev the
following day to brief them, in very general terms, what had happened.39 All knew that
nothing could be resolved until the March 18 elections in East Germany. Most
observers in the West feared that even though the Communists would probably lose,
the voters would turn to the Social Democrats, making it hard for Kohl and the
Christian Democrats to regain momentum.
There were two basic possibilities for reunification according to the Basic Law
of West Germany. Article 146 allowed for a constitutional assembly following allGerman elections to create a new political state with a new constitution and new form
38 Original list in memorandum from Zelikow through Blackwill to Scowcroft and
Gates on 12 March 1990, “The Two Plus Four Agenda,” National Security Council
Files, George Bush Presidential Library. A summary of this memorandum can be
found in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 227.
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of government. The Soviets hoped that the result would be a weak confederation. The
other lawful possibility was for East Germany to dissolve and be absorbed through a
direct takeover by West Germany under Article 23, thus creating a larger, more
powerful FRG with its current system of government intact. Led by Kohl, the official
West German position favored using Article 23. East Germans would have their
chance to voice their opinion when the first free general elections in the GDR were
held on March 18, 1990. With an amazing 93 percent voter turnout, the Alliance for
Germany garnered more than 48 percent of the vote; the Social Democrats (SPD)
received 22 percent; the ex-Communists, the Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS),
received 16 percent of the vote.40 It was a decisive vote for the absorption of East
Germany into the more prosperous West: over 75 percent of the vote went to parties
promoting reunification. It was a mandate for Kohl’s plan for unity. The new East
German government was dedicated to a rapid West German takeover under article 23,
giving Kohl complete control of internal unification. President Bush phoned Kohl to
congratulate him on a stunning victory, exclaiming, “You’re a hell of a campaigner!”41
Having already begun discussions with the SPD-East leader BOhme in anticipation of
victory, the election caught the Soviets by surprise. As a result, the Soviet position
became weaker after the elections.
39 A record of these telephone calls can be found in the Presidential Telcons Notebook
(January-June 1990), National Security Council Files, George Bush Presidential
Library.
40“Results of the Parliamentary Elections in East Germany, 18 March 1990,” Uniting
Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker
Gransow, eds., translated by Allison Brown and Belinda Cooper (Providence, RX:
Berghahn Books: 1997), 128.
41 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Bush and Kohl, March 20,1990,
Telcons and Memcons- Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential Library.
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While Kohl continued handling the internal aspects o f reunification, it was up
to the United States, as Baker recalls, to address the major task of leading a
fundamental change in NATO and the CSCE:

A unified Germany would alter the fundamental geo-strategic, political, and
economic architecture of Europe. That meant that NATO had to become a
more political institution, CSCE had to be strengthened, and a clear and
complementary division of responsibilities among these institutions and the
European Community would have to be defined.
Resolving German reunification meant taking a fresh look at European security as a
whole. Secretary Baker had mapped out his plan for a new European architecture in
December 1989. Now, the position of the United States needed to go even further. A
fundamental change in NATO’s strategy would have to be made if it were to
incorporate a unified Germany without angering the Soviets. It was necessary to
convince the Soviet Union that Europe’s political and security institutions were
evolving. The Soviet Union needed to feel unthreatened by a NATO strengthened by
the addition of a unified Germany. After all, the Soviet Union still had 350,000 troops
stationed in the GDR and had the legal right to refuse to give up their Four Power
rights and remain a military presence in Germany. The best approach for the United
States was to convince them that such an action would isolate them diplomatically. As
Bush’s advisors believed:
It must at least be clear that the costs of continued rigidity would be a
deterioration in the smooth, stable relations so essential to the benign
international environment in which the Soviet leaders could concentrate on
domestic reform.43

42Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 232.
43 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 246.
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In order to achieve this level of isolation, there had to be complete solidarity on the
part of the West Now that the German election made it clear that unity could not be
halted, Mitterand and Thatcher began to play a more constructive role. Bush met with
Thatcher in Bermuda and Mitterand in Key Largo, Florida, to discuss the goals of the
upcoming Two-plus-Four conference. Bush sent letters after these meetings and his
meetings with Kohl to reiterate what had been agreed upon so that the Western
position on NATO and Two-plus-Four was clear. He would then make statements to
the press to provide public repetition of the agreements, speaking as the official voice
of a solidified West, thus locking up debate. Bush dramatically improved the solidarity
of the West’s position by the end of April. The first meeting of the Ottawa Group was
held in Bonn on May 5,1990. The day before, Bush spoke on the future of NATO at a
commencement address at Oklahoma State University, once again using a low-profile
media event to make an important policy speech. Bush had previewed his ideas to
NATO leaders in the days leading up to his speech, meeting with Thatcher, Mitterand,
and Kohl, and talking via telephone to NATO Secretary General Woemer. As with
previous dealings with NATO leaders, Bush wanted to make sure everyone was on the
same page—his. Bush proposed an early NATO summit to review NATO’s political
role in Europe, review its strategy in conventional defenses and nuclear weapons, and
establish a consensus on the future of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). This “wide-ranging NATO strategy review for the transformed
Europe o f the 1990s” was meant most of all to signal to Gorbachev that NATO was
changing and would not be a threat:
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As military threats fade, the political dimension of NATO’s work—always
there but seldom noticed—becomes prominent....our enemy today is
uncertainty and instability.. ..we must plan for a different kind of military
presence focused less on the danger of an immediate outbreak of war.44
In the same speech, however, he also sent a message that Germany would remain a
part of NATO:
And we should reaffirm the importance of keeping a united Germany as a full
member of NATO.45
Bush made it clear that the West was committed to changing NATO’s traditional role,
which had been one of defense against a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe,
and re-inventing it as a political alliance. This idea built on a speech Secretary Baker
made before the Berlin Press Club the previous December in which he called for a
“new architecture” for a new era:
As we construct a new security architecture that maintains the common
defense, the non-military component of European security will grow. Arms
control agreements, confidence-building measures and other political
consultative arrangements are going to become more important. It is in such a
world that the role of NATO is going to evolve. NATO will become the forum
where the Western nations cooperate to negotiate, to verify and to extend
agreements between East and West.46
NATO had to adapt to a new role if the United States was to stay in Europe.
Gorbachev had suggested doing away with NATO and the Warsaw Pact in favor of
other European alliances. Bush had to demonstrate that NATO, the EC, and CSCE
were complementary, not competitive. To further that goal, the Bush team put together
44 “Remarks at the Oklahoma State University Commencement Ceremony in
Stillwater, May 4,1990,” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: George
Bush, 1989-1992,1990 Book I-January 1 to June 30,1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1991), 627.
45 Ibid.
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a proposal that would, as Brent Scowcroft put it, “help Moscow save face,” and
transform the alliance in four areas:
1. It would emphasize its political mission and develop cooperation and
partnership with former adversaries. The alliance pledged never to be the
first to use force, proposed a non-aggression pact with members of the
Warsaw Pact (not with the Pact itself), and invited those governments to
establish diplomatic missions at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
2. It called for changing the character of conventional defense by moving
away from “forward defense” and relying increasingly on more mobile,
truly multinational forces. The document also proposed conventional arms
control negotiations (after the conclusion of a CFE treaty) to further limit
offensive military manpower in Europe.
3. It announced a new NATO nuclear strategy, modifying “flexible response”
to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and make them “truly weapons of
last resort.”
4. It proposed strengthening the CSCE process by giving it a new mandate to
promote democratic institutions, operational capacity in the area of conflict
prevention, and, for the first time, an institutional structure through a new
secretariat and other bodies.47
These proposals would be made at the NATO summit to help resolve the obstacles to
Soviet acceptance of German reunification within NATO.
Persuading Gorbachev to give his approval for German membership in NATO,
however, would require more than just a change in NATO. Kohl urged Bush to agree
to Gorbachev’s request for financial assistance. But Bush could not give Gorbachev
the $20 billion for which he had asked, not while the Soviets were still blockading
Lithuania and not until Gorbachev made economic reforms to demonstrate that the
money would not be wasted. What the United States actually offered was the image of
a deal being struck between the two superpowers. Gorbachev desperately needed this
image, even if the economic assistance came from a different source. The Bush

46 Excerpt in Renata Frftsch-Boumazel, Europe and German Unification (New York:
S t Martin’s, 1992), 66-67.
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administration planned a Washington summit at which they would shower Gorbachev
with attention. Gorbachev arrived on May 31,1990, and was greeted with a parade of
soldiers wearing ceremonial Revolutionary War uniforms of the Old Guard from Fort
Meyer. Gorbachev and Bush reviewed the fife and drum corps on the South Lawn of
the White House against the backdrop of the Washington Monument before moving
into the Oval Office for a private meeting at which Gorbachev hinted at financial help.
Bush planned the type of summit that Gorbachev needed to boost his image. Unlike
Malta, the Washington summit was full of ceremonial events, where Gorbachev
mingled with prominent business leaders, intellectuals, and celebrities. By the end of
the summit, Gorbachev would receive various honors, including the FDR fo r
Freedoms Medal from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Institute, the Peace Prize from
the Albert Einstein Peace Prize Foundation, and the Martin Luther King, Jr., Non
violent Peace Prize. The first day concluded with a formal State Dinner honoring
President and Mrs. Gorbachev. The dinner had a long and varied guest list ranging
from political leaders, such as Henry Kissinger and Richard Gephardt, to movie stars,
such as Morgan Freeman and Jessica Tandy.48 In his toast Bush laid it on thick:
Mr. President, you deserve great credit for the course you’ve chosen—for the
political and economic reforms you’ve introduced—and for creating within the
Soviet Union a commitment to change. As I said this morning as I welcomed
you to the White House, we want to see perestroika succeed—we want to see
this transition now underway in the Soviet Union maintain its momentum.49
47 Summary of proposals found in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 293.
48 Detailed information concerning the Washington summit can be found in White
House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File: USSR-US/USSR Summit 5/30/906/03/90, George Bush Presidential Library.
49 ‘Texts of Remarks by the President During Toast Honoring Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev, the White House, Washington, D.C., May 31,1990,” White
House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File: USSR-US/USSR Summit,
5/30/90-6/03/90 [1], George Bush Presidential Library.
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Of course, this type of praise and effort by the Bush administration to boost
Gorbachev’s image was not meant as a one-way gesture. Bush hoped Gorbachev
would move slowly to embrace NATO membership for Germany. At 4:30 the next
afternoon, both sides crowded into the Cabinet Room to discuss Germany. At first,
Gorbachev seemed unwilling to soften his position on NATO membership for a united
Germany. Bush had tried all the standard arguments, but to no avail. Then, as Bush
recalls, he tried something else:
I tried a new track. I reminded Gorbachev that the Helsinki Final Act stated
that all countries had the right to choose their alliances. To me, that meant
Germany should be able to decide for itself what it wanted. Did he agree? To
my astonishment, Gorbachev shrugged his shoulders and said yes, that was
correct. The room suddenly became quiet Akhromeyev and Valentin Falin
looked at each other and squirmed in their seats.50
Amazingly, the leader of the Soviet Union had, on his own and without consulting his
advisors, now conceded that German membership in NATO was a matter for the
Germans to decide. Knowing that Kohl had already publicly stated that Germany
wanted to join NATO, Gorbachev had just given Germany the right to make that
decision without having to gain approval from the Four Powers. The American side
almost could not believe what they had heard:
Bob Blackwill slipped me a note asking whether I thought I could get
Gorbachev to say that again. I nodded to him. T m gratified that you and I
seem to agree that nations can choose their own alliances,’ I said. ’Do you and
I agree that a united Germany had the right to be non-aligned, or a member of
NATO, in a final document?’ asked Gorbachev. ’I agree with that, but the
German public wants to be in NATO,’ I replied. ‘But if they want out of
NATO, we will respect that They are a democracy.’ ‘I agree to say so
publicly, that the United States and the USSR are in favor of seeing a united

50 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 282.
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Germany, with a final settlement leaving it up to where a united Germany can
choose,' said Gorbachev.51
Gorbachev’s concession angered his own side:
By this time, the dismay in the Soviet team was palpable. Akhromeyev’s eyes
flashed angrily as he gestured to Falin. They snapped back and forth in loud
stage whispers in an agitated debate as Gorbachev spoke. It was an
unbelievable scene, the likes of which none of us had ever seen
before—virtually open rebellion against a Soviet leader.52
Despite this opposition, Gorbachev refused to recant his concession to Bush’s major
point. He suggested that the foreign ministers work out the details. Shevardnadze
refused, saying that it was a matter for the presidents to decide. The Americans had
managed to get a major concession from the Soviet leader and were not about to let
him forget his pledge (See figure 4.2).
The rest of the summit went as planned, with discussions of other pressing
matters. There were no further discussions of Germany between Bush and Gorbachev
during the summit. Instead, Gorbachev pressed for a trade agreement that included
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. He almost seemed agitated at times, desperate to
go home with some tangible accomplishment from the summit. Considering
Gorbachev’s newfound flexibility on Germany, the Bush administration was inclined
to accommodate him. The only problem was the situation in Lithuania. The trade
agreement would have both a public side and a private one. The United States would
sign the grain and trade agreements but would not send the package to Congress until
the Soviets passed legislation on emigration, something that had been a precondition
for MFN status. The package would also not be sent for congressional approval until
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 282-283.
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Figure 4.2. Bush and Gorbachev in the Cabinet Room during the Washington Summit on May 31, 1990. By the end of this meeting,
Gorbachev had conceded that NATO membership was a matter for the Germans to decide. (Courtesy of the George Bush
Presidential Library.)

the Soviets lifted the economic embargo on Lithuania and began negotiations. With
those stipulations, the trade agreement was signed and Gorbachev had a tangible
accomplishment to take back with him to bolster his support at home. Gorbachev’s
accomplishment came at considerable public expense for President Bush. Unaware of
the secret conditions behind the agreement, the press attacked Bush for abandoning
Lithuania. The next day the two men traveled to Camp David for more relaxed
discussions (See figure 4.3). Bush had gotten Gorbachev to be flexible on German
membership in NATO, and Gorbachev had gotten his trade agreement to help his
struggling domestic economy. At the press conference at the end of the summit, Bush
sought to get Gorbachev’s pledge on record (See figure 4.4):
On the matter of Germany’s external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor
Kohl and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full
member of NATO. President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But
we are in full agreement that the matter of Alliance membership is, in
accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide.33
The statement had been cleared with the Soviets. From that point on, Gorbachev never
publicly opposed the idea that alliance membership was a matter for the Germans to
decide. The Washington summit had been a success. In Copenhagen on June 5,
Shevardnadze met with Baker during a session of the CSCE and told him that the
Soviet Union would accept a unified Germany in NATO and that the unification
process could be completed by the end of 1990. This offer, of course, would be
dependant on the United States following through with the assurance that had been

53 “Press Conference by the President and President Mikhail Gorbachev, the East
Room, June 3,1990,” White House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File:
USSR-US/USSR Summit: 5/30/90-6/03/90, George Bush Presidential Library. Video
footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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Figure 4.3, Informal discussions at Camp David, June 2, 1990. Around the table clockwise: Bush, Quayle, Scowcroft, Shevardnadze,
Gorbachev, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Peter Afanasenko (interpreter), and Baker. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential
Library.)
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Figure 4.4. Gorbachev and Bush sign agreements reached at the Washington summit. June 1,1990. (Courtesy of the George Bush
Presidential Library.)

promised in the nine-point plan.54 Baker marched over to Genscher’s hotel to get him
out of bed to tell him the good news.55 Gorbachev made it official the following week
on June 12 when he publicly announced from Moscow that he would accept a unified
Germany as a member of NATO if certain conditions were met. In an amazingly short
time span, the Soviet position had moved from an adamant “no” to a “yes, but”
Bush sought to eliminate Gorbachev’s remaining reservations at the NATO
Summit in London on July 4. Despite some objections by Thatcher and Mitterand
concerning some of the language used in his proposals, Bush was largely able to push
through his plan for a new NATO structure. On his flight from London to the G-7
summit in Houston, Bush sent Gorbachev a personal message transmitted from Air
Force One that described how the NATO declaration addressed Soviet concerns:
Working solely from a draft text I circulated to my NATO counterparts, we a
few hours ago issued a declaration that promises the Alliance’s transformation
in every aspect of its work and especially of its relationship with the Soviet
Union. As you read the NATO declaration, I want you to know that it was
written with you importantly in mind, and I made the point strongly to my
colleagues in London.... I hope today’s NATO declaration will persuade you
that NATO can and will serve the security interests of Europe as a whole.
At the G-7 meeting, Bush sought to address Gorbachev’s remaining condition:
economic assistance. Unfortunately, the international consensus that had helped push
through the London declaration did not exist when it came to large-scale aid. Instead,
over the objections of Kohl, the leaders asked the International Monetary Fund to start
a year-long review of the economic needs of the Soviet Union. Direct assistance
would have to wait...or come solely from the Germans. That is exactly what
54 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 230.
55 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 255.
56 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 295.
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happened. Kohl and Gorbachev met on July 14 in the Caucasus at Gorbachev’s home.
Kohl agreed to assume all GDR economic obligations to Moscow, arrange a credit of
DM 5 billion ($3 billion), and pay the costs of Soviet troops in East Germany during
the transition period. Finally, Gorbachev was ready to agree to German unification
within NATO without conditions or reservations.57 As Margaret Thatcher cynically
assessed, “The Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest boost from
Germany to their crumbling economy.”58 Although the final concession was monetary,
the Washington summit and NATO declaration had allowed Gorbachev to accept the
final terms without, at least in his mind, appearing to concede to Western ultimatums.
No matter when or why he decided to concede to the American position, Gorbachev
knew that he had to sell German NATO membership to the Soviet people. He would
soon find out how good a salesman he had been.
The reunification process went smoothly after the Gorbachev/Kohl Caucasus
meeting with the Two-plus-Four talks producing a final document that detailed the
international conditions of German reunification. The Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany was signed with little fanfare on September 12, 1990.59
There was little reason for celebration. The true accomplishment had not come during
the Two-plus-four talks, where negotiators quibbled over minutiae. It had come
months earlier during the private meetings, letters, and phone conversations between
leaders from both the East and the West. It was during those moments that personal
57“Kohl on His Caucasus Meeting with Gorbachev, 17 July 1990,” Uniting Germany:
Documents and Debates, 1944-1993,175-178.
58 Thatcher, The Dawning Street Years, 792.
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diplomacy proved to be decisive. The United States in particular used personal
diplomacy to achieve what had once been unthinkable. Convincing the Soviet Union
to allow a unified Germany to remain in NATO was an important foreign policy
achievement for the Bush administration. As Secretary Baker recalls, the Bush
administration “took advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity.”60 The first
step was to unite Western leaders. Bush accomplished this through extensive
meetings, letters, and telephone conversations with Western leaders. As Baker recalls:
Personal Diplomacy was very important I think President Bush believes in it I
certainly believe in i t and personal diplomacy to me does not mean that you
put personal relationships ahead of principle or ahead of your party’s or
country’s interests. It just means that if you can trust a person on the other side
of the table, you have a better chance at getting things done.61
This was particularly important in relations with Helmut Kohl. Bush had to make sure
that the Germans would remain in NATO. Bush ensured Kohl’s partnership by
offering him full support for his plan for German reunification as long as it was
understood that the end result would be a unified Germany inside NATO. As
Scowcroft recalls, the Bush-Kohl meeting after Malta was the turning point in their
partnership:
It was pivotal because Kohl was sort of out on his own, both inside Germany.
.. Genscher, they had a free democratic party, was worried about moving too
fast and wanted a different kind of relationship between East and West
Germany. The other allies didn’t want German unification, so Kohl was kind
of feeling his way. And they had this meeting and the president said that, you
know, “I’m not worried. I like your ideas. You go ahead; I’ll back you. I’ll

59 “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990,”
Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, Jarausch and Gransow, eds.,
translated by Brown and Cooper, 204-208.
60 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
61 Ibid.
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keep everybody else off your back.” So he gave, in essence, a blank check to
Kohl to move ahead. And from then on it was a pretty steady course.62
After that meeting it was a pretty steady course as far as Western solidarity was
concerned. But getting the Soviets to accept what had been difficult even for some
Western leaders to accept would prove much more difficult. America’s strategy
depended on Western solidarity and Soviet unwillingness, or inability, to take decisive
action. Just as having a clear plan of attack was key for the West, disagreements
within the Soviet hierarchy weakened their resolve. The Bush administration needed
to hold firm in their demands, try to diplomatically isolate the Soviet Union, and hope
for a crack in the Soviet position. Getting a defeated Soviet Union to accept an abrupt
realignment of the European power balance would require the Bush administration to
wait for an opening. That narrow window of opportunity was created when Gorbachev
simply could not provide an acceptable alternative to the position taken by the United
States. Scowcroft describes Gorbachev’s dilemma:
There were two problems. First of all, there was the problem of unification
itself. And that is that East Germany was the crown jewel of the Soviet bloc.
That was the major achievement, if you will, out of World War H. And so it
was difficult to say, “Yes, we [the Soviet Union] failed there.” And secondly, it
was the heart of the Warsaw Pact. It’s pretty hard to have a viable Warsaw
Pact if East Germany is not in it So that was the problem with unification.
Then there was an added problem: suppose you let Germany unify—What do
you do about membership in NATO? Because East Germany was in Warsaw
Pact West Germany was in NATO. And that was a very hard pill for
Gorbachev to swallow. And in the end I think that he swallowed it only
because he didn’t have a better alternative. He toyed around with the idea of a
neutral Germany, but I think he decided that that would be more
dangerous—to have a neutral Germany loose in Europe, than one tied down by
the United States.63

62 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
63 Ibid.
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Not having an acceptable solution of his own, facing increasing domestic problems,
and desperately needing foreign financial assistance, Gorbachev broke with the hard
liners and acquiesced at the Washington summit to allow a unified Germany to remain
in NATO. These same hard-liners blamed him for losing Eastern Europe and
weakening the Soviet Union.
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-Chapter 5“When You Lose Your Best Enemy”:
The Collapse o f the Soviet Union
Although the Bush administration was preoccupied with the Persian Gulf War during
the latter part of 1990 and the first part of 1991, the new relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly evident. When Iraq
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, James Baker and Edward Shevardnadze met to
discuss the situation. The following day, August 3, Baker and Shevardnadze signed a
joint statement condemning the Iraqi invasion that, at least to Baker, made it clear that
the Cold War was over:
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I
flew back, I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through
Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without clearing it with Gorbachev, joined with
me in a statement condemning the invasion and calling for an arms embargo of
Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time ever that the Soviet Union foreign
minister and the Secretary of State of the United States would ever have a joint
press conference condemning the action of a Soviet client state. That’s the day,
at least to me, it was quite clear, if it wasn’t clear the day the wall fell, it was
certainly clear that day that the Cold War was over. But that’s the kind of
cooperation we were able to achieve from them. I mean nobody could conceive
of that happening.1
Later, on November 29,1990, the United Nations, with Soviet support, would
authorize “all necessary means” to compel compliance with UN resolutions on
Kuwait This, basically, allowed military intervention by the UN forces to end Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait Wanting to illustrate the new U.S.-Soviet relationship,
Baker called for actual Soviet participation in the multinational force. Baker’s
suggestion was not widely embraced on the American side. Bureaucrats within
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Baker’s own command at the State Department argued that sanctioning a Soviet
military presence in the Persian Gulf directly contradicted more than 40 years of
American diplomacy designed to keep the Soviets out of the region. According to both
James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, President Bush, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and
Scowcroft, also expressed initial misgivings. Baker recalls that “Powell was especially
worried about giving the Soviets a role in a possible attack on Iraq in the Future.”2
Powell disputes Baker’s claim, adding, “I certainly don’t remember any particular
conversations.”3 What was more important to Powell was the fact that the United
States had the support of the Soviet Union where it really was needed—during votes at
the United Nations where a solid bloc of support was needed to pass resolutions
against Iraq. Regardless of which view is accurate, there is no denying that Soviet
participation in the Persian Gulf War, whether direct or indirect, was an event
unthinkable during the Cold War. The coordination of superpower positions on the
Gulf crisis showed a level of cooperation that demonstrated just how far the
relationship between the two countries had progressed. That does not mean that there
was complete unanimity throughout the crisis. But disagreements were worked out in
meetings that simply would not have taken place during the Cold War. The Soviets did
end up playing a role in the coalition effort, albeit a small one. They sent a few ships
to join the international flotilla and monitor the blockade but did not participate in the
coalition ground forces. Although their help was not needed, their support was
essential. According to U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock, Jr.,
1James A. Baker IB, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
2 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
Revolution, War & Peace (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 282-283.
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Soviet support of the United States during the Gulf War was “the final nail in the
coffin” in terms of the Cold War rivalry.4
During the course of negotiations with the Soviets over their support for the
UN resolutions that would allow the use of force, Secretary Baker had successfully
lobbied Saudi Arabia to extend a $4 billion line of credit to the Soviets to help them
during their transition into a market economy. It was, Baker insists, instrumental in
maintaining the Soviet’s support for coalition efforts.5 It also demonstrated the
growing crisis in the Soviet Union. Originally brought to power in 1985, in part
because of dissatisfaction with the faltering Soviet economy, Gorbachev had
orchestrated a revolution in Soviet economic thinking. However, surprisingly little
progress was made in reshaping the Soviet economy. A 1990 State Department
evaluation concluded that:
Despite all the rhetoric about economic reform, the Soviet economy still
operates in much the same way it did when Gorbachev came to power.
Enterprise decisions on production, prices, investment, wages, supplies and
product mix are still constrained by central planners; innovators have no
incentive to innovate, nor workers to work.
According to this report, the old central planning system had been disrupted by
ballooning deficits, inconsistent reform measures, labor unrest, and national conflicts.
No new framework had been utilized to replace the crumbling system.
Consequently, the economy slowly deteriorated between 1985 and 1988; more
3 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
4 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
5 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 294-295.
6 Theme Paper: Perestroyka and U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations, 21 May 1990,
Department of State Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,
http://foia.state.gov/
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noticeably in 1989. In 1990, the GNP declined by 7-9 percent; 1991 looked to be even
worse. Under Gorbachev’s perestroika, wages and government budget deficits rose
significantly faster than production. This, in turn, caused a “ruble overhang” that led to
an explosion of shortages, rationing, and inflation. The resulting deterioration in living
conditions sharpened social and ethnic conflicts throughout the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev responded to the growing economic crisis with a “radicalization of
rhetoric,” assuming the “executive” presidency and announcing a move to a “fullblooded” market. Unfortunately, this rhetoric was not followed by real economic
reform programs such as monetary stabilization, the creation of property rights and
incentives, microeconomic reform to create enterprise competition, and the creation of
a safety net based on income subsidies rather than price subsidies. The report
concluded that Gorbachev had been able to survive primarily because no other
credible leader had emerged.7As Ambassador Matlock concluded:
Public confidence had plummeted just as the public was being allowed to
express its views. Nationalism found sustenance in nutrients thrown off by the
centrally controlled economy. Economic reform had been bungled—or rather
had not been seriously attempted—and the stumbling economy was causing
growing distress.8
Even Gorbachev admitted in his memoirs that “Perestroika did not give the people
prosperity, something they expected of me, as head of state, based on an ingrained,
traditional feeling of dependence.”9 If the economic crisis was not addressed, the
people would eventually find a new leader upon which to depend.
7 Ibid.
8 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account o f
the Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 293.
9 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs: Mikhail Gorbachev (New York: Doubleday, 1995),
673.
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Gorbachev’s domestic difficulties were complicated by his policies in regard to
foreign affairs, which opened the door for the democratization of Eastern Europe, the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the stand down of Soviet forces, and German
reunification.10 First, Gorbachev’s concessions to the West angered hard-liners in
Moscow that increasingly began to view Gorbachev as a traitor, blaming him
personally for the country’s problems. At a meeting with Gorbachev in November of
1990, more than a thousand military officers openly expressed their dissatisfaction
with Gorbachev’s leadership.11 Gorbachev was shaken by this meeting, fearing a
military coup. Second, the events in Eastern Europe both directly and indirectly
promoted separatist tendencies within the Soviet Union. The doctrine of selfdetermination, which Gorbachev promoted in Eastern Europe, was used by Latvians,
Lithuanians, and others calling for secession. Gorbachev’s goals of decentralization
and democratization directly worked against his desire to preserve the Soviet Union’s
political and territorial integrity.12 Finally, Gorbachev had to worry about maintaining
his political authority. Boris Yeltsin was growing increasingly popular. A poll in the
Soviet Union at the end of 1990 to select the “Man of the Year” showed that 32
percent supported Yeltsin; only 19 percent backed Gorbachev. This was a dramatic
change from the end of 1989 when 46 percent had supported Gorbachev and only 6
percent Yeltsin.13 It was becoming increasingly apparent that Yeltsin could appeal to
10 Theme Paper: European Security, 22 May 1990, Department of State Freedom of
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://foia.state.gov/
11 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 422-423.
12Glenn R. Chafetz, Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy
Toward Eastern Europe, 1985-1990 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 124.
13Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 447. Polls conducted by Yuri Levada’s All-Union
Public Opinion Center.
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the reformers who felt let down by Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s approval rating also
plummeted, dropping from 52 percent in December 1989, to 44 percent by January
1990, to 39 percent by May, to 28 percent by July, and to 21 percent by October.14
Gorbachev made a sharp turn to the right politically in an effort to protect against
public and political opposition from Yeltsin and his allies on the left. This angered
Shevardnadze who, already under intense criticism for his decision to join the
Americans in support of the Gulf War, resigned on December 20,1990, delivering a
scathing speech:
Democrats, I will put it bluntly: comrade democrats, in the widest meaning of
this word, you have scattered. The reformers have gone to seed. Dictatorship is
coming; I state this with complete responsibility. No one knows what kind of
dictatorship this will be and who will come—what kind of dictator—and what
the regime will be like. I want to make the following statement: I am resigning.
Let this be—and do not respond, do not curse me—let this be my contribution,
if you like, my protest against the onset of dictatorship.13
The move stunned Gorbachev, whom Shevardnadze had not consulted before making
his surprise announcement in the Congress of People’s Deputies. Gorbachev stood and
blasted the idea that a coup was possible or that there was an approaching dictatorship,
charging that Shevardnadze was deserting him at his most difficult time. Certainly, it
was a sign that Gorbachev’s problems would only get worse.
The U.S. Viewpoint
General Colin Powell made a trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991.
Arriving on July 22, Powell met with his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Moiseyev, and
was, in his words:
14Ibid.
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...dragged through Red Army showcase exercises, paratrooper operations so
choreographed that they resembled skydiving ballets; tours of mess halls where
my guides would have you believe the Soviet chief quartermaster was
Escoffier; inspections of fighter aircraft, T-80 tanks, and AK-47 rifles until I
was ready to scream.16
But, as Powell recalls, behind the facade the rot was evident. The Soviet leaders would
only let him see the elite troops that they were putting on display to impress him. They
denied his requests to see how the Soviet troops who had been pulled out of Eastern
Europe were living and denied his requests to talk with ordinary Russians. President
Bush, who was scheduled to arrive in the Soviet Union shortly after the general, asked
for a report. The resulting observations depicted a military in serious decline and, with
it, a deep dissatisfaction in the upper reaches of the Soviet military:
After traveling across the Soviet Union and talking to a lot of their generals,
many of whom just didn’t understand the reality of the situation they were
i n . . . I still remember lecturing a bunch of Soviet generals at the General Staff
Academy, and afterwards when I was through, my colleague, my counterpart
General Moiseyev and all the others just leaping up and not really facing the
realities. I said, ‘You guys, you’re going to have to cut back sharply; you’re
probably going to have to go to a volunteer force,’ and they just kept
dismissing it And so there was a lack of reality to the situation they were in. I
also could sense a deep, deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior
ranks of the Soviet military leaders. They were also very troubled over what
they saw in Desert Storm and in what they saw in terms of the sophistication of
the West and what we could do, and we were no longer that weak sistered,
soft, not terribly competent military that they might have been counting on.
And finally, I just saw generation after generation of Soviet weaponry
abandoned in airfields. Every time they brought in a new generation of
equipment, they just left the other generations laying around. And I could see
the Red Army was essentially bankrupting the country, and it could not
continue; it was not sustainable.17
15Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 442443.
16Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random
House, 1995), 537.
17Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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The problems were not merely with the Soviet military. As Colin Powell recalls, the
problems in the Soviet Union had taken their toll on its political leader as well:
The Mikhail Gorbachev whom I met on this trip was not the supremely
confident figure of earlier summits. He seemed beaten down by the incessant
battering he was taking in this convulsed country [the Soviet Union].18
When President Bush arrived in Moscow the following week, he found Gorbachev in
better spirits (See figure 5.1):
I saw Gorbachev late in the morning in Saint Catherine Hall
Gorbachev
was marvelous, and how he could stand up to all the pressures against him I
simply did not know. At first I thought he still believed that there would be
some windfall of Western money that would help bail out the Soviet
economy—he seemed confident as he spoke—but it was soon clear that he was
pragmatic and resigned to the fact that he would not get funds.19
The fact is that by 1991 Gorbachev was more comfortable talking to President Bush
than he was most officials in the Soviet Union. Despite the very tenuous beginning to
their relationship during “the pause,” Bush and Gorbachev became genuinely friendly
after Malta. During the spring and summer of 1991, Bush and Gorbachev spoke on the
telephone almost every week (See figure 5.2).20 Yet, Bush could not give Gorbachev
what he really needed—economic aid. The Bush administration’s reluctance to
provide economic aid to the Soviet Union would fall under heavy criticism, some of
the most pointed of which coming from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union:
I think at first, in ’89, there was a fear, particularly on Baker’s part, that the
Soviets would simply get into the international financial and other
organizations as trouble makers, as spoilers, and he didn’t want to let them in.
And it was true that many of these organizations were setup for market
economies, and they [the Soviet Union] did not have a market economy. But I
think that’s also a reflection of the fact that Baker hadn’t quite grasped that the
18 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 537.
19 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf,
1998), 511.
20 Based on Telcon and Memcon records, Bush Presidential Library.
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Figure 5.1. Gorbachev takes Bush on a tour of Moscow on July 30, 1991. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
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Figure 5.2. Bush talking via telephone to Gorbachev. January 11, 1991. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

Cold War really was over and they were looking for advice and help on how to
become a capitalist society, though they didn’t want to use that word. And I
think they were very slow in grasping that.... I knew that he [Bush] would
want something new, and I thought that given his background in business and
whatnot, to make economic cooperation to bring the Soviet Union into the
world economy and to create a market economy there could be, you might say,
the watchword for the Bush administration. So I was trying to give him
something new. But I think they [the Bush administration] didn’t really grasp
the potential until too late.21
The Bush administration did start to address the problem of economic aid to the Soviet
Union in the fall of 1990 when Gorbachev’s support of U.S. actions against Iraq
prompted the Bush administration to be more inclined to help. Bush sent Secretary of
Commerce Robert Mosbacher with a group of top executives to the Soviet Union to
suggest investment and trade possibilities. The trip demonstrated to Gorbachev the
benefits that could come from continued Soviet cooperation with the United States
during Security Council votes on Iraq. But, as far as producing any real help to the
Soviet economy, the trip did little good because, as Matlock explains:
[The trip] was without any strategy and without any real briefing about what
we wanted to encourage. They hadn’t really given any thought to that, and
whereas Gorbachev never came up with something worthy of support, at the
same time we never gave him any coherent advice either. And the time to give
him that advice was ’89, and ’90 at the very latest. By 1991 it was too
late—things had fallen apart too much. But there could have been a lot more
direct support for the reformers there if we’d have gotten involved earlier.22
Bush did not get involved in helping the Soviet economy early on in his administration
and refused to offer large-scale aid, citing ballooning budget deficits in the United
States. Matlock takes issue with that excuse:
I think they could have found the money if they wanted to. Obviously this
made it more difficult that there were budget deficits. But I think they could
have, and that is what Thatcher, in effect, when she was no longer Prime
21 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
22 Ibid.
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Minister... was pressing them to do: You know, George, we need to do it and
you don’t have to do it all. But, you know, press the Germans. And, by the
way, Major was willing to give very substantial support in January and
February ’92 after the Soviet Union collapsed. It was no longer Gorbachev,
and it was Bush who turned it down.23
Certainly, Bush quickly found money in his budget to finance the Persian Gulf War. In
that case, Bush told the American people that even though they were experiencing
financial difficulties at home, the stakes in Kuwait were too great to sit idly by and let
aggression stand. When it came to the Soviet Union, however, he treated it more like a
corporation evaluating a large-scale investment and deciding not to take a risk.

The Coup Attempt
The Bush administration had always been worried about a coup attempt by the
hard-liners in Moscow. In fact, one of the reasons that the Bush administration had
been slow in embracing Gorbachev had been their uncertainty over whether or not he
would be able to maintain power or, in the event of a coup, whether or not his reforms
would prove to be merely temporary and reversible, with a new government relapsing
into earlier policies. There had been rumors of a coup attempt in July of 1991. Bush
had even warned Gorbachev through a message sent through Ambassador Matlock.
But Gorbachev had dismissed the rumors as false. It was during July that negotiations
were taking place concerning a new Union Treaty. The republics had built upon the
example of Russia and declared their sovereignty. They then began the task of
securing as many rights for themselves as possible. Although most of the republics’
leaders recognized that they needed some central authority capable of resolving
common problems, they also wanted to tackle their own affairs without interference.
23n>i<[
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The details of the Union Treaty were agreed upon on July 23,1991—the same month
that Boris Yeltsin was officially inaugurated as the president of Russia. The Union
Treaty was scheduled to be signed the following month. On Sunday, August 18, just
two days before the Union Treaty was scheduled to be signed, information began to
filter to President Bush, who was vacationing at his home in Kennebunkport, Maine,
that Gorbachev had been removed from office and that a “State Committee for the
State of Emergency” had been setup. The committee included Vice President Gennady
Yanayev, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, KGB
chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Oleg Baklanov, who was in charge of the militaryindustrial complex, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, and two civilians: Valery
Starodubstev and A.I. Tizyakov. These eight men were all hard-liners and now seemed
to be in control of the Soviet government That was the problem facing the Bush
administration. They really did not know if the coup was successful or what had
become of Gorbachev. Bush immediately engaged in frantic telephone diplomacy,
calling John Major, Fran?ois Mitterrand, and Helmut Kohl to see if they had any more
information than the Americans had been able to obtain. Coordinating their responses,
all agreed to avoid statements that might give legitimacy to the new coup. Bush
conducted an impromptu press conference at Walker’s Point at which he described the
coup attempt as “extra-constitutional” and a “disturbing development.” Admitting that
he had few details of the situation currently taking place in the Soviet Union, Bush
promised to “watch the situation unfold” before taking any action, warning that it was
too early to write off Gorbachev because coups are not always successful—“Coups
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can fail,” he added hopefully.24 By the end of the day, Bush had received a letter from
the plotters explaining the “official” reasons for the coup:
There has emerged a situation of uncontrollability with too many centers of
power. All this cannot but cause widespread discontent of the population.
There has also been a real threat of the country’s disintegration, of a
breakdown of the single economic space, and the single civil rights space, the
single defense, and the single foreign policy. A normal life under these
conditions is impossible. As a result of inter-ethnic clashes there has been
bloodshed in many areas of the USSR. A disintegration of the USSR would
have gravest concerns not only internally, but internationally as well. Under
these circumstances we have no other choice but to take resolute measures in
order to stop the slide towards catastrophe..
The deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior ranks of the Soviet military that
General Powell had witnessed earlier that year were apparent in the letter. And
although Yanayev claimed that the new regime would honor the international
agreements and continue Gorbachev’s reforms, there were plenty of reasons to doubt
him. Bush flew back to Washington that night still wondering what, if any, action he
should take. His daily diary indicates that he was especially concerned with how his
administration would be criticized. Reporters were already asking why the Bush
administration had not anticipated the coup. This was evident in the fact that Bush,
along with many of his cabinet, was on vacation. The Bush team quickly assembled an
eight-point plan for action:
1. Make an assessment Meet with advisors to determine how we can
influence the situation. Perhaps through arms control or economic aid
2. Get Marlin [Fitzwater] back to Kennebunkport
3. Contact the South American leaders and stress to them the necessity for the
entire hemisphere to speak out against the coup
4. Make sure the U.S. message is constant and steady
5. Stay in touch with Yeltsin
24 Presidential Press Conference from Walker’s Point, Kennebunkport, Maine, 19
August 1991. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
25 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 524.
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6. No politics
7. Get our information out to our people so that we speak with one voice
8. Change the work schedule from the relaxed vacation schedule to one that
was more formal26
The plan of action was more reactive than proactive; however, there was little that
Bush could do until he learned more about the situation in the Soviet Union. The most
important item on the list was the need to stay in constant contact with Yeltsin.
Bush placed a call to Yeltsin the next morning, August 20,1991. Unlike his
repeated calls to Gorbachev, Bush was actually able to reach Yeltsin who informed
him of the situation:
The situation is very complex
President Gorbachev is located in Foros in
the Crimea. He is absolutely blocked, no way of reaching him. President [sic]
Yanayev is using the pretext that Gorbachev is ill, but this is not yet confirmed.
Essentially a committee of eight people has taken over the presidency and
established a state of emergency in Russian territory and the Baltics. Troops
have been brought up to Moscow, not only in the city, but in Moscow District
and surrounding towns. And by issuing [these] decision[s], the group has
exposed itself as no more than a right-wing junta. I appeared before the people
and soldiers and I said that actions of the committee were unconstitutional,
illegal, and have no force on Russian territory.27
Remarkably, the man that most observers considered Gorbachev’s main political
opponent ardently defended him during the coup attempt Over the next few days,
Bush stayed in regular contact with Yeltsin and came to gain a new respect for the
Russian leader. While Yeltsin was voicing his condemnation of the coup in Russia,
Bush continued to call for the restoration of the legitimate government In a press
conference on August 20,1991, Bush, in a somber and resolute tone, declared that
26 Reported by CNN on August 22,1991. Video footage provided by the Bush
Presidential Library.
27 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin,
8/20/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums/Ed Hewitt Files, George Bush
Presidential Library. Also quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 527.
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U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union—MFN status, grain credits, etc.—would be put
on hold until there was a resolution of the crisis and the constitutional government was
restored. In his statement, Bush praised Yeltsin for “standing courageously against
military force.”28 The intent of Bush’s words was not to threaten the coup plotters but
to keep the heat on. He knew that the United States did not need to get involved
militarily and he knew that the coup leaders controlled enough of the military to crush
Yeltsin. Bush had to rely on international pressure and hope that Yeltsin, who
organized a demonstration of more than 150,000 people, could generate enough public
pressure to force the coup leaders to release Gorbachev. Bush was betting that the
coup leaders had underestimated the power of the people in their calculations, that the
Soviet people were committed to democracy, and that the reforms started by
Gorbachev could not be easily reversed. He knew that, if the coup failed, the hard
liners’ influence would be broken and democracy would take a gigantic leap forward.
Bush and the world watched over the next few days as Yeltsin put on a masterful
performance. He had the Russian Supreme Soviet unanimously declare the coup
attempt illegal. The other republics soon followed suit and the coup fell apart. Bush,
on vacation and out riding in his boat, the Fidelity, was summoned to shore to receive
a telephone call. Scowcroft had instructed the Signal (military) switchboard to
periodically attempt to call Gorbachev and had finally gotten through. Bush rushed
into his home at Kennebunkport to speak with Gorbachev (See figure 5.3):
Bush: Oh my God, that’s wonderful. Mikhail!

28 Press conference on 20 August 1991. Video footage provided by the George Bush
Presidential Library.
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Figure 5.3. George Bush receiving a call from Gorbachev after the failed coup attempt. Kennebunkport. August 21, 1991. (Courtesy
of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

Gorbachev: My dearest George. I am so happy to hear your voice again.
Bush: My God, I’m glad to hear you. How are you doing?
Gorbachev: Mr. President, the adventurers have not succeeded.29
The two men talked like old Mends excited to hear from the other. It also suggests
why some felt that Bush had become too Mendly with Gorbachev and had stayed with
him even when it was becoming apparent that Yeltsin was gaining power. James
Baker explains the Bush administration’s outrage to such charges:
The press loved that argument and they used to write i t They also wrote that
Clinton stuck with Yeltsin too long. But when you’ve got a reformer in power
and things are going the way you want ’em to go, then you stick with that
person, particularly when they’re freely elected, as Yeltsin was. So, that’s just
a fun and games exercise by the press that don’t know what they’re talking
about
What did we lose by hanging in there with Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze? When Yeltsin came to power, he embraced us even more
whole-heartedly. We didn’t lose a damn thing. And we gained a lot. So, we’ll
shoot that one down.... That argument is just totally without foundation or
without rationality or reason. If you look at what happened, yes, we stuck with
Gorbachev. He was the general secretary and then president of the Soviet
Union. And when Yeltsin came onboard. . . when I went over there in
December o f ’91 before the implosion of the Soviet Union, I met with Yeltsin.
He met me in St. Catherine’s Hall. Why’d he do that? To stick it in
Gorbachev’s eye. But certainly his embrace of the United States was total and
complete, 100 percent, every bit as much as Gorbachev. We didn’t lose
anything by doing that.30
Certainly, Bush did side with Gorbachev until the coup attempt. During and after the
coup attempt, however, Bush switched his support to Yeltsin. Yeltsin’s actions during
the failed coup attempt made him a force to be reckoned with, and Gorbachev faced a
very difficult political reality. Central Soviet authority was declining at an accelerated
rate and the Communist Part/ was discredited. Telephone records show that calls
29 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Mikhail
Gorbachev, 8/21/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bruns Files, George Bush
Presidential Library. See also Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 531-32.
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between Bush and Yeltsin increased sharply beginning with the coup and continued to
outpace calls between Bush and Gorbachev until the Soviet Union collapsed.31 Bush’s
diary just a couple of months after the coup, the day before he was to meet with
Gorbachev in Madrid, demonstrates just how quickly things changed:
Diary, October 26
It is clear to me that things are an awful lot different regarding Gorbachev and
the Center than they were. He’s growing weaker all the time. I am anxious to
see what his mood is. He’s still important in nuclear matters, but all the
economic stuff—it looks to me like the republics have been more and more
exerting themselves. It will be interesting to figure out his mood. I remember
not so long ago how he couldn’t stand Yeltsin. How he, up at Camp David [in
June 1990], made clear he didn’t think Yeltsin was going anywhere. But, now
all that has changed. Reports recently that he might not be around long. The
briefing book indicates this may be my last meeting with him of this nature.
Time marches on.32
This shift in power was also evident in Bush’s public comments. Every time that Bush
mentioned Gorbachev, he now also mentioned Yeltsin—an obvious sign of the
changing reality in the Soviet Union. This change had begun when Yeltsin won his
popular election and became a properly-elected leader. During the coup attempt, the
world watched Yeltsin in charge, on top of a tank, directing the opposition, almost
single-handedly defeating the coup. That is the image people remembered because
Gorbachev was not to be seen. Even Bush was sure to mention to the press that
Gorbachev’s first telephone call had been to Yeltsin. Yeltsin was, along with the
republics, on the rise. The failed coup had accelerated the demise of Gorbachev, and
with him, the Soviet Union.
30 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
31 Based on an analysis of the Telcon and Memcon records, George Bush Presidential
Library.
32 Bush’s Presidential Diary quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed,
548.

182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

At the time of the coup attempt, the world did not really know what had
happened to Gorbachev. In his memoirs, Gorbachev gives a detailed account
supported by passages from his wife’s diary o f what was occurring in his dacha.33 He
was visited on the night before he was scheduled to leave for the signing ceremony of
the new Union Treaty by several of the coup plotters who informed Gorbachev of the
creation of an emergency committee and demanded that he sign the decree on the
declaration of a state of emergency. When he refused, they suggested that he turn
control over to Vice President Yanayev because of “failing health” or resign
completely. Gorbachev refused; the plotters stormed out of the dacha leaving
Gorbachev and his family confined to the premises and with all outside
communications severed. Gorbachev would remain there for a total o f 73 hours, as the
emergency committee told the world that Gorbachev was experiencing “health
problems.” It would not be until August 21, with the realization by the coup plotters
that they had failed to gain public support, that outside communications were restored
to Gorbachev’s dacha and he was free to leave. The coup had failed in large part to the
fact that Gorbachev had succeeded in establishing better relations with the outside
world. Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were the only world leaders to express
approval of the coup. Along with the democratic achievements of perestroika and
Yeltsin’s ability to rally public support, the condemnation by world leaders helped
convince the coup leaders to end Gorbachev’s captivity. Upon returning to Moscow,
Gorbachev made a statement:

33 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 626-645.
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I have come back from Foros [where he was held captive] to another country,
and I myself am a different man now.34
Gorbachev’s statement was correct in many respects. He had hoped that the Union
Treaty would help transform the Soviet Union into a viable democratic federation. But
the coup attempt had delivered to the separatists and extreme radicals a compelling
argument to support the breakup of the Soviet Union. In an ironic twist, the coup,
which had been led by hard-liners attempting to keep the Soviet Union from
transforming, led to its complete breakup. The coup produced, in the words of
Gorbachev, a “landslide” and “a strong impulse for disintegration.”35 Gorbachev
himself resigned his post of general secretary of the Communist Party and
recommended that the Central Committee be dissolved because he felt betrayed by the
party leadership and a large number of party functionaries who had not supported him
during the coup attempt. All of the republics declared their independence in September
and October 1991. The coup shattered the process of establishing new Union ties
between sovereign states and had left the machinery of the state in disorder.
Authorities within the republics implemented only those decisions of the Union
ministries they considered advantageous for themselves, ignoring the rest To make
matters even harder to control for Gorbachev was the fact that power was now divided
between the Kremlin and the Russian White House. This, of course, is explained by
Yeltsin’s increased status; he continued issuing decrees that applied to the entire
Union for several days after Gorbachev returned to power. It seemed only a matter of
time before Yeltsin would use his power to take complete control of the Kremlin.
34 Ibid., 642.
35 Ibid., 646.
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The breakup of the Soviet Union seemed to many to be a victory rather than a
tragedy. The debate quickly centered on what would emerge out of the old Soviet
Union. Gorbachev urged a union of sovereign states, a confederative state that would
carry out the functions delegated to it by the various republics. Yeltsin, however,
wanted a commonwealth of fully independent countries. Gorbachev warned that any
gains attained from sovereignty could not compensate for the losses incuned as a
result of the complete breakup of the USSR. The final agreement came as a result of a
secret meeting between Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuck, the president of Ukraine, and
Stanislav Shushkevich, the president of Belarus. They met at Minsk during the first
days of December 1991. At the meeting, the three leaders decided to dissolve the
USSR and establish the CIS, or Commonwealth of Independent States. The purpose of
the meeting had been zealously guarded because the three leaders did not want
Gorbachev to attempt to stop them. It was not until the three leaders had reached full
agreement and called President Bush to ask for his support that they called Gorbachev
to inform him of the situation. During their phone call to Gorbachev, they told him
President Bush had already given his support to their agreement. Gorbachev angrily
replied to Yeltsin:
What you have done behind my back with the consent of the U.S. president is a
crying shame, a disgrace!36
According to Bush, he had been very careful not to either accept or reject the
agreement reached by the three leaders at Minsk:
To me, the provisions sounded as though they’d been designed specifically to
gain U.S. support for what was being done, since they directly addressed the
36 Ibid., 659.
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conditions for recognition we had laid out. I did not want to imply prematurely
our approval or disapproval. ‘I see,’ I said simply.37
Since the transcript of that phone conversation remains classified, there is no way yet
to know whose account to believe.38 Gorbachev believed that Bush had given his
approval to the Minsk agreement and the subsequent actions by the Bush
administration did nothing to suggest otherwise. In fact, even in Bush’s account, he
basically told Yeltsin that he would go along with the agreement if Yeltsin gained the
support of the other republics:
I promised to read the accord as soon as he sent it to me and to respond
quickly. I felt a little uncomfortable. ‘We will work with you and others as this
develops,’ I said. ‘Of course, we hope that this whole evolution is a peaceful
process.’ Sidestepping the question of American support for Yeltsin’s
implication, I added that we understood this must be sorted out by the
participants, not by outside parties such as the United States. Yeltsin agreed,
and confidently added that he was sure all of the other republics would join
them soon.39
Another reason that Gorbachev was willing to believe that Bush would go along with
Yeltsin’s plan was the way that he had acted since the coup attempt. Gorbachev knew
that Bush had been shifting his support to Yeltsin and was under increasing domestic
pressure to recognize the sovereignty of the republics. In fact, the key to Yeltsin’s
success in convincing the other republics to agree to the Minsk agreement was the
situation in Ukraine, which had not agreed to join the new Union proposed by
Gorbachev. Yeltsin, and many other presidents of republics, did not feel that the
Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States would be viable without Ukraine. Without
37 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 555.
38 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin,
12/8/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums/Ed Hewitt Files, George Bush
Presidential Library.
39 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 555-556.
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Ukraine, the two Slavic countries, Belarus and Russia, could be outvoted. Adding to
Gorbachev’s troubles was Bush’s decision to recognize Ukraine. The information had
leaked out after a meeting between Bush and some Ukrainian Americans. The news
infuriated Gorbachev, who called Bush to voice his displeasure. Bush, however, had
made up his mind. His decision to recognize Ukrainian independence, a decision that
came four days before the Ukrainians themselves voted on independence, was based,
according to Brent Scowcroft, entirely on domestic politics.40 Bush had complained to
Gorbachev in October during a Middle East peace conference in Madrid that the
coming year was going to be difficult for him because of the looming presidential
election.41 Bush’s foreign policy decisions would increasingly be influenced by
domestic policy concerns. His decision to recognize Ukrainian independence as well
as his decision to back Yeltsin seem, in retrospect, almost inevitable given the
pressures that he faced at home and the disagreement within his own foreign policy
apparatus.
American policy disagreements came to a head in a long NSC meeting on
September 5,1991. It was a complex situation: the Baltics had been granted
independence by the Soviet State Council and republics throughout the Soviet Union
were threatening to secede. It was still very unclear what would happen. Dick Cheney
called for an aggressive approach:
I assume these developments are far from over
We could get an
authoritarian regime still. I am concerned that a year or so from now, if it all
goes sour, how we can answer why we didn’t do more.. . . We ought to lead
and shape events
The voluntary breakup of the Soviet Union is in our
40 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
41 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 665.
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interest If it's a voluntary association, it will happen. If democracy fails, we’re
better off if they’re small.42
Cheney, in essence, argued that the United States should actively encourage the
breakup of the Soviet Union. He did not simply want to react to events—he wanted to
use the leverage that he believed the Bush administration had to shape the outcome.
He suggested establishing consulates in all the republics and providing humanitarian
assistance. Cheney’s basic premise rested on his belief that the United States would be
dealing with 15 or 16 independent countries. Baker disagreed: “The peaceful breakup
o f the Soviet Union is in our interest. We don’t want another Yugoslavia.”43 In
particular, Baker wanted to avoid a Russian-Ukrainian clash. He felt it was best not to
exacerbate any disputes among the center, Russia, and Ukraine.44 When Scowcroft
and Baker added that aid programs from the West were based on the premise of a
strong center and that the United States should try to prop up the center, Cheney
dismissed it as “old thinking.” He saw Ukraine as the key to whether or not a viable
Union could be maintained and predicted that it would not join a new Union. The
possibility of a weak center especially disturbed Colin Powell, who worried about the
fate and command and control of nuclear weapons:
We want to see the dissolution of the old Soviet Union. I am not sure that
means fifteen republics walking around. Some confederation is in our interest
as well as seeking out bilateral relationships
1 am comfortable with where
they [nuclear weapons] are. Who has them is the more important question. The
Red Army has them now. If they move back to Russia, I am not sure who will
be in control.45

42 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 541.
43 Ibid.
44 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 560.
45 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 542.
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The meeting ended without any clear decision. Scowcroft explains that the Bush
administration really could not decide which plan would be preferable:
We had a long debate about what our preferences were, and Baker was on one
side of the arguments that you just made [that it would be preferable to have at
least some form of the Soviet Union survive rather than face the possibility of
chaos because a strong central authority could at least maintain reliable control
over the nuclear arsenal]; Cheney was on the other side saying we actively
ought to split up the Soviet Union. And we debated and came to no firm
conclusion. So we really didn’t have a position. We just let nature take its
course.46
Bush knew, however, that he wanted the process, regardless of which one occurred, to
be a peaceful one and one that did not rush to independence at the expense of true
democratic reforms. In Ukraine, in what would be labeled by the press as his “chicken
Kiev” speech, Bush warned against local despotism:
But freedom cannot survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly
minor restrictions to multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles.
Later today, I’ll visit the monument at Babi Yar, a somber reminder, a solemn
reminder of what happens when people fail to hold back the horrible tide of
intolerance and tyranny. Yet freedom is not the same as independence.
Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a
far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a
suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. We will support those who want
to build democracy47
Many members of the press mistakenly thought that Bush’s speech was meant to
dissuade the republics that were seeking self-determination. Instead, rather than
calling for the Soviet Union to remain intact, Bush was warning against the outbreak
of violence that could result from an upsurge of intolerant nationalism. U.S.

46 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
47“Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet
Union, August 1,1991,” Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George
Bush, 1991, Book II-July 1 to December 31,1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992),
1007.
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Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock explains the reason for Bush’s
warning:
Well, there were several reasons. One was that the nationalists in several of the
republics wanted independence for their own reasons, and the Communists in
other republics, once they saw that the Communist Party was losing power,
wanted independence in order to save themselves and stay in power. This
happened in central Asia. You ended up with five dictators in central Asia in
those five countries and keeping the old system primarily open; therefore, with
all o f their talk of opening up the economies, they were basically a totalitarian
political system in die way that they controlled things. I think that is why I
think Bush was right when he said don’t confuse independence with freedom.
In other words, if you have freedom and you want independence, eventually
you’re going to get it But if you take independence under conditions before
you get freedom, you could be deprived of freedom for a long time, and that’s
happening in a lot of the republics. In fact in all of them, except the Baltic
states, it’s happening. Now, I think we understood that we couldn’t do it for
them. It’s something they had to do for themselves.48
While the Bush administration had varying views on what course of action would be
best for the Soviet Union, the overriding concern, notwithstanding Cheney, was that
they wanted the Soviet Union to work out the internal problems on their own and in a
way that ensured a peaceful process. This preoccupation with assuring a peaceful
process led Baker and the State Department to come up with a set of “five principles”
that were similar to the “four principles,” which had been used as a guideline on
German unification:
(1) peaceful self-determination consistent with democratic values and
principles
(2) respect for existing borders, with any changes occurring peacefully and
consensually
(3) respect for democracy and the rule of law, especially elections and
referenda
(4) human rights, particularly minority rights
(5) respect for international law and obligations49
48 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
49 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 525.
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Baker intended to use the “five principles” to create a political structure to guide U.S.
policy through the transition period of the Soviet Union. Later, a sixth principle would
be added—central control over nuclear weapons, and safeguards against internal or
external proliferation. Despite these principles, the Bush administration never arrived
at a rigid policy on the potential breakup of the Soviet Union. This was due to the
sheer rapidity of the events and the fact that many in the administration still had views
that differed from Baker’s. Most agreed, however, that the United States did have
some role to play in regard to external concerns and obligations. Knowing that he
would need the support of the United States, Yeltsin obviously geared the Minsk
agreement to meet the concerns publicly expressed by the Bush administration. The
plan that he read over the telephone after secretly meeting with the presidents of
Ukraine and Belarus guaranteed international obligations, including foreign aid debt,
under agreements and treaties signed by the former Soviet Union and provided for
unitary control of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. It was reasonable for Yeltsin
to assume that the Bush administration would likely agree to a plan that seemed to
mesh with the six principles outlined in various official U.S. public statements. That
is, of course, if he could follow through with his claim that the other republics would
soon be in agreement. And Yeltsin’s prediction soon came true. The Minsk agreement
was released while the republics’ parliaments were reviewing the Treaty on the Union
of Sovereign States drafted by the USSR State Council and supported by Gorbachev.
Their attention quickly turned to the Minsk agreement with 11 republics approving it
almost immediately and the Central Asian states joining in at a later date. Despite the
continued objections by Gorbachev, the Declaration of Adherence to the
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Commonwealth of Independent States was signed on December 21,1991, at AlmaAta, by all of the republics save the Baltic states and Georgia.
On December 25,1991, Gorbachev signed a decree relinquishing his duties as
president of the USSR. The end of the Soviet Union was not a surprise. President
Bush had already had his staff write a letter to Gorbachev to be sent on the day he
resigned. He had also had them write a draft statement on the resignation that praised
Gorbachev for his contributions in ending the Cold War. Bush received the final draft
the day before Gorbachev’s announcement.50 In reality, Gorbachev’s resignation was
anticlimactic. Yeltsin had been methodically stripping Gorbachev of power since the
coup, thus ensuring that the Soviet Union would cease to exist The morning of
Gorbachev’s resignation Bush received a final call from Gorbachev.51 Bush was
spending Christmas day at Camp David with his family. Despite the events that led to
Gorbachev’s fall and Bush’s role in recognizing Yeltsin, Bush and Gorbachev
remained close friends. In fact it bad been Bush who tried to keep relations between
Gorbachev and Yeltsin as cordial as possible and ensure a peaceful transfer of power.
As Bush’s press secretary recalls:
Maybe one of the best examples was when Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev after
the coup attempt It was President Bush who got on the phone to Yeltsin and
convinced him that in a peaceful turnover, he needed to be good to Gorbachev.
And [he] told him to give him a car, give him a house, and treat him well. And
Yeltsin didn’t want to because he hated Gorbachev, and then Bush called
Gorbachev and said the same thing—You want to demonstrate a peaceful
transition; you got to be praising Yeltsin or at least don’t be criticizing him in
public. Don’t be tearing him down and picking a fight. You two guys have got
50“Draft Statement of Resignation of President Gorbachev,” 12/24/91, National
Security Council, Nicholas Bums Files, George Bush Presidential Library.
51 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Mikhail
Gorbachev, 12/25/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums Files, George Bush
Presidential Library.
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to show that you can change power peacefully. And that’s the hallmark of that
period for President Bush.
Despite the relationship between Bush and Gorbachev, in the end, Bush supported the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Many western politicians of the Cold War Era had seen
the breakup of the Soviet Union as the main goal of the Cold War. Bush was of that
generation but was also fearful that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could leave
a dangerous and unpredictable geopolitical vacuum. In that final telephone
conversation, Gorbachev assured Bush that he was leaving everything under reliable
control. He was, of course, referring to the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons.
The lack of central authority did open up the danger of the loss of physical control of
the country’s nuclear weapons. The Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons was
concentrated in four republics: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. The United
States was not entirely confident that all four of the republics could handle or secure
the weapons or fissionable materials to their satisfaction. The Bush administration had
finally, after much debate among the advisors, reached the conclusion that it would be
preferable to see the nuclear weapons under the control of one entity that had both the
experience and stability to control them. Gorbachev agreed with this and, just before
leaving office, turned over the “presidential briefcase,” which contained the control
system for nuclear arms to Yeltsin, so it would be controlled by the Russian
Federation.53 Russia would also take the Soviet Union’s place on the United Nations
Security Council. Gorbachev assured Bush that he could celebrate Christmas without
worry. In an address from the Oval Office on Christmas night, Bush spoke to the
52 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
53 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 671
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nation to explain the historic change that had taken place that day (See figure S.4).54
He expressed gratitude to Gorbachev for his commitment to peace—giving
Gorbachev’s policies the credit for changing the USSR. But he also gave credit to
American policies, citing the nine American presidents since the Cold War started as
playing key roles in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush then offered a three-tier
recognition process. The United States would first fully recognize Russia and Yeltsin.
Then full diplomatic recognition would be extended to the republics that had taken
proper steps to achieving stability. Finally, the United States would recognize the
independence of the rest of the republics on a conditionary basis. “Our Enemies have
become our partners,” Bush told American viewers—with that, the official seal was
placed on the end of the Cold War. One final vestige of the Cold War was wrapped up
by START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The breakup o f the Soviet Union
had convinced Bush to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides even
further than what had been agreed upon in START. Scowcroft suggested getting rid of
all tactical nuclear weapons with the exception of air-delivered ones. Short-range
nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly undesirable. For example, in Europe,
with the unification of Germany, short-range nuclear missiles would detonate on
German territory. They were also problematic for the Navy, who had received
complaints from countries that were reluctant to allow warships carrying nuclear
weapons into their ports. Scowcroft also suggested de-MIRVing of the ICBM force,

54 Address from the Oval Office, December 25,1991. Video footage provided by the
George Bush Presidential Library.
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Figure 5.4. Bush prepares to speak from the Oval Office on Christinas night, 1991, announcing that the Soviet Union had ceased to
exist. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)

perhaps the most destabilizing nuclear weapons used by either side.55 These
suggestions developed into START II, which was signed just before President Bush
left office in January 1993.
Why did Gorbachev fall?
If the basic goal of the Cold War was seen by many to be the breakup of the
Soviet Union, then it is important to understand Gorbachev’s failure because the
collapse of the Soviet Union mirrored the collapse of Gorbachev. An understanding of
Gorbachev’s failure thus provides an explanation of why the Soviet Union itself
imploded. The first step is to look at the task that Gorbachev had to address
immediately upon taking power—the failing Soviet economy. The Soviet economy
was failing because of isolation from the world economy. A fundamental shift in the
Soviet Union’s foreign policies had to be made in order to end its economic and
political isolation. Those foreign policies had, in the past, made the Soviet Union a
pariah within the international system. Shifting those foreign policies, however, would
directly contradict what had been a source of pride for the Soviet Union. As Soviet
expert Condoleezza Rice points out, “The Soviet Union had taken pride in being a
pariah—neither an accomplice to nor a victim of global capitalism’s exploitation of
the world.”56 This was the basic understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology that had
been used by Soviet leaders. The central tenet of Marxist-Leninist ideology since
Joseph Stalin’s rule had been that the Soviet Union’s long-term interests could not be
reconciled with the interests of an “international economic and political order
55 This would mean that intercontinental ballistic missiles would no longer have
multiple warheads that could be targeted separately.
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dominated by capitalist democracies.”57According to this ideology, the Cold War and
the separation that it required was the very foundation of the Soviet Union. Until the
day when socialism finally triumphed, that division had to be maintained in order to
provide insulation from an international economic system tbat could destroy the Soviet
Union. Stalin had actually formulated this plan prior to World War II. He felt that the
Soviet Union should be self-sufficient until a “ring of socialist brother states” would
come along to provide the resources and additional insulation and security to protect
against capitalism. Once this happened, a truly alternative system would be in place to
counter capitalist democracies. This helps explain the evidence presented by the
Venona intercepts and why the Soviet Union would be waging an espionage war
against a supposed ally.58 Of course, Stalin achieved the spheres of influence that he
needed in the aftermath of World War II. He would use Eastern Europe’s resources to
build a stronger Soviet Union, one that could hope to outlast capitalism. But the
socialist economies had a flaw that the capitalist democracies did not—the system
could not be regulated by the market. Therefore, the Soviets had to build a structure to
coordinate the socialist economies. This structure, found largely in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), would further isolate them from the capitalist
democracies of the West. The American containment policy actually mirrored Stalin’s
original blueprint, providing further insulation. Unfortunately for the East, it also kept
them from gaining access to changing technologies that would have benefited the
56 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed:
A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 7.
57 Ibid.
58 See John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in
America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).
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Soviet military economy as well as civilian needs. This flaw was readily apparent in
the 1970s as the Soviet Union increasingly relied on foreign technologies as well as
imported grain. This did not dissuade the Soviet Union from its goal. It hoped to
revitalize its system through detente by acquiring technological help from the West
while affirming its superpower status. On the other hand, the West hoped to use
detente to force the Soviets into a “web of interdependence” that would chip away at
the insulation from the economic and political order dominated by capitalist
democracies. The hopes of the West had dissipated by the end of the 1970s as they
realized that the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan in 1979 and the Soviet buildup of
conventional forces demonstrated that they were trying to turn detente into a victory
rather than an accommodation. President Carter responded to this challenge by
ordering a sharp increase in defense spending at the end of his term. President Reagan
extended this increase to even higher levels. After decades of economic stagnation, the
Soviet Union could not match American technological innovation and could not afford
to continue trying to overwhelm with brute strength. This placed Gorbachev in a very
difficult position. He knew that the very foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology was
the precept of a “permanent revolution” in which the socialist states would have to
outlast the capitalist democracies. He knew that although the Soviet system was not in
immediate danger of collapsing, the reality was that the West could almost certainly
last longer. He could either follow the pattern set by previous Soviet leaders and wait
for the system to eventually collapse because of economic pressure, or he could seek
to reform the system by ending Soviet isolation and reintegrating it into the
international system creating, in the words of Gorbachev, a “common European
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home.” This, o f course, would mean the end of the Cold War. His critics would charge
that such a move would shake the very foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and
the Communist Party. Gorbachev, however, was more concerned with practical and
fundamental reforms. He was a genuine reformer whose goal, unlike his predecessors,
was not to accumulate more power for himself and the Communist Party but to
establish a government based on the consent of the governed. In theory and on paper,
the Soviet state was a voluntary federation of sovereign republics. But in practice, the
Soviet Union operated as an imperial state. As Gorbachev himself recalls, perestroika
was meant to end this totalitarian system:
Yes, there were political, economic, and social problems—and problems
between nationalities. These were not, however, problems of our country as a
whole but of the system that had been established. This administrativebureaucratic system, this totalitarian system, could not respond adequately to
the problems that had built up. Not only did it fail to contribute to their
solution; it deepened and intensified them. As a result, by the 1980s our
country had entered a stage of crisis. It was in order to overcome this crisis that
perestroika was begun.59
The realization in the 1980s that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race helped
Gorbachev deal with the hard-liners. Yet he still could only push limited reforms for
fear of being removed from office by the Central Committee if he began to be seen as
too radical. In short, Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union could not continue as it
had. He knew that the change must occur internally but with the cooperation of the
West But Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union, not destroy it, as the hard
liners accused him of doing. He wanted to transform the empire into a federated or
confederated state:
59 Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World, Translated from Russian by
George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 84.
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Today the assertion can often be heard that the Union treaty that was to be
signed in August 1991 would have meant the destruction of the Soviet Union
anyway. No! The signing of the treaty would have been a real alternative to the
breakup of the Union. It would have meant preservation of Union-wide
citizenship, which was recognized as a separate point in the document. The
citizen of any state belonging to the Union was simultaneously a citizen of the
Union. That was Article 2 of the treaty. The new Union treaty would have
meant preservation and development of a unified Unionwide market Armed
forces under a single command (not “joint command”) would have been
preserved. The state security of the Union as a whole and a unified foreign
policy would have been assured. Preservation, renewal, and reform of the
Union was my main political and, if you will, moral task in my position as
president of the USSR. I consider it my greatest sorrow and misfortune that I
did not succeed in preserving the country as a single whole. All my efforts
were focused on trying to preserve that unity.60
But Gorbachev failed to preserve that unity. His failure was assured by the August
coup and the damage that it did to his ability to lead. According to Boris Yeltsin’s
journal:
Instead of a gradual transition from the Unitarian Soviet Union to a softer, freer
confederation, we had a complete vacuum at the political center. The
center—in the person of Gorbachev—was totally demoralized. The emerging
national states had lost faith in him. Something had to be done.61
The only real chance that the Soviet Union had of remaining intact was for Gorbachev
and Yeltsin to cooperate. Their personal antagonism prevented this from happening.
From the time of the coup attempt, Yeltsin began seizing the bureaucratic structures of
the Soviet Union in an effort to destroy the Soviet state and, with it, Gorbachev. In the
past, Russia had been ruled directly by the central ministries. A fully sovereign Russia
needed the institutions of government controlled by Gorbachev in order to prevent
political gridlock. Certainly, Yeltsin would not remain content to share Moscow with
Gorbachev. Thus, it was Gorbachev, backed into a comer by the August coup and
60 Ibid., 158.
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Yeltsin, who bore the primary responsibility for bringing about the end of communism
as a system of rule in the USSR and the end of the Soviet Union itself. The United
States, as Ambassador Matlock explains, could only play a supporting role:
Obviously, some of the things we pushed for to end the Cold War, such as
opening up the country, bringing in democratic processes, supporting the
election process, were things that made the eventual disintegration of the
Soviet Union possible
In that sense, by opening up the country,
encouraging them to open up and so on, we created conditions which when
they could not deal with these other pressures, the state collapsed. So I’m not
saying that none of our policies had any relevance. I’m just saying that we
didn’t bring it about We didn’t have the power to bring it about. It was
brought about internally. Some of these internal forces had been encouraged by
the United States and the West in general, not so much by a direct action,
although by that to, but by our very existence. After all, as long as we [the
West] existed as free societies, as democratic societies, with economies that
seemed to work, we were a threat to the Soviet system. And what their task
was to try to be more like us without admitting it. And we were really in favor
of that. It turned out that they couldn’t. Well, that was their problem.62
The end of the Cold War set in motion forces that attacked the very foundation of the
socialist system. By encouraging democratization, human rights, and the free flow of
information, the United States helped introduce outside pressure on a flawed system.
But in the end, Gorbachev would be the one who had to alter the existing system in an
effort to save his country, not destroy it. The type of radical change that could have
made the Soviet Union viable, however, was exactly the type of change that it had
been designed to block.63

61 Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle fo r Russia, Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New
York: Times Books, 1994), 105-106.
62 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
63 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 650.
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-Chapter 6The Prudent Cold Warrior:
The Foreign Policy Legacy o f George Bush
Assessing the impact of any recent president is a difficult task for historians. The very
use of the word legacy suggests a sense of judgement that is unavoidably subjective. It
is necessary, however, now that a reasonable amount of time has passed since the
ending of the Cold War, to examine the presidential organizational and policy making
arrangements that shaped that end at a time when many of the men and women who
influenced those decisions are still alive to be questioned by historians. Interviews
with President Bush’s principal aides and advisors have been a central underpinning of
this study. It is still impossible to provide a complete, if history is ever complete, view
of the end of the Cold War because of limited, though not inconsequential, amount of
documents available for research. Documents have been declassified and released to
the public in sporadic bursts, offering a continuously changing image of exactly what
occurred. This study is based on many recently declassified documents that challenge
some o f the well-accepted views of the Cold War. There is no reason to be alarmed if
some preconceptions are challenged or even replaced. As Cold War historian John
Lewis Gaddis reminds us, “Cold War historians should retain the capacity to be
surprised.”1 Thus, it has been the purpose of this study to show the foreign policy
apparatus and the decision-making process of the Bush administration to provide an
accurate portrayal o f the Bush administration’s role in ending the Cold War.

1 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1997), 294.
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No one man ended the Cold War. Neither Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev,
George Bush, or any other single leader had that type of impact. But each influenced,
by their foreign policy successes and mistakes, when and how that end would occur.
In order to gage the true impact of these figures, one must understand when and
exactly how that end was realized. The exact date has been endlessly argued by Cold
War historians. For the general public, the end of the Cold War is usually marked by
the fall of the Berlin Wall. The dramatic television images of Germans “dancing on
the wall”—something George Bush refused to do—are memorable. But the building
of the Berlin Wall did not mark the beginning of the Cold War, nor did the fall of the
Berlin Wall mark its end. So when did the Cold War end? Participants cannot agree on
an exact time. Some members of the Reagan administration still insist that it was over
by the time that Reagan left office. Attorney General Edwin Meese, perhaps Reagan’s
most devoted admirer, hailed Reagan as “the man who ended the Cold War.”2
Secretary of State George Schultz implies much the same as he recounts the final
months of the Reagan administration in his memoir:
It was as if the whole world had breathed a deep sigh of relief. An immense
tension had gone out of the system. The world had changed. Margaret Thatcher
had it right. In an interview with the Washington Post and Newsweek on
November 17, during her last official visit to Washington during the Reagan
administration, she said flatly, “We’re not in a Cold War now.” Despite this
new reality, many in the United States seemed unable or unwilling to grasp this
seminal fact. But to me, it was all over but the shouting.3
The “shouting,” as Schultz describes it, would entail the collapse of Communist
control of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the
2 Edwin Meese, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway,
1992), 163.
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Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Claiming that the Cold War ended
in 1988 and declaring Reagan the man who had single-handedly won the war shows,
of course, very heavy bias by Reagan loyalists whose own reputations and legacies are
inextricably tied to that of Reagan’s. There is strong evidence to negate the claims of
Reagan loyalists. Certainly Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” or
“negotiation from strength” had helped the Soviets to lose ground to the United States
as far as military and economic power. But the Soviet Union remained a formidable
nuclear power and, in terms of raw numbers, still held an edge in conventional forces
in Europe. In addition, as historian Joseph Powers argues, “With the rise to power of
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 a Soviet leader once again assumed a prominent role in
world affairs reminiscent of Khrushchev’s during the 1950s.”4 Certainly the Soviet
Union in January of 1989, while perhaps beaten, was not vanquished. The few people
that served in both the Reagan and Bush administrations tend to take a more moderate
view of Reagan’s accomplishments. Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary
for both President Reagan and President Bush, felt that Reagan had won the Cold War
by 1988, but that the Malta conference on December 2-3,1990, was the pivotal point
in changing the relationship with the Soviet Union and making plans for the post-Cold
War world:
I would say that [the Malta conference] was the pivotal point at which the
West first recognized that Communism was changing and may collapse. And
we met with the purpose of trying to define how that could happen, what our
role would be, and how we could help guide the future of whatever Russia
emerged.... [the Malta conference] was the point at which we recognized as a
3 George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years A s Secretary o f State (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1131.
4 Joseph Smith, The Cold War: Second Edition, 1945-1991 (Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell, 1998), 149.
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country, as a president, that Communism was gone, or on its way. And we
were making plans for the post-Cold War world.5
According to this view, although Reagan had accelerated the demise of the Soviet
Union, there were still many aspects of the Cold War that had to be addressed before it
would completely end. To Fitzwater, Malta was the turning point. Other officials
would point to other “turning points” as the date when the Cold War could
conclusively be deemed at an end. Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker argues that
the Cold War ended on August 2, 1990:
Suddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I
flew back, I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through
Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without even clearing it with Gorbachev, joined
with me in a statement condemning the invasion and calling for an arms
embargo of Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time ever, that the Soviet
Union foreign minister and the Secretary of State of the United States would
ever have a joint press conference condemning the action of a Soviet client
state.... That’s the day, at least to me, it was quite clear, if it wasn’t clear the
day the wall fell, it was certainly clear that day that the Cold War was over.6
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft takes a different view. He points to July
15, 1990, as the end:
The point at which I was willing to say the Cold War is over is when
Gorbachev in July of 1990 . . . Kohl went over to visit him. . . and Gorbachev
said it was alright if a united Germany could belong to NATO. To me that was
the end of the Cold War.7
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was not willing to say that the Cold
War was over until December 25,1991:
The end of the Cold War, I guess for me as a finite date in time was Christmas
1991 when the Soviet Union ended.8
5 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
6 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
7 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
8 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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How can there exist so much disagreement concerning an end date to the Cold War?
How can historians set a date if the very men that lived through the events and made
the decisions that shaped the end are in open disagreement? To answer that question,
we must examine the Cold War as a whole rather than as a series of isolated events.
That requires an examination o f the origins of the Cold War. After all, the Cold War
could not end until the original issues that set in place the foundation of the Cold War
had been resolved.
Origins of the Cold War
The origins of the Cold War can be traced back to the Bolshevik revolution in
November 1917. The United States, in opposition to communism, was the only great
power to refuse to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. The United
States finally relented in 1933; however, both countries largely withdrew from Europe
in the 1920s and 1930s, thus preventing any potential confrontations. The military
realities of World War II forced the two into an uneasy, and unavoidable, military and
political alliance to stop Nazi Germany—a foe that neither the Soviet Union nor the
U.S./British forces could defeat independently. With Hitler’s demise seeming
increasingly more certain, the one thing that the leaders at the Crimean (Yalta)
Conference in February of 1945 agreed upon was that Germany had to surrender
unconditionally and that it would be occupied for an undetermined length of time.
When the Soviet and U.S. troops met on April 25,1945, in the center of Germany, it
was meant to be a symbol of a joint victory. In reality, it marked a division of Europe
that would last for decades. Despite President Roosevelt’s policy of friendship and
accommodation toward the USSR that had been adopted during the war effort, the
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Soviet Union had used the period of 1942 to 1945 to launch an unrestrained espionage
offensive against the United States. Through the Venona intercepts, which were some
2,900 deciphered encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications, the National Security
Agency (U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service) was able to learn that the Soviet
Union was launching an espionage attack of the type that a nation directs against an
enemy state. By the late 1940s the evidence provided by Venona of the massive size
and intense hostility of Soviet intelligence operations caused both American
counterintelligence professionals and high-level policymakers to conclude that Stalin
had already launched a covert attack on the United States. Senior Army officers in
consultation with the FBI and the CIA decided to keep Venona a secret from the
public and even restricted knowledge of it within the government.9 The Soviet
espionage offensive would be one of the reasons that the “practice of wartime
cooperation did not become a habit that would extend into the postwar era.”10
Evidence of the growing divide would be increasingly apparent as, throughout 1946
and 1947, both sides began to solidify their opposition to the other. Joseph Stalin’s
speech in February of 1946, which suggested the existence of a protracted conflict
between the communist-based Soviet Union and the capitalist powers, and Winston
Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946,
heightened the rhetoric of opposing camps. In March 1947, Truman unveiled the
Truman Doctrine, which was used to commit the United States to defending Greece
and Turkey against communist forces. The announcement of the Marshall Plan in June
9 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in
America (New Haven: Yale, 1999).
10 Gaddis, We Now Know, 15.
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o f 1947, which offered economic aid to Western and Eastern Europe, followed by its
rejection by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European states, which were now firmly
within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, solidified the division of Europe. The
authors of the Marshall Plan even recognized before it was offered that it would
solidify the division of Europe. During the discussions leading up to the unveiling of
the plan, policy advisor George Kennan insisted to George Marshall that the assistance
be offered to all of Europe so that “if anyone was to divide the European continent, it
should be the Russians, with their response, not we [the United States] with our
offer.”11 The Marshall Plan would become the chief instrument of a new foreign
policy doctrine that had been suggested by George Kennan—containment. Kennan
was credited as the architect of containment policy after publishing an article in the
July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, under the pseudonym of “X.”12 The concept of
containment, however, had been developed by Kennan over the previous two years
and presented in various forms, most notably the 8,000 word “long telegram” of
February 22, 1946. Simply stated, the idea was to contain the Soviet Union and
communism from spreading further in Europe until it decayed from within and
brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. Designed to keep the peace while
preserving the balance of power, Kennan realized that by 1945 American-Soviet
relations had crystallized on three levels: (1) Soviet predominance in most of Eastern
Europe could not be avoided, (2) the Soviet Union was ruled by a Communist tyrant
and must be contained within its existing and unduly swollen limits, and (3) such a
11 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 343.
12 X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 25,
no. 4 (July, 1947), 566-582.
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containment must not only mean an American commitment to the defense of nonSoviet Europe but also that it would eventually lead to a withdrawal of some of the
most extended positions of Soviet armed presence in Eastern and Central Europe after
which serious discussions about the correction of the division of Europe (including
Germany) should occur.13 Only the second precept was accepted by the American
government in 1947 and developed into the official containment doctrine employed by
the United States—an incomplete version that ignored Kennan’s long-range
considerations and took on more of a military character than Kennan had proposed.
This prompted his resignation from the government in 1953. He felt that the Cold War
that evolved from that point was “a reflection of misunderstandings on both sides of
the intentions of the other side, each ascribing to the other the intention to try to solve
the division of the European continent by military means.”14 In his view, on neither
side were these military fears justified.
Containment doctrine had been meant to address the division of Europe. But
the Cold War’s sudden expansion into Asia in 1949-50 demonstrated that World War
II had “left not just a single power vacuum in that part of the world, as in Europe, but
several.”13 The expansion of the Cold War to Asia meant that Americans began to
look at the Cold War in more global terms. Korea and Vietnam would be the sites for
much of the “hot” parts of the Cold War, with soldiers being brought home in body
bags. The second phase of the Cold War moved beyond the division of Europe and
went from the practical, concrete problem seen by George Kennan and into a more
13 George F. Kennan and John Lukacs, George F. Kennan and the Origins o f
Containment; 1944-1946 (Columbia, Mo.: University o f Missouri Press, 1997), 16-17.
14 Ibid., 63.
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ideological one, pitting Communism against Capitalism, Totalitarianism against
Democracy—no matter where they collided.16 The Cold War became much more than
just the division o f Europe, and Kennan’s containment policy began to be used in
ways that he had not foreseen. That second phase of the Cold War, the one built on
ideology, was the war that Ronald Reagan had fought. That war had been fought with
rhetoric—a moral crusade to defeat the Evil Empire and stop the approaching
Armageddon. While that might seem like a stretch, it is exactly how Ronald Reagan
felt. It was the undercurrent of almost all of his speeches concerning the Soviet Union
during his first term in office and indeed the undercurrent of his anti-Communist
speeches on behalf of the Screen Actors Guild early in his career. He became more
conciliatory during his second term as it became apparent that the United States was
winning, and by 1988, the second phase of the Cold War was all but won. But the
original phase of the Cold War—the one Kennan had addressed—had not been
resolved. The division of Europe still existed. Two armed camps still were entrenched
in Europe, exerting their power over their spheres of influence and forcing the other to
be ready for an onslaught that would never come. More concerned with ideology and
rhetoric, nuclear weapons and Armageddon, Reagan could not see that the division of
Europe had to end before the Cold War would be completely finished. In fact, as Jack
Matlock recalls, Reagan saw the division of Europe as a symptom not the cause of the
Cold War.17 For the 20 years prior to the Reagan administration, the conflict between
15 Gaddis, We Now Know, 54.
16Richard L. Russell, George F. Kerman's Strategic Thought: The Making o f an
American Political Realist (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 10.
17 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech given at a luncheon forthe Society of Historians of
American Foreign Relations, Boston, Massachusetts, January 6,2001.
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the United States and the Soviet Union had been fimneled into arms control
negotiations—a place where both sides could safely flex their might and use hot
rhetoric to demonstrate that the Cold War was a battle between superpowers. Both
sides wanted to show that their country, and thus their ideology, was superior. When
Brent Scowcroft was given the opportunity to be Bush’s national security advisor, he
saw an opportunity to fundamentally change how the Cold War was being fought—to
move it from an ideological battle fought with rhetoric to a pragmatic agenda resolved
through diplomacy:
I wanted to change that a little and to focus on Eastern Europe. There was
ferment in Eastern Europe, especially Poland. And I wanted to take advantage
of that ferment to try and get die Soviet army out of Eastern Europe, or at least
reduce their presence to allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a
progressive way.18
And that is exactly what the Bush administration accomplished. They both encouraged
and helped manage the end of the division of Europe in a way that would help it end
with minimal turmoil and minimal bloodshed. Thus, the original phase of the Cold
War, and with it the Cold War itself, ended when the division of Europe ended. More
precisely, it ended when the center of Europe, where the Soviet and U.S. troops had
met in 1945 to symbolize victory, was unified. The reunification of Germany ended
the original phase of the Cold War. The official conclusion took place on September
12,1990, when France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and
East and West Germany signed an agreement that ended Allied occupation rights and
united Germany, thus fully restoring its sovereignty.19 The practical end, however,
18Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
19 Kenneth L. Hill, Cold War Chronology: Soviet-American Relations, 1945-1991
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1993), 327.
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took place on July 1S, 1990, when Gorbachev finally agreed to a unified Germany in
NATO, thus clearing the final hurdle for reunification. That reunification, along with
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern
Europe, and NATO’s shift toward a greater political and less military role, ended the
division of Europe and fulfilled the third precept of Kennan’s containment policy.
The argument that there existed in reality two distinct dimensions to the Cold
War is the only credible argument that explains the differences in President Reagan’s
and President Bush’s foreign policy initiatives, and it is the only one that resolves the
original suggestions made by Kennan concerning containment. It also explains why
Kennan became one of the more vocal critics of how the government was putting the
Containment Doctrine into practice. In 1966, Kennan argued against the war in
Vietnam on grounds of American self-interest.20 To him, the Cold War was a practical
concern that need not evolve into the United States fighting communism in every part
of the globe. It was not in America’s self-interest to fight a military war to end
communism. The Soviet Union had no intention, as the American military
establishment feared immediately following the Second World War, to conquer
Western Europe and establish subservient Communist regimes. He understood the
willingness of the government and the military to accept this image because it would
give the military “a new purpose, a new function, even in a sense a new legitimacy, to
the greatly swollen military bureaucratic establishment with which the end of the war

20 Allen J. Matusow, “The Vietnam War, the Liberals, and the Overthrow of LBJ,”
Retracing the Past: Readings in the History o f the American People, 4th ed., vol. 2,
Gary B. Nash and Ronald Schultz, eds. (New York: Longman, 2000), 208-220.
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had left us.”21 The suspicions on the Soviet’s part, contends Kennan, were confirmed
by “the entire trend of American policy in the immediate postwar years.”22 The
unwillingness of the United States to pursue any realistic discussions, discussions
advocated by Kennan, about the future of Europe added to the fact that the United
States intended to rearm the West Germans and admit them to NATO, events that
convinced the already oversuspicious Stalin that the West was determined to steal the
spoils that he had won in World War Q. Kennan argues that Stalin failed to realize that
the members of the NATO alliance were not adequately prepared or unified enough to
mobilize in an attack on the Soviet Union. On the other side, the Americans had no
reason to justify their belief that the Soviets were preparing an onslaught against the
rest of Europe. A Soviet victory would involve the unification of Germany under a
single Communist government—something Stalin did not want. Moving the center of
European Communism to a united Germany would have been dangerous because such
a powerful regime would not remain a puppet of Moscow for long and could
eventually challenge the Russian Communist regime for superiority. Thus, from a
practical standpoint, the situation that solidified in the opening years of the Cold War,
at least according to Kennan, was absurd. He particularly disagreed with how the
problem of Soviet power was treated in NSC-68, a document that formed the basis of
postwar American foreign policy.23
Between 194S and 1950, relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union had greatly deteriorated and had become increasingly hostile. The contest,
21 Kennan and Lukacs, George F. Kennan and the Origins o f Containment, 19441946, 64.
22 Ibid., 64.
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however, had been fought largely on political and economic grounds. During this time,
foreign policy had stressed economic assistance through the Marshall Plan and
collective security through the North Atlantic Treaty and a program of very modest
military aid to its allies. That changed when NSC-68 argued that the West needed
large, ready military forces to stop the expansion of communism and the Soviet Union.
President Truman’s budget of 19S0, the year NSC-68 was drafted, called for spending
less than $13 billion for the military—less than S percent of the gross national product
(GNP). The next year, after NSC-68 was officially adopted, Truman requested more
than $60 billion for the military—18.5 percent of a robust GNP.24 Military power
would continue to have primary claim on U.S. resources throughout the Cold War
period as the militarization of the Cold War began in earnest with NSC-68, presented
to Truman in April of 1950, and, just two months later, the Korean War. NSC-68 had
presented four possible courses of action to Truman: (1) continuation of current
policies, (2) isolation, (3) war, (4) and “a more rapid building up o f the political,
economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under [option number
one], with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations
without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is
attacked.”25 The study strongly recommended that Truman pursue option number four.
Just as Kennan’s famous “X” article, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan
marked a turning point in 1947 and provided the basis for the Cold War based on a
23 Ibid., 70.
24 Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston:
Bedford Books, 1993), vii.
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political and economic struggle, 1950 witnessed the Korean War and NSC-68
providing the example and rationale, respectively, for U.S. strategy during much of the
Cold War. It was not by coincidence that NSC-68 was formulated immediately after
Kennan stepped down as the director of the Policy Planning Staff and Paul Nitze
assumed the position. Kennan, who saw the international confrontation as essentially
political in nature and thus necessitating a political response, would not have
recommended to President Truman a military solution. Indeed Kennan would spend a
good part of the rest of his career voicing his disagreement to the treatment of the
problem of Soviet power in NSC-68, warning that:
History shows that belief in the inevitability of war with a given power affects
behavior in such a way as to cripple all constructive policy approaches towards
that power, leaves the field open for military compulsions, and thus easily
takes on the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy.26
But, Nitze felt that the report answered the fundamental question of national security:
How do we get from where we are to where we want to be without being struck by
disaster along the way?27 Nitze and Kennan disagreed on both where they were and
where they wanted to be. Aside from Kennan’s disdain for the militarization of the
Cold War, there was a more fundamental disagreement. Both NSC-68 and Kennan
viewed American security as being dependent upon the maintenance of a balance of
power. But NSC-68 argued that the balance of power was very fragile and could shift
at any moment. Kennan believed that there were only five real centers of power—the
25 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” (April 14,
1950), reprinted in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, Ernest R. May,
ed. (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 21-82.
26 George F. Kennan, The Cloud o f Danger: Current Realities o f American Foreign
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 201-202.
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industrial complexes of the United States, Great Britain, the Rhine valley, the Soviet
Union, and Japan. As long as the West maintained control of four out of those five, no
threat to the international order would exist. Kennan saw a very tangible struggle
based primarily on geography and economic capacity. NSC-68 suggested that changes
in the balance of power could result from intangibles such as intimidation,
humiliation, and loss of credibility. Within the argument for pursuing the fourth
option, the authors of NSC-68 cited an important advantage as being its
“psychological impact.”28 Historian John Lewis Gaddis explains the impact of such a
line of reasoning:
The implications were startling. World order, and with it American security,
had come to depend as much on the perception of the balance of power as on
what that balance actually was. And the perceptions involved were not just
those of statesmen customarily charged with conducting international affairs;
they reflected as well mass opinion, foreign as well as domestic, informed as
well as uniformed, rational as well as irrational. Before such an audience, even
the appearance of a shift in power relationships could have unnerving
consequences; judgments based on such traditional criteria as geography,
economic capacity, or military potential now had to be balanced against
considerations of image, prestige, and credibility. The effect was to vastly
increase the number and variety of interests deemed relevant to the national
security, and to blur distinctions between them.29
These proliferating interests would have to be defended by an increase in defense
expenditures. This completely went against the perception of limited resources, which
had been one of the underpinnings of Kennan’s views on containment. Instead, there
was not to be any distinction between peripheral and vital interests. Indeed, if
27 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A t the Center c f Decision (New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 95.
28 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” (April 14,
1950), 73.
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American security depended as much on perception of the balance o f power as on
what that balance actually was, all interests were vital. NSC-68 suggested:
... a way to increase defense expenditures without war, without long-term
budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdens: if, as Truman’s domestic
economic advisors had argued, the administration would learn to live with
temporarily unbalanced budgets in the interests of stimulating the economy,
then the means of defense could be expanded as necessary to protect the
American position in the world.30
The debate over NSC-68 implied that the country could achieve expandable means if a
threat to its survival existed. Clearly, NSC-68 recognized such a threat. The
comparisons between this approach and Reagan’s “Peace through Strength” program
are obvious, as are the comparison of Kennan’s approach based on limited resources
and Bush’s approach amid huge deficits and a weak economy. Another comparison
can be made between NSC-68’s view of American security based on perception and
Reagan’s fight against the “Evil Empire,” which was based on rhetoric and ideology.
Certainly, Kennan’s emphasis on geography and economic capacity has direct
correlation with Bush’s emphasis on Eastern Europe. It seems clear, at least in light of
this study, that there was a marked difference between the policies of 1947 and 19S0;
between the policies of 1981 and 1989.
The hypothesis of two distinct levels of the Cold War can not only be seen in
the writings of George Kennan and Paul Nitze but also in the words of official who
where there when the Cold War ended. Take, for example, the words of Marlin
Fitzwater, who served as Press Secretary to both Reagan and Bush:
29 John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,”
International Security, Spring 1980, vol. 4, no. 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1980), 164-176. (166)
30 Ibid., 166.

217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When Reagan came [into office] in 1988, we were in the heat of the Cold War,
and Reagan was the Cold Warrior. He knew how to fight communism. He had
a strong ideology, a strong belief in America, and so he was a perfect president
to take’em on and say America’s going to win this war. And when President
Bush came in he had the international background and the diplomatic
experience to then negotiate the new realities of an East-West relationship.31
He identified Reagan’s fight, and his strength, as being based on ideology. He was
“the Cold Warrior” because he “knew how to fight Communism”—with ideology.
This ideology was manifested in rhetoric. Fitzwater identifies Reagan as the perfect
president to take them on and “soy [emphasis added] America’s going to win this
war.” When Fitzwater refers to Bush, he praises him for his international background
and diplomatic experience. Bush was the right president to “negotiate [emphasis
added] the new realities of an East-West relationship.” In that same interview,
Fitzwater indirectly refers to Bush’s ability to “navigate [emphasis added] the waters
of European change.” The difference in terminology could not be more striking.
Reagan is going to “fight communism,” “take’em on,” and “say America’s going to
win.” Bush is going to use his “diplomatic experience” to “negotiate” and “navigate.”
The two presidents were addressing the Cold War in two distinct ways. That is
because they were fighting two different levels o f the Cold War, partly because of
their two markedly different backgrounds and partly because of the circumstances in
which they found themselves:
The point is that the world changed there and it changed just about the time we
changed presidents, so you can’t really judge President Bush, his views on
ending the Cold War, against Reagan’s because the Cold War was different
when he became president.32

31 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
32 Ibid.
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It is difficult to compare the effectiveness of the foreign policy approach of each man
because they had such different goals and such different concepts of the war that they
were fighting. Reagan put his belief in words, words such asfreedom and democracy.
He felt that espousing those words was a goal in itself. If he could get people,
Americans and Soviets, to believe in those words, successful policies would naturally
follow. In essence, he used ideology as both a guide for policymaking and as a tool to
justify policy once it was made. In his memoir, Reagan explains the essence of what
the Cold War meant to him:
Democracy triumphed in the Cold War because it was a battle of values—
between one system that gave preeminence to the state and another that gave
preeminence to the individual and freedom.33
To Reagan, the Cold War was a battle of ideology and values that had been won once
it was demonstrated that democracy was superior. Indeed Jack F. Matlock Jr., who
served on Reagan’s National Security Council staff from 1983-86 and as U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union under both Reagan and Bush, confirms that Reagan
viewed the Cold War as a war of ideology: totalitarianism versus freedom.34 Matlock
distinguishes between the ideological phase of the Cold War and the diplomatic phase.
He points to Gorbachev’s speech before the United Nations as the point at which the
Cold War philosophically came to an end:
I distinguish between the ideological end to the Cold War and, as I say, all of
the cleanup diplomacy, which was important. It’s sort of like something
happening as die end of a crisis, but you don’t know if there’s going to be a
relapse if you’re speaking in medical terms. So it had to be confirmed, but it
was confirmed over the next two years.... So I think that, in general, we no
longer had totally antagonistic goals. After all, the Cold War was conceived as
33 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 715.
34 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society of Historians of American
Foreign Relations, January 6,2001.
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a zero-sum game—any gain for one was [a loss for] the other—and then
suddenly we were looking at how we can disengage, how can we serve the
interests of everybody.... that’s why I say I think it ended ideologically. That’s
not to deny that there was a lot of diplomacy to be done to clear up the
remnants of the Cold War, the results.35
According to this view, when President Bush took office, the United States needed a
skillful diplomat who excelled at personal diplomacy and could help “wrap things up”
peacefully—what Matlock refers to as cleanup diplomacy. Although the Cold War’s
back had been broken in terms of ideology, the responsibility for cleaning up the
remnants of the Cold War would fall on Bush. It was a role that Bush, who was wary
of excessive rhetoric and preferred pragmatic (he would say “prudent”) diplomatic
solutions, was well suited to perform. That is certainly the view of Brent Scowcroft:
The Carter administration. . . well, they had a tough time. But in a way it was
sort of a disaster because everything was going wrong for us and it was the end
o f Vietnam and Watergate, and the Soviet Union was talking about the
correlation of forces and the world was changing in their favor and so on. So
what we needed was Reagan to restore American spirits and to have us stand
up and stand up tall. But it took Bush to bring it to an end.36
Scowcroft certainly felt that Bush ended the Cold War:
The Cold War . . . well, you know the Reagan administration tends to think
they ended the Cold War. I think the Cold War was not at all ended when Bush
came into office. Eastern Europe was still divided just like it was before. The
Soviet army was still manning barricades and so on. No, it happened under
President Bush, and it happened the way it did in considerable part because of
his great skill at diplomacy about eliciting cooperation from people, both
friends and opponents.37
Notice what Scowcroft points to as the reason the Cold War had not ended—Eastern
Europe was still divided:

35 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
36 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
37 Ibid.
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I thought that. . . the Cold War was really about Eastern Europe. And, with the
unification of Germany and its membership in NATO, that really finished the
Cold War.38
The division of Europe that Kennan had addressed with his Containment Doctrine had
to end before the Cold War could be over. However, the division of Europe could not
end, at least peacefully, until the Soviet Union allowed for that division to end.
Gorbachev and the “new thinkers” who gained power in 1985 provided the
initial conditions needed for the end of the Cold War. But he did not intend to end the
division of Europe: he was more interested in internal change. Changes in foreign
policy were merely designed to help perestroika succeed. Gorbachev looked favorably
on world developments that he felt promoted perestroika and never considered that
they might lead to the emergence of anti-communist and anti-Soviet governments: “If
we can bring people back into the socialist system instead of alienating them, we can
give socialism a second wind.”39 This optimistic remark in July of 1989 demonstrated
that the purpose of his policies was not to promote separation or grant independence.
Instead, they were intended to “inspire much-needed reform and modernization.”40 His
belief that socialism would be strengthened depended on his ability to revitalize the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s domestic reforms, however, could not revive an economy
beleaguered by mismanagement and inefficiency. With falling agricultural and
industrial production, inflation, and increased foreign debt and trade deficits, criticism
of Gorbachev’s reform efforts led to demands for local autonomy by many of the more
38 Ibid.
39 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism in
Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 75.
40 Joseph Smith, The Cold War: Second Edition, 1945-1991 (Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell, 1998), 142.
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than 100 different nationalities within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s reforming
activities and his denunciation of Brezhnev’s “years of stagnation” did not merely
impact the Soviet Union. The rising expectations sparked by glasnost (open debate on
government policies) and perestroika (economic restructuring) led to movements in
the satellite states for the same type of fundamental reforms and, thereby, challenged
the power and authority of the local communist bosses. This progression of change
from ‘below’ followed the path that Gorbachev was taking from ‘above.’ As Jack
Matlock recalls, Gorbachev’s initial foreign policy approach was that of a dogmatic
defender of traditional nationalistic, exclusive, and intolerant Soviet attitudes. But
within just a few years he had rejected the class struggle ideology and embraced
universal human values. Gorbachev knew that a less confrontational foreign policy
would allow him to lower defense spending, thus freeing up needed resources for
internal economic reform. Also, Soviet leaders had used the Cold War to justify
internal repression. Gorbachev knew that the needed reforms might be blocked by
hard-liners as long as the Cold War continued. In addition, continuing a
confrontational security policy would make it imperative that the coercive control of
Eastern Europe be maintained—something Gorbachev increasingly began to view as
incompatible with his policies of democratization and economic reform within the
Soviet Union.41 Reducing the Soviet sphere of influence would have the added benefit
of reducing the cost of economic subsidies to Eastern Europe, which had long been a
burden to Soviet resources. For example, by ending the Soviet sale of oil and natural
gas to Eastern Europe at prices far below world market, a key source of hard currency
41 David S. Painter, The Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge,
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for the Soviet Union could become available. Gorbachev’s change in foreign policy
was also done to help his country overcome “the hostility, and permanent tension with
the outside world that the Bolshevik Revolution had engendered.”42 Gorbachev knew
that, in order for his efforts to succeed, he was going to need better relations with the
West. This change in relations started during Reagan’s second term and was nearly
complete by the time Bush assumed the presidency. Gorbachev recognized that
between his last visit to the United States while Reagan was still in office and the first
visit under President Bush, “the ‘enemy image,’ used to fuel the Cold War
confrontation for decades, had lost much of its appeal.”43 Gorbachev’s ideological
pronouncements were more than a shift in rhetoric; they led to the reorientation of
Soviet foreign policy to conform to them. That is why Gorbachev, unlike previous
Soviet leaders, consistently used force not as a first but as a last resort.44 That is why,
in the end, he was willing to agree to arms reductions based on equality rather than
along proportional lines, which would have maintained Soviet superiority. That is why
he took a non-interventionist policy toward Eastern Europe and allowed those
countries to leave the Soviet sphere of influence; why he allowed a unified Germany
in NATO and opposed aggression by a former Soviet client state in the Persian Gulf. It
is worth remembering that the Bush administration had its best success in negotiations,

1999), 104.
42 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on An Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account
o f the Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 658.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs: M ikhail Gorbachev (New York: Doubleday, 1996),
536.
44 Unlike his non-interventionist policy towards Eastern Europe, Gorbachev was
prepared to use armed force to maintain the Soviet Union itself. But, again, only as a
last resort.
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for example Gorbachev’s agreement for a unified Germany, when the discussion was
couched in the rhetoric o f universal human values. As Matlock concludes:
He [Gorbachev] did not originate the specific program that eventually ended
the Cold War and eliminated the East-West divide. But he came to understand
that the Soviet Union could benefit from joining the rest of the world, and he
made an essential contribution when he found and adopted an ideological
justification for making peace with the world.43
Thus, Bush dealt with a Soviet leader with no clear strategic vision, but one that
eagerly wanted his internal reforms to succeed. The task was to find common interests
that could move forward the U.S. objective of ending the division o f Europe and aid
Gorbachev in his task of preserving and developing the democratic transformations
that were occurring within the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
Foreign relations are a major concern of every presidency. This was especially
true in the presidency o f George Bush, during which the Cold War ended, Germany
was reunited, the Soviet Union collapsed and the former Soviet Bloc countries began
the transition to democracy and market economics, and the United States led the
alliance that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi control. In no other area does the president
play more of a central role than in foreign affairs. This is especially true when, as in
the case of Bush, both houses o f Congress are controlled by the opposing party. The
concept of George Bush as an excellent president with regards to foreign policy and a
poor president in regards to domestic policy seems to have been universally accepted.
In fact, it is now almost a cliche. It is worth noting that out of all o f the Bush
administration officials interviewed for this study, when asked to list the achievements
43 Matlock, An Autopsy On An Empire, 658.
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o f the Bush administration, not one cited a domestic policy achievement. All
exclusively focused on accomplishments in foreign affairs. The press were quick to
see this disparity and focused on it throughout the Bush presidency. At the end of
1990, Time magazine named its “Man of the Year.” The award was supposed to go to
the person who, for better of for worse, had made the most impact on news that year.
Their selection was unusual in that they named “the two George Bushes” as “Men of
the Year.”46 They claimed that George Bush had seemed like two presidents: one
displaying a commanding vision of a new world order, the other showing little vision
for his country. In short, they were making a distinction between a remarkably
successful “International George Bush” and a rudderless “Domestic George Bush.”
This perception was not confined to 1990 nor was it limited to Time magazine. In fact,
this is the image that most of the general public, and many trained observers and
historians, have of George Bush’s entire presidency. Economist Robert Reich
mockingly labeled Bush the “best secretary of state we’ve ever had.”47 Economist
John Kenneth Galbraith added that, in his opinion, “[Bush] becomes slightly depressed
when he has to come home and deal with economic or other dreary subjects of that
sort.”48 Bush did have some limited success on domestic policy such as passage of a
clean air bill, legislation to help the handicap, an improved immigration bill, and
efforts to bail out the savings-and-loans. But then-Senator A1 Gore seems to have
summed up the prevailing opinion when he labeled Bush a “do nothing president on
46 George J. Church, “Men of the Year A Tale of Two Bushes,” Time, 7 January
1991,18-33.
47 “Bush-7/me Man o f the Year,” CNN, 30 December 1990. Video footage provided
bg the George Bush Presidential Library
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domestic problems.”49 It is not unusual for a president who was in office during a war,
indeed Bush had to deal with both the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, to be
remembered primarily in conjunction with that war. But Bush is one of the few who is
remembered only in relation to the wars that he fought. If not for the victories in two
wars, the assumption is that Bush would have been a rather forgettable president or
remembered only as the man entrusted with the Reagan legacy. Such a hypothesis
attempts to separate Bush from his historical context and judge him apart from the
events that confronted his presidency. Such an effort would be foolish. The success of
a president depends largely on the crises that confront him. How he deals with the
situation in which he has been placed determines how he should be remembered.
George Bush was president at a time when the United States needed a capable foreign
policy leader. Bush’s accomplishments must be seen as the culmination of his long
career in foreign affairs and national security policy. His tenure as U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations, envoy to China, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
vice president of the United States uniquely prepared him to be an excellent foreign
policy president. Even apart from the shadow of Reagan, Bush was highly qualified to
assume the presidency when it was apparent that the Cold War was coming to a
conclusion. And it was logical in 1992, with the end of the Cold War and foreign
policy expertise not needed as much as domestic policy experience, that George Bush
would lose the presidency. And it is within the context of historical events that Bush
should be judged. That does not mean that Bush should be hailed as having
masterminded the end o f the Cold War. Indeed, Bush received substantial criticism at
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the beginning of his administration for inaction, and many of the decisions made in
1989 in particular were reactionary in nature. But just as American foreign policy
from 1947 to 1950 was not merely a working out of a clearly delineated Doctrine of
Containment, Bush did not chart a clear course of action. Both Truman, with the help
o f men such as Kennan and Marshall, and Bush, with Scowcroft and Baker, decided
upon the major elements of an American response to the Soviet Union in a piecemeal
and staggered manner.30 The events in 1989 in particular were so unpredictable that
any precisely laid out plan would have to be continually altered. According to Brent
Scowcroft, Bush, with his strong background in foreign affairs, excelled in this sort of
ad hoc policymaking:
He was not a great strategist, but he had wonderful instincts and he wanted to
move out and get things done. And so when you’d give him an idea, if it was a
good one, he was ready to charge off on it, and did frequently.51
In fact, one of Bush’s strengths, as Scowcroft recalls, was his ability to recognize and
then guide the effects of the historic events that occurred during his presidency:
President Bush recognized historic change was taking place. He didn’t create
the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really cataclysmic
changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.52
Bush led a transition: a transition from the Cold War to a post-Cold War world. Bush
recognized practical diplomatic problems and addressed them with practical
diplomatic solutions. Marlin Fitzwater argues that Bush should get credit for that
transition:
50 For a detailed description o f foreign policymaking between 1947 and 1950 see
Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making o f American Foreign
Policy, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
51 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
52 Ibid.
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(Bush should get credit] for transitioning, for understanding the relationships
o f the country, for having a geo-political view o f the world that allowed him to
work cooperatively with Gorbachev and with Kohl and with Mitterand in
France and with John Major in Great Britain in a very cooperative way in
shaping that year or two where Germany was reunited and the Soviet Union
was trying to sort itself out.53
And he was responsible for it ending it peacefully. The Cold War did not have to end
peacefully. General Colin Powell, who served under both Bush and Reagan, explains
Bush’s foreign policy legacy:
He [Bush] is the one who guided the Cold War to its end, and he did it with
great skill. The unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union
without us gloating about it was very wisely done by the president, certain
magnanimity in the manner in which he dealt with Gorbachev and then
Yeltsin, and I think he played a key role at the end.54
It was Bush’s adroit management—diplomatic and political management—that
allowed for a peaceful transition. The Bush presidency had many faults—especially
with the domestic agenda and the inattention to the ceremonial aspect of the
presidency—but its one great strength allowed for the division of Europe to finally be
resolved and for the Cold War to end with a whimper and not a bang.

53 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
54 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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-Appendix AMarlin Fitzwater Interview
I spoke with Marlin Fitzwater via telephonefrom his home in Deale, Maryland, on
May 9,2000. Fitzwater served as White House press secretaryfrom 1982 to 1992
under both Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
How would you contrast the differences between President Reagan and President
Bush as far as their ability to deal with the media?
Well, they were both very effective but in totally different ways. President Reagan
pretty much ignored the media in a personal sense. He read the press a lot and, of
course, was very sensitive to what was being portrayed on television, but he seldom
took it personal. And he tended to conduct his press relations in the same way. He held
48 press conferences in eight years. He tended to use press conferences to speak
directly to the American people on issues, and generally conducted his press relations
through formal kinds of meetings like the press conference. President Bush, on the
other hand, knew all the reporters. They had covered him during eight years as vice
president before being president. He tended to interact with them personally. He gave
240 press conferences in four years, and he appeared in the press briefing room often,
sometimes even two or three times a day. So he was much more interactive with the
press on an individual basis.
Did you as press secretary have to make any adjustments when say working for
President Reagan or working for President Bush?
Well, yes. At the end of the Reagan administration, President Bush asked me to be his
press secretary. And we sat down and had a talk about how he wanted to conduct his
press relations. And that was my advice to him that he was good with the press, he
should be more personal in his relationships, hold more press conferences, talk to them
on a regular basis so there wasn’t this huge build up for press conferences every
month.
And when he was gearing up for the 1988 election, what steps did he take to try
to establish his own image separate from Reagan?
Well, now that, see I wasn’t involved. I was President Reagan’s press secretary
through ’88. So, I don’t really know.
Did the Reagan administration, during the 1988 election, make a conscious effort
to try to stay out of the campaign so Bush could form his own identity?
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No, we made a conscience effort to stay in the campaign. One o f the reasons was that
President Bush was not trying to create a separate identity. I mean, he was to a small
degree, but his challenge was to show that his policies were the same as Ronald
Reagan’s because they had worked together for a long time, and they were both
conservatives. People wanted to know if he was going to be loyal to the Bush, I mean,
Reagan policies. And the press were always trying to drive a wedge between he and
President Reagan. So it’s just the opposite of what we have today. Today, Gore is
trying to get away from Clinton. But in the Bush-Reagan period the question was
could they stay together, and the press was always trying to find differences on tax
issues particularly. And, so that was the different challenge.
Do you think that the interview that Bush had with Dan Rather during the 1988
election helped him overcome the press charges of the wimp label or do you think
that hurt him in the long run by focusing more attention on the Iran-Contra
Affair?
Oh, I think it helped him considerably. I don’t recall any fallout on Iran-Contra
because it didn’t have anything to do with the substance o f that matter. But the
confrontation itself was helpful because simply it did kind of have a symbolic
manhood effect if you will. Dan Rather came out of it looking really bad. He was
angry and felt he’d been humiliated and so forth. So I think on the whole it was very
helpful for President Bush and the campaign. In the long term, it hurt his relationship
with CBS, and that was always a difficult relationship from then on through his
presidency. But the immediate effect was definitely good for President Bush and bad
for Dan Rather.
Once Bush became president, what steps were taken as far as style to distance
him from Reagan? Did he try to lower expectations once he became president?
Well, I don’t know about lowering expectations, but as I’d described the differences in
their press relationship, and that was the most obvious one was that President Bush
was just always available to talk to the press. And he would talk to them at meetings
and during photo ops, in the driveway and so forth, which was a lot more open kind of
personal relationship than Reagan had. That was the most dramatic kind o f effect. I
don’t know that he tried to change relationships and that sort of thing. President Bush
wasn’t much for PR strategies. If you tried to take him some strategy on say, well,
let’s raise our profile or lower expectations or something, his view was that that was
pretty much phony and it was best that you just do your job and things will work out.
That wasn’t always true, but he hoped it was.
What problems were created with the press by the foreign policy review at the
beginning of President Bush's presidency?
Well, yes, because, o f course, the press is always an impatient group. I mean, a day is
forever in the news business. And you promise a policy review and they expect to

242

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

have it tomorrow or the next day. And if it drags on for six or eight months, something
like that, that seems like a long time and you’ve got to expect you’re going to start
getting editorials and others saying, “Where’s that policy review?” So, you always
have to deal with media impatience.
When the foreign policy review was complete, it was revealed in a series of
speeches. What was the reasoning behind that and why were they not televised?
No, they weren’t nationally televised. Well, the problem was, first of all, we had to
have some way to put it out And secondly, the review that took place was a more
informal one between the president the national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft,
Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and so it was, ya know, it
didn’t lend itself to kind of being published in a book. This review really was,
amounted to a lot o f private discussion, a lot o f meetings they had had and so forth. So
they needed some way to kind of say to the American people, “Here’s what my
policies are going to be.” And the speeches simply were a, seemed to be, the most
effective tool for producing three or four documents on three or four different areas of
foreign policy that outlined where he intended to go from here.
Reagan used the media to help shape our relationship with the Soviet Union.
What was Bush’s strategy as far as utilizing the press to shape foreign policy?
Did he use the press like Reagan did?
Well, not so much. First o f all, the relationship was different. President Reagan used
the media very effectively in holding up a spotlight on Communism. He criticized
them in his speeches. When we went to Moscow in 1987, he made the walk in Red
Square, which was the symbolic way of showing a new relationship with the Soviet
Union. Then he went to an orthodox church to show, to highlight freedom of religion,
and then he went to Moscow State University to highlight freedom of speech and
education. Then we met with dissidents and had some dissidents come over to the U.S.
embassy, again as a symbolic way of highlighting freedom o f speech and movement.
So Reagan used the media and used symbolic events very dramatically to highlight the
Cold War fight between democracy and Communism. By the time President Bush
came into office, Communism was in its last throws if you will. And the question was
not so much, in 1989, how does democracy defeat Communism; the question was how
does democracy help communism go away in a peaceful way that maintains some
semblance o f civility and peace and so forth within the country. And how do we help
guide what was going on in the Soviet Union.
So by the time Bush became president, he, instead of using the grand, symbolic
gestures to the media, he would need to use more personal diplomacy, correct?
More personal diplomacy and direct policy help. So President Bush’s first meeting
with Gorbachev as president was in Malta in the shipboard meeting. And the first
thing President Bush said was, in the meeting, “Before we even start, I would like to
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open the meeting with a statement” And in that statement he presented Gorbachev
with a seventeen-point economic plan for helping them transition into this new kind of
perestroika world that Gorbachev was defining. And it cleared a pathway to get access
to the World Bank and the international monetary fund, included changes to the
Jackson-Vanik trade bill to increase trade activity, and a number o f other points. But
that was really the first kind of direct support that America gave the Soviet Union—ever. But that was an entirely different kind of approach, o f course, than President
Reagan had had when we were fighting more the ideology—the differences of the two
countries.
Speaking of negotiations—when Reagan was negotiating with Gorbachev, he
realty used SDI to bring him to the bargaining table, correct?
Right
Did Bush back off of SDI and not push it as much with Gorbachev?
No, he did, and in all the summit meetings I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev,
everyone of them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI.
That was the objective, and the reason was because they always thought it was an
offensive system. President Reagan presented it as a defensive shield, but they always
thought we were going to get up in space, build some platform, and then launch a
nuclear attack on Russia. And their problem was that they felt they couldn’t afford to
match i t And so, they knew. . . that’s when they started getting serious about arms
reduction. Their view was, we don’t have the money to ever build a space-based
system; let’s get out of the arms race. So they started reducing nuclear weapons.
President Bush kept the pressure on in the same way when he met with Gorbachev and
then with Yeltsin, after Yeltsin replaced him in ’90, their goal was still the same. They
still focused every meeting on how to get us to back out of SDI. So President Bush
wanted to hold that pressure point out there all through his four years as well.
Was Malta seen as the pivotal point in the change in the relationship with the
Soviet Union, going from the symbolic, more confrontational time of Reagan, and
now Bush working to try to help improve the relationship through specific
programs?
No question in my mind. I would define that a little differently though. I would say
that that was the pivotal point at which the West first recognized that Communism was
changing and may collapse. And we met with the purpose of trying to define how that
could happen, what our role would be, and how we could help guide the future of
whatever Russia emerged. And so it didn’t have so much to do w ith. . . basically
Reagan had won the Cold War by 1988, especially as we look back on i t At the time
it wasn't quite so clear, but it was clear. And I remember a memo from General
Scowcroft to President Bush, which I’m pretty sure that all of this is in Bush’s book
Looking Forward, but in any case, I remember a memo from Scowcroft, and I talk
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about it in my book Call the Briefing/, that for Malta they laid out three different
scenarios o f what might happen in the Soviet Union. And one was that Gorbachev was
killed or thrown out of office by hard-line Communists. The other was that Gorbachev
did actually change things but it created so much chaos and corruption that the whole
country fell apart Another one was that it kind o f worked moderately well—they
changed the politics and so forth, but the economy slipped away, and he would be
eventually replaced by somebody else who might be able to run the country. But the
point is not how well those three scenarios reflected what actually happened, but the
point is that that memo indicated that that was the point at which we recognized as a
country, as a president, that Communism was gone or on its way and were making
plans for the post-Cold War world. And certainly then the whole economic assistance
was a post-Cold War situation even though there were still a lot of uncertainties.
Bush faced a great deal of criticism over his reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Was he less concerned with his image and more concerned with ending the Cold
War and tying up all the loose ends as far as not wanting to Mrub it in” to the
Soviet Union?
First of all, he didn’t give a damn about his image. And I specifically raised it ’cause I
went to him and said, you know, the wall is coming down and you need to say
something here that’s going to be strong and show that the president recognizes what’s
happening and it’d be good for your image and so forth. And he said to me he didn’t
care about image. That this was not a time to be worrying about that sort o f thing. And
that he wanted to respond in a way that Gorbachev would understand and that would
be supportive o f moving ahead in the future relationship. I mean, it’s one o f Bush’s
more admirable traits in the sense that he had enormous discipline in order to do what
he thought was right for the country even at the personal risk of bad press and bad
publicity and image consideration. And he wouldn’t do it. But it paid off, and when
we went to Malta and they sat down at the table and one of the early things he said
was, “I hope you noticed” . . . maybe it wasn’t Malta. It was the first meeting after the
wall fell anyway, and he said to Gorbachev, “I hope you noticed that I didn’t dance on
the wall when it came down.” And Gorbachev said, “I did and I appreciate it very
much.” And they talked then about the language that they would use to describe the
new relationship in a post-Berlin Wall situation.
And did that help smooth over with Gorbachev the idea of a unified Germany?
It did. It was very helpful. And what it showed was that the United States and
Germany, again, were more interested in building real relationships and moving the
process forward then they were just taking credit for winning the Cold War.
Because of his symbolic gestures and his media presence during the end of the
Cold War, Reagan gets a lot of credit for ending the Cold War. Do you think that
a distorted image exists concerning Bush’s accomplishments because he cared
more about actual policy-making decisions than his media image?
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No, I d o n 't I think President Bush gets a lot of credit for the transition to, over the end
o f the Cold War and moving into the new relationship. The point is that the world
changed there and it changed just about the time we changed presidents, so you can’t
really judge President Bush, his views on ending the Cold War, against Reagan’s
because the Cold War was different when he became president And so I think
President Bush has gotten pretty good credit for, again for transitioning, for
understanding the relationships of the country, for having a geopolitical view of the
world that allowed him to work cooperatively with Gorbachev and with Kohl and with
Mitterand in France and with John Major in Great Britain in a very cooperative way in
shaping that year or two where Germany was reunited and the Soviet Union was
trying to sort itself out Maybe one of the best examples was when Yeltsin replaced
Gorbachev after the coup attempt It was President Bush who got on the phone to
Yeltsin and convinced him that in a peaceful turnover, he needed to be good to
Gorbachev. And told him to give him a car, give him a house, and treat him well. And
Yeltsin didn’t want to do it because he hated Gorbachev, and then Bush called up
Gorbachev and said the same thing—You want to demonstrate a peaceful transition;
you got to be praising Yeltsin or at least don’t be criticizing him in public. Don’t be
tearing him down and picking a fight. You two guys have got to show that you can
change power peacefully. And that’s the hallmark of that period for President Bush.
You just spoke of Bush’s relationships with foreign leaders. During my research I
found that Bush spent a great deal of time trying to establish personal
relationships with foreign leaders. Was that different than Reagan? Did Bush
spend more time in communication and correspondence with foreign leaders and
in establishing relationships?
Yes, and there are two or three reasons for that One is that he had long had an interest
in foreign policy and had been a student of foreign policy in a way that President
Reagan hadn’t as governor. President Bush, as you recall, by the time he had been
president had already been envoy to China, ambassador to the United Nations, and
director o f the CIA. All three o f those are major kinds of diplomatic foreign policy
jobs. And they are ones at which he came to know the heads of state of many countries
around the world So he just brings about a much different background to the job at
that time. I think he was ideally suited to the changes in the world affairs, that we’re
lucky we didn’t have a president come in in ’88, well, like Dukakis, who was a
governor with no foreign policy experience. I think he would have had a lot of trouble
navigating the waters o f European change.
So you're saying that Reagan came in at the right time because at that point we
needed the grand symbolic gestures. But when Bush came in, foreign policy
expertise was needed to tie up all of the loose ends of the Cold War.
No, what I’m saying is that when Reagan came in in 1988, we were in the heat of the
Cold War, and Reagan was the Cold Warrior. He knew how to fight communism. He
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had a strong ideology, a strong belief in America, and so he was a perfect president to
take 'em on and say America’s going to win this war. And when President Bush came
in he had the international background and the diplomatic experience to then negotiate
the new realities o f an East-West relationship. I think it goes to the very substance of
world affairs at those times.
Thank you.
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-Appendix BJames A. Baker HI Interview
l spoke with James Baker via telephonefrom his office in DaUas, Texas, on May 22,
2000. Baker served as Ronald Reagan’s chiefof staff, 1981-85, and secretary of the
treasury, 1985-88. Under George Bush, Baker served as secretary of state, 19891992, and chiefofstaff, 1992.
BAKER: I’ll be happy to talk to you, but my book will go into a heck of a lot more
detail than what I can tell you in a 20-minute conversation on the phone. And it tells
you a lot about President Bush’s role in managing the end o f the Cold War. What I
basically say there is that he did a superb job of seeing to it that the Cold War ended
with a whimper and not with a bang. It’s called Politics o f Diplomacy. It was
published by Putnam and Company, Putnam and Sons. I got it out in about September
o f ’95. It’s hard to find, but if you look for it, you can find it. It’ll give you a lot more
than I can give you over the phone. Secondly, if you haven’t done it, you ought to also
read At the Highest Levels.
Yes, sir, I’ve read that book.
OK, good. Well, go ahead and shoot.
As the campaign manager during the fight for the 1980 Republican nomination,
would you point to the debate in Nashua, New Hampshire, as the turning point of
that nomination?
I think probably it was one turning point. I think it would have been very difficult for
an unknown like George Bush, someone who was not known at all nationally—even
after Iowa—to upset Ronald Reagan who had almost knocked off an incumbent
president for the nomination in ’76. He came very close to knocking off Gerry Ford.
And people don’t remember this but Governor Reagan started running for president in
1968. So I think that it would have been very tough for Bush to win in any event, but
conceivable, and the Nashua debate was critical.
And once he lost that early momentum during the debate, it was pretty much
over from that point?
Well, it was except that, you know, we won a lot o f delegates and the reason he was
put on the ticket. . . Reagan didn’t want to put him on the ticket because they’d had a
fairly contentious primary, and Bush lasted through Michigan and Pennsylvania, well
into May. He didn’t have to get out o f the race until sometime in the first or second
week in May, and he had a lot of delegates at the national convention. And, if you
recall, in Detroit, Reagan tried to go to Ford and that never worked out He really
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didn’t want to do Bush but then when that collapsed, when the Ford effort collapsed,
there wasn’t anyplace to go except to Bush because he had delegates.
What was the main goal behind the lengthy foreign policy review at the
beginning of Bash’s term in office?
Well, any new administration, even if it’s one o f the same party, has got to put its
imprint on foreign policy, and you needed to have a Bush imprint on the nation’s
foreign policy. Also, you needed to make sure that there had not been an overly
aggressive effort to conclude a deal just, you know, just before time ran out with the
Soviets. Nothing had been concluded. Also, you had to, you know. . . Vice President
Bush had not really been in those meetings with Gorbachev. He had to satisfy himself
that Gorbachev was for real. The Cold War still was on. You have to remember that.
They were still supplying weapons through Cuba to Nicaragua. There was still the
Angola problem. We had major arms control negotiations going on, and many o f them
were stuck. Chemical weapons was stuck. Sea launch cruise missiles and the linkage
with START was a sticking point. We had a lot, there’s still a lot o f problems. So it
wasn’t a case of the Cold War being over. I mean, I really sort of think, you know, you
can’t underestimate the significance of Ronald Reagan’s role in ending die Cold War.
But there’s a lot of grounds to debate exacdy when that Cold War ended. A lot of
people will tell you it ended when the wall came down. Course, Ronald Reagan called
for the wall to come down. Ronald Reagan was the architect of our buildup of peace
through strength when we first came in in ’81. But I think it’s a mistake really to try
and say it ended on one time or another. I mean I think it was the combined effort. . .
the policy of peace through strength, which was a policy of the two Reagan
administrations and the Bush administration, that caused a peaceful end to the Cold
War. And primarily President Bush managed that end skillfully. That did not have to
end peacefully.
So the policy review didn’t really alter the basic policy approach; it was just a
matter of stopping to see where they were at and how President Bush could move
forward?
That’s correct. It didn’t stop i t Well, you say stop i t . . . it put a little pause in it there
for a while while we completed the review. If you read the books, including mine,
you’ll see that the review was a disappointment We didn’t feel that it really went into
the depth that it needed to go into. But by May o f the first year o f the Bush term we
had concluded that Gorbachev and Sheverdadze were people we could do business
with, and that we should move forward and move forward rather aggressively. And we
did.
Was the Bush administration hesitant to provide concessions to Gorbachev out of
concern that he would not be able to maintain power?
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Well, that was certainly a factor throughout, but we always felt that Gorbachev was a
reformer. As I told you earlier, we had to determine whether or not we could trust
these guys. We had to determine whether or not the positive steps toward change in
the relationship that occurred at the end o f the Reagan administration were in fact
legitimate or real. So I guess you’d have to say yes to your question. I mean, we had to
make sure that these were people that wanted to reform. And by May of ’89, we had
concluded that, at least I had and you’ll see that in my book and in At The Highest
Levels, we concluded. . . and then President Bush had by July because we went ahead
and had a summit right then and there. If you remember we had Malta. . . I guess that
was July.
Did the foreign policy review hurt the Bush administration on the domestic
front? Did he take a lot of criticism for that?
Well, there was a lot of press criticism, but it was the right thing to do, in my opinion,
rather than just charging, hard charging, in there. If Gorbachev and Sheverdnadze had
not been for real, it would have been a mistake.
Did the events surrounding the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe and the fall of
the Berlin Wall prove to the Bush administration that the changes being made by
Gorbachev were not merely cosmetic or easily reversible? That they were more
permanent?
No, what it proved to us was that the Soviet leadership had, in fact, as they had told us
they had, ruled out the use of force to keep the empire together. That was the critical
factor. They told us early on they weren’t going to use force to keep the empire
together. And when they didn’t that proved that they were telling us the truth and that
they could be trusted and that we could do business with them.
What was Bush’s private reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall?
Oh, he was very very pleased with it. We were all. . . it was quite an emotional event.
But I still think that history will prove that he was absolutely right in not trying to
stick it in the eye o f the Soviets, not trying to goad them or, as everyone put it at the
time, “dance on the wall.” That would have been a terrible mistake politically and
diplomatically.
Did he fear that a Western celebration of the wall's collapse might encourage a
backlash by the hard-liners in East Berlin and Moscow?
He feared that. Well, yes he feared that in part, but also he feared that it would make it
tougher for us to continue to move forward positively with Gorbachev. You don’t
stick it in somebody’s eye when something is fundamental and as big and important as
that happens. You celebrate it but you do so in a more statesmanlike way. Because,
that would have been counter productive for us to start. . . even today when we talk
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about winning the Cold War, and I see Gorbachev today, and even today when we talk
about winning the Cold War, he takes offense at that He says, “You didn’t win the
Cold War, we came to an understanding, a peaceful resolution of our differences.”
At Malta, Gorbachev said to Bush, “We don’t consider you an enemy anymore.”
And then he went on to say that he actually wanted the U.S. to maintain a
presence in Europe. You mention in your book that you considered that to be the
most important statement of the Malta conference. Why was that so important?
Well, because it showed that the relationship had moved from confrontation to
cooperation. I mean, for 40 years we’d been enemies.
There were no formal agreements reached at Malta. Was it primarily a trustbuilding meeting?
Yeah, I think *so. Yeah, there were not a lot o f specifics that were accomplished there,
but it was a very good trust-building meeting. And remember that I had been having
meetings with Sheverdnadze before Malta at which I had become convinced that the
Soviet leadership was real when they were talking about reform and when they were
talking about renouncing the use of force. President Bush needed to hear that and see
that and experience that himself with the head of the Soviet Union.
In the Malta negotiations, how did the Baltic crisis affect Bush's support of
Gorbachev?
Well, look, that is such an expansive question. Again, I would simply refer you to my
book because it comes back all the time. There were two or three incidents in the
Baltics from the time, in the aftermath of Malta until the Gulf War. In fact, there was a
real period o f doubt in our minds on January 12or 13,1991, just before the Gulf War
when the Soviets sent their interior Oman troops into the Baltics and seized radio
stations and stuff like that, and we thought maybe they were trying to capitalize on the
fact that we were so committed in the Gulf. And that was way up in January of 1991..
. but I go into all that stuff in exquisite detail, and I just can’t do it here on the phone.
Did the Bush administration agree at anytime to back off of the commitment to
SDI in order to achieve Soviet concessions in other arms reduction talks?
No.
They stayed committed to SDI?
Yeah.
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President Bush assigned you the task of working toward the reduction of
chemical weapons stockpiles. Considering that had not really been on the Reagan
agenda, is that an achievement of the Bush administration?
Well, it was a treaty that was negotiated that was concluded during the Bush
administration and, you know, people today will still argue whether it’s verifiable,
whether it’s a good treaty or not a good treaty. I think it’s a good treaty, and it was
certainly an accomplishment of the Bush administration. And President Bush and I
both worked in ’94 or ’95, whenever it was, I guess ’96 or ’97, to get it ratified. We
helped the Clinton administration get ratification of i t
In February of 1990, you met with Gorbachev to explain the Two-plus-Four
process. What was his overall reaction to that process?
I don’t think he had a real problem with the process. I think they were interested in a
treaty of peace. I think they were interested in seeing Germany unified outside of
NATO, at least with respect to the eastern part of Germany.
How was the Bush administration finally able to convince Gorbachev a unified
Germany should remain in NATO?
Well, I think we took advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity. Unification
of Germany as a member of NATO was one of the distinct and lasting
accomplishments, I think, of the Bush administration, much more important probably
than the chemical weapons convention. I think, if you look at the unification of
Germany, the management o f the collapse o f communism and the implosion of the
Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Middle East peace process, those are the major
foreign policy accomplishments of the four years of the Bush administration.
Moving to your close working relationship with Shevardnadze, was
Shevardnadze more inclined than Gorbachev to take risks to end the Cold War
and stand up to the hard-liners in the Soviet Union in order to push for things
like German unification, arms control, and other issues?
The answer’s yes, although he wasn’t pushing for German unification in NATO. That
was a very tough topic. But the answer to your question is yes.
Was personal diplomacy really the key to shaping the post-Cold War world?
Well, I don’t know. That’s an overstatement Personal diplomacy was very important.
I think President Bush believes in i t I certainly believe in it, and personal diplomacy
to me does not mean that you put personal relationships ahead o f principle or ahead of
your party’s or country’s interests. It just means that if you can trust a person on the
other side of the table, you have a lot better chance of getting things done. I have a
whole chapter on that in the book by the way.
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Did Bush’s relationship with Gorbachev cause him to be slow in reacting to the
rise of Yeltsin?
The answer to that is an emphatic no. The press loved that argument and they used to
write it. They also wrote that Clinton was stuck with Yeltsin too long. But when
you’ve got a reformer in power and things are going the way you want ’em to go, then
you stick with that person, particularly when they’re freely elected, as Yeltsin was. So
that’s just a fun and games exercise by the press that don’t know what they’re talking
about. I would ask you this in your research. What did we lose by hanging in there
with Gorbachev and Sheverdnadze? When Yeltsin came to power, he embraced us
even more whole-heartedly. We didn’t lose a damn thing. And we gained a lot. So
we’ll shoot that one down. That is the dumbest thing and it keeps cropping up.
So it was more a fabrication of the press that was really just trying to attack Bush
on the domestic front?
Well, I don’t know if the press were attacking him. I’m not going to say that. But all
I’m saying is that argument is just totally without foundation or without rational or
reason. If you look at what happened, yes, we stuck with Gorbachev. He was the
General Secretary and then President of the Soviet Union. And when Yeltsin came
onboard. . . when I went over there in December of ’91 before the implosion of the
Soviet Union, I met with Yelstin. He met with me in St. Catherine’s Hall. Why’d he
do that? To stick it in Gorbachev’s eye. But certainly his embrace of the United States
was total and complete, 100 percent, every bit as much as Gorbachev. We didn’t lose
anything by doing that.
Would you point to the reunification of Germany as the main achievement of the
Bush administration?
Well, I’d point to that. But I would also point to the fact that the Cold War ended
peacefully. And it didn’t have to end peacefully. And it was President Bush’s adroit
management—diplomacy and political management—of the process that permitted it
to end peacefully. Now, those are the accomplishments with respect to the Soviet
Union and the Cold War. And there were other accomplishments, which I mentioned
like the Gulf War, the Middle East peace process, the Madrid conference, and those
things. But, you know, when the Soviets stood up in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I flew back, I happened to
be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without
even clearing it with Gorbachev, joined with me in a statement condemning the
invasion and calling for an arms embargo o f Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time
ever that the Soviet Union foreign minister and the Secretary o f State of the United
States would ever have a joint press conference condemning the action o f a Soviet
client state. And so in my book what I say is that’s the day, at least to me, it was quite
clear, if it wasn’t clear the day the wall fell, it was certainly clear that day that the
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Cold War was over. But that’s the kind o f cooperation we were able to achieve from
them. I mean nobody could conceive of that happening.
The cooperation fostered by the Bush administration, that is really the true
achievement as far as the end of the Cold War because it completely changed the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union?
That’s correct

254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-Appendix CBrent Scowcroft Interview
I spoke with General Brent Scowcroft via telephonefrom his office in Washington,
D.C., on May 23,2000. Scowcroft served as national security advisor to President
Bush, 1989-1992.
How did you first meet George Bush?
Well, I first met him in 1972 when he was Representative to the United Nations and I
was military assistant to President Nixon. And I’ve been sort o f close to him ever
since.
And when did he ask you to be his National Security Advisor?
He asked me on the week before Thanksgiving in 1988.
The Tower Commission, which you served on, found that Reagan’s National
Security Council experienced a lack of accountability and direction. What steps
did you take when you became the National Security Advisor to improve on this?
Well, before I became National Security Advisor I talked both to Frank Carlucci, who
was Reagan’s National Security Advisor or became his National Security Advisor, and
I talked to Carlucci at length about the problems I saw in the Reagan administration
that had let the Iran-Contra thing grow, and made some suggestions. And Carlucci did
some of them and passed the rest on to Colin Powell, who was Carlucci’s successor.
So by the time I got there there wasn’t much left. One of the things I did do is make
sure in my morning meetings with the president that there was always somebody else
there to make a note of what I was asked to do and what I told the president, so that we
would have some kind of record by a third person o f that kind of operational meeting,
which had not always been the case in the Reagan administration.
You’ve said that President Bush in private made clear that he wanted to take
charge o f the foreign policy agenda and try to shape events rather than be shaped
by them.
Yes.
That completely goes against the public perception of him as being very cautious.
Why was there such a difference between the public perception of him and the
way he went about foreign polity in private?

255

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

You know that’s a good question. . . that’s a good question. I’m not sure that I know
the answer to th at He was much more decisive in moving out in private than he
appeared in his public persona. I think he was deeply affected by his mother who used
to tell him all the time, “George, don’t brag.” And so I think he tended in public to
underplay things. That’s the only explanation I can give. He was not a great strategist
but he had wonderful instincts and he wanted to move out and get things done. And so
when you’d give him an idea, if it was a good one, he was ready to charge off on it
and did frequently. I can’t give you any better explanation for that.
You are quoted in a book saying that President Reagan’s rush toward
disarmament had been a “mighty dubious objective for grown-ups in this
business.” Was the policy review in 1989 an effort to slow down the rush toward
disarmament and make sure that it was accomplished in a very careful and
prudent manner?
No, it wasn’t really designed to slow down. It was designed for two things. First of all,
to review where we were going. The Reagan administration had put the emphasis on
numbers, reducing numbers and getting rid of certain kinds of weapons. I didn’t think
that was the overall goal in arms control. I thought the goal in arms control was to
improve stability, to reduce the chances that in a crisis either side would resort to the
use o f nuclear weapons for fear of some vulnerability in the nuclear arsenal. So that’s
what I wanted to do, and numbers had nothing to do with that So I wanted to rethink
where we were going and see if we wanted to modify the arms control proposals that
Reagan had left before the Soviet Union. But there was another and even more
important thing that I wanted to accomplish. For the 20 years before the Reagan
administration, the chief issue between us and the Soviet Union was arms control. I
say issue. . . the thing we talked about. . . that was the only thing that we had to talk
about. And I wanted to change that a little and to focus on Eastern Europe. There was
ferment in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. And I wanted to take advantage of
that ferment to try and get the Soviet army out of Eastern Europe, or at least reduce
their presence to allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a progressive way. So I
wanted to put arms control on the back burner for a time until we had gotten our
Eastern Europe strategy underway and moving.
During this policy review, was there disagreement between the Defense
Department, the State Department, and the White House concerning how the
arms control progress should be made?
No, not a great deal. The chief problem with the policy reviews is that they didn’t
produce anything. They were sort of bureaucratic exercises, and it’s not surprising that
the bureaucracy thought everything was going well because they had designed the
policy. So mostly we got back studies that said do more of the same. That was the
principle problem, and as a result, we just fashioned policies ourselves within the NSC
and then debated them in the NSC.
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Because of his extensive experience with foreign policy, did President Bush intend
to make the final decision by himself, or was it more of a collective decision?
Well, it was never a collective decision. He always made the decision, but he liked to
debate it with his advisors. He liked to ask questions; he liked to provoke people to
defend their views and so on and so forth. That helped him clarify the issues in his
own mind. So, rarely did he make major decisions without a lot of back and forth with
his advisors in order to set things in his own mind. I can’t answer the question how
much was he influenced by other people, because he always had an open mind. But in
the end, he’s the only decision-maker in the executive branch.
SDI was a much-criticized program domestically. But it was used by both the
Reagan and Bush administrations to bring Gorbachev to the bargaining table.
Marlin Fitzwater told me in an interview a couple of weeks ago that every
meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan ended with a plea toward getting us to
drop SDI. How would you characterize the importance of SDI as a leverage tool
in negotiations with the Soviets?
Honestly, this will probably disappoint you, I don’t think very much. I think they were
afraid of SDI because. . . not so much because they thought it would work, but that if
we went down that path, they would have to follow and it was too expensive for them.
They didn’t have the resources. That did i t But my sense is that it tended rather than
to use as leverage to get other things we wanted, it tended to stymie the negotiations
because we would never put SDI on the table. So the Russians tended to drag their feet
because of that
You said in your book that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe was not a catalyst
for change. That it merely provided solid encouragement and allowed the U.S. to
react property to events. Would you please elaborate on this?
We did not stimulate ferment in Eastern Europe. We had done that earlier in the ’70s
and indeed in the ’50s when we helped stimulate the Hungarian revolt and so on. That
turned out to be counter productive because when we turned people out in the streets,
we weren’t prepared to support them. So what we tried to do was to encourage reform
at a level that we thought would be below that that the Soviet Union would think they
would have to crush i t So we wanted to keep it going but we didn’t want it smashed,
as was usually the case with revolt in Eastern Europe with all of the leaders killed or
put in prison. And that’s what we tried to do and it turned o u t you know, because of
our skill or because of luck it turned out that that was very effective in this case.
What were President Bush’s goals for the Malta conference? Was it meant to be
more of a trust-building meeting?
It was primarily more of a trust-building meeting. He had wanted from the outset of
his administration to talk with Gorbachev and I think Dick Cheney had held him back
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because historically the Soviet Union always profited by summits because there was
an atmosphere that, you know the Cold War was over; we didn’t have to worry. And
that always made it harder for us to get appropriations through Congress and so on. So
we didn’t want—I didn’t want, and Cheney didn’t want—a summit until we had
something specific to get from it, that is an arms control agreement or something else.
And early in the administration we didn’t have anything yet. So the president
acquiesced in holding off a summit. Then in the summer o f ’89, as a result of his trip
through Eastern Europe and what he saw there and his meeting with his European
allies at the G-7 summit, he decided that he had to talk with Gorbachev, that things
were moving too fast, that there was too much danger o f misunderstanding, and so he
had to talk with Gorbachev. But he, in fact, he didn’t even want to call it a summit. He
wanted to call it an exchange of views, not to make agreements, which summits
usually are, but just to exchange views. And he was delighted with the idea of a
summit out away from everybody where the press couldn’t be hovering around and
where there would be little pressure for either side to try to make negotiating points or
debating points.
Is that why the negotiations leading up to the Malta conference were kept secret?
He didn’t want to build it up too much?
That was part of i t The other is that we couldn’t find a place to hold it.
How did the collapse of the Berlin Wall affect the Malta negotiations?
They were set by the time the Berlin Wall came down, and I think that what it did is
mostly underscore the importance of the two leaders talking because unexpected
events could turn into a crisis very easily. Gorbachev was very frightened by the fall
o f the Berlin Wall.
Can the Malta meeting in 1989 be seen as the point when our relationship with
the Soviets truly changed?
I think the relationship between the two leaders changed. That was the most dramatic .
. . that they got comfortable with each other, and from that time on . . . there was a
rough patch in the spring of 1990 over the Baltic states. . . but the two knew each
other as individuals. They would occasionally call each other on the phone and so
forth. So the personal relationship changed, and that was very beneficial.
In your book, yon identify the Bush-Kohl meeting after Malta as a turning point
Why was that meeting so pivotal?
It was pivotal because Kohl was sort of out on his own, both inside Germany. . .
Genscher, they had a free democratic party, was worried about moving too fast and
wanted a different kind o f relationship between East and West Germany. The other
allies didn’t want German unification, so Kohl was kind of feeling his way. And they
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had this meeting and the president said, you know, “I’m not worried. I like your ideas.
You go ahead; I’ll back you. I’ll keep everybody else off your back.” So he gave, in
essence, a blank check to Kohl to move ahead. And from then on it was a pretty steady
course.
What were the problems surrounding reunification that had to be resolved
before the process could move forward?
Well, there were two problems. First o f all, there was the problem of unification itself.
And that is that East Germany was the crown jewel of the Soviet bloc. That was the
major achievement, if you will, out o f World War II. And so it was difficult to say,
“Yes, we failed there.” And secondly, it was the heart of the Warsaw Pact It’s pretty
hard to have a viable Warsaw Pact if East Germany is not in it. So that was the
problem with unification. Then there was an added problem is suppose you let
Germany unify—What do you do about membership in NATO? Because East
Germany was in the Warsaw Pact West Germany was in NATO. And that was a very
hard pill for Gorbachev to swallow. And in the end I think that he swallowed it only
because he didn’t have a better alternative. He toyed around with the idea o f a neutral
Germany, but I think he decided that that would be more dangerous—to have a neutral
Germany loose in Europe, than one tied down by the United States. So those are the
major issues.
What problems were created for the U.S. when, because of the August coup,
much of Gorbachev's power shifted to Yeltsin?
Well, the problems that were created is that from then until the end of the Soviet
Union most everything turned into a struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. And
Yeltsin was determined to destroy Gorbachev. And so we had little affect on internal
developments during that period because he was determined to do that. And he
succeeded.
Did President Bush prefer to have at least some form of the Soviet Union survive
rather than face the possibility of chaos because a strong central government
could at least maintain reliable control over the nuclear arsenal?
No, we had a long debate about what our preferences were, and Baker was on one side
o f the arguments that you just made; Cheney was on the other side saying we actively
ought to try to split up the Soviet Union. And we debated and came to no firm
conclusion, so we redly didn’t have a position. We just let nature take its course.
Why did President Bush recognize Ukrainian independence four days before the
Ukrainians themselves voted on the issue? Didn't that really upset Gorbachev?
It was domestic politics.
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He just felt the pressure to move?
Yes.
Did President Bush phone Yeltsin and Gorbachev to persuade them to peacefully
work together during the transition?
Weil, I don’t recall him making a special call with that in mind. But he certainly did
his best to ensure a peaceful transfer. And he talked to both of them frequently during
that period.
Marlin Fitzwater told me that the Malta conference was the point at which the
U.S. first recognized that Communism was changing and might collapse. In the
conversation I had with James Baker, he points to a joint press conference that
he had with Sheverdnadze just prior to the Persian Gulf War as being the
moment when the Cold War was clearly over. What moment would you identify
as being the pivotal point in the changing relationship between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union?
Well, I would say, the point at which I was willing to say the Cold War is over is when
Gorbachev in July o f 1990 . . . Kohl went over to visit him . . . and Gorbachev said it
was alright if a unified Germany could belong to NATO. To me that was the end of
the Cold War.
So once he recognized the reunification of Germany, that was the end?
Yeah. Now later on, certainly, the fact that, as Baker says, the fact that we were on the
same side against aggression in the Persian Gulf, that certainly cemented it But I
thought th at. . . the Cold War was really about Eastern Europe. And with the
unification o f Germany and its membership in NATO, that really finished the Cold
War.
In a talk that I had yesterday with James Baker, he said that the main
accomplishment of the Bush administration was “seeing to it that the Cold War
ended with a whimper and not a bang.” Is that the real legacy of the Bush
administration that President Bush was able to bring incremental change rather
than allowing the Cold War to end in some big, and perhaps dangerous,
moment?
Well, I think, yeah, that’s basically i t Dying empires rarely go out peacefully. And I
think that President Bush recognized historic change was taking place. He didn’t
create the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really cataclysmic
changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.
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Everyone takes it for granted now, but the Cold War did not have to end
peacefully. There was still a great deal of uncertainty when President Bush took
office.
Absolutely. The Cold W ar. . . well, you know the Reagan administration tends to
think they ended the Cold War. I think the Cold War was not at all ended when Bush
came into office. Eastern Europe was still divided just like it was before. The Soviet
army was still manning barricades and so on. No, it happened under President Bush,
and it happened the way it did in considerable part because of his great skill at
diplomacy about eliciting cooperation from people, both friends and opponents.
Marlin Fitzwater told me that he felt the country was very fortunate to have
Reagan president when he was because he was the ultimate cold warrior and we
needed that warrior, we needed that symbolic leader at that time for the peace
through strength program. But when President Bush took office what we realty
needed was a skillful diplomat who excelled at personal diplomacy and help wrap
things up peacefully. Would you agree with that?
Yes, I think that’s true. I think Reagan. . . The Carter administration w as. . . well,
they had a tough time. But in a way it was sort o f a disaster because everything was
going wrong for us and it was the end of Vietnam and Watergate, and the Soviet
Union was talking about the correlation of forces and the world was changing in their
favor and so on. So what we needed was Reagan to restore American spirits and to
have us stand up and stand up tall. But it took Bush to bring it to an end. Yeah.

261

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-Appendix DColin Powell Interview
I spoke with General Colin Powell via telephonefrom his office in Alexandria,
Virginia, on August 7 ,2000. Powell served as national security advisor to President
Reagan, 1987-88, and chairman, Joint-C hiefs-of-Staff under President Bush, 198992.
My first question concerns the 1988 meeting in New York between Gorbachev,
President Reagan, and President-elect Bush. What was the purpose of that
meeting and were there signs at the meeting that the Bush administration would
be more cautious with Gorbachev than Reagan?
The meeting was really as a result of a request from President Gorbachev. I was
national security advisor and we were not expecting to have any more summits or
meetings. Really, it was not a summit In fact, we carefully did not call it a summit
But we were not planning to have any more meetings with Gorbachev, and suddenly
he said, “Well, I’m going to be in the United Nations” . . . September wasn’t it?
September of ’8 8 ? ... “I’m going to be at the United Nations for the general session
and would like to meet and have one final go at it, to talk.” And so it was hard to say
no at that point. Wait, I’m sorry. It wasn’t September. It was after the election, so it
was December. It wasn’t the general assembly meeting; then it must have been some
other UN appearance. But, be that as it may, he initiated it and, o f course, we accepted
it. No reason not to accept it. We made it clear to the Soviets, however, that we were
not looking for a substantive exchange. It was a good way to say goodbye ReaganGorbachev and also say hello to President Bush. There was nervousness on the part of
President Bush and his associates that perhaps the Soviets might try to throw some
proposal at us that they would have to deal with before they had even come into office.
And so, yes, there was nervousness on the Bush side.
Brent Scowcroft and Janies Baker told me that the National Security Council
during the Bush administration operated more smoothly than it had during the
Reagan administration, especially prior to the changes made after Iran-Contra.
Do you think that was the case and what would you attribute that to?
Yeah, now after Iran-Contra it was still the Reagan-Bush administration. My own
view is that, and this is a very self-serving view as you can imagine, that when Mr.
Carlucci took over and I was his deputy, we restored a sense o f process and discipline
to the National Security Council and its functioning. Then there were some additional
changes in personality when Mr. Carlucci went to die Pentagon and Mr. Weinberger
left And a more cooperative relationship emerged between the State Defense and the
NSC. And I would say that it continued into and through the Bush administration. But
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I’m not going to bite and say that the Bush administration was better than the last two
years o f the Reagan administration. That would not be right, sir.
Was it easier to work for President Bush because of his knowledge and
experience in foreign affairs and did he take charge of his meetings with his
advisors more than Reagan who you describe in your book as having a passive
management style?
They were different people, and so I don’t want to compare them in that way because
it is not the right comparison. President Reagan relied more on his advisors to shape
issues for him, and President Bush got a little more deeply involved in the shaping of
the issues but didn’t constrain his staff. And he wanted to hear more of the in and out,
up and down debates and dialogues over the various issues than President Reagan. But
it doesn’t mean that President Bush was better at it. It’s just two different styles. And
President Clinton was yet a different style altogether.
In your book, you write that you saw your main mission as chairman of the JCS
to be able to move the armed forces onto a new course. You called this strategic
overview, “When You Lose Your Best Enemy.5*Would you please explain your
basic goals in the overview and describe how it evolved into the concept of a
“base force”?
Yeah, for 40 years or there abouts we had built our armed forces against a single
contingency, and that was war with the Soviet Union. We fought other wars
meanwhile in Korea and Vietnam, but it was always part o f a possible conflict with
the Soviet Union. These were sort of surrogates for the great war that might be
coming. Our research and development was always trying to build a new tank better
than the latest Soviet tank, build a new airplane better than the latest Soviet airplane.
Build a 600-ship navy, why? So we could cross the Atlantic under threat of all of those
Soviet submarines. Everything we did related to what we thought the Soviets might be
doing and how we might have to fight them. And this dominated defense thinking,
defense research and concurment, our base structure, our National Guard and reserves,
were all structured for this long war. We had depot facilities all over the country to
rebuild equipment during this long war. We built up our nuclear weapons, tactical
nuclear weapons especially. . . thousands of them, to fight this war. And then
suddenly, they quit. The Soviet Union went away, and this war was not going to be
fought; it was never going to be fought And there we were with a structure and a
philosophy and a theology that was based on that conflict with that enemy. And so I
thought it was our responsibility, the military leaders o f the department working with
our political leaders, to reshape the armed forces and begin to modify them to
recognize this change. And we’d better do it quickly because there’d be a thousand
people out there with better ideas, they thought, than we had as to how to do it and
because the Congress and the American people were rightfully, rightfully demanding a
peace dividend, meaning that if you have lost this enemy, then you shouldn’t have to
spend as much on defense. And if you still want to spend on defense, then what for. So
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the what for became the two major regional contingency answer, which I think made
sense then and still makes sense. We might have to fight a regional war, not World
War m , but a regional war in either the Persian Gulf area or in Northeast Asia.
Saddam Hussein helped make that thesis come true a few months later and that still
remains national strategy even though people attack it constantly; it still remains the
strategy. And then we downsized the force. And people have criticized the way we did
that and I have been criticized that it wasn’t a bold enough set of changes. But people
remember that when we started to downsize the force, there still was a lingering
potential threat from the declining Soviet Union and even from the new Russia. So we
were doing it during a time of historic change. Would they reverse? Would it go back
the other way? And we did it prudently, got down to that lower size. Unfortunately,
the current administration has made it even lower. And I think there is some distress
within the force, but it’s still the best in the world.
Did the Goldwater-Nichols authority help you speed up the process and allow you
to push for force reductions even over the objections of some of the chiefs?
To the extent that Goldwater-Nichols did not require me to speak with the corporate
voice. In other words, I can speak in my own right as principle military advisor. All
the other chiefs are military advisors to the president as well. But, because the
chairman is the principle military advisor, I did not need the chiefs to vote on what my
advice should be for the corporate body. That was of enormous help. But the great
influence that I was able to use was the influence given to me by my superiors. The
fact that Mr. Cheney found the ideas that we came up with useful and that the
president found them useful and relevant to the challenges they had is really what
made it work more so than bureaucratic imprimatur o f Goldwater-Nichols.
During the Persian Gulf War, Secretary Baker suggested Soviet military
participation in coalition efforts as a way of demonstrating that the Cold War
was over. Most of the administration objected to this and thought it was
premature to invite them in. Would you go over some of the discussions that took
place, including your opinion on the subject?
I don’t even know what he’s . . . what you’re talking about. I read the questions and so
I don’t know who these other people are that you say “most of the administration
objected to this.” What’s the basis for that?
Brent Scowcroft, in his book for example, and in a conversation I had with him
said that he thought it was too soon.
That’s one.
Bush mentions it in his book.
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But they all invited the Soviets to do something with us in the Persian Gulf War and
they didn’t do much, but they were certainly on our side voting. So even though there
may have been reservations, we didn’t stiff them. And I don’t know that we asked for
a lot from the Soviets. So I don’t know that I have anything to add to this, and I
certainly don’t remember any particular conversations.
Secretary Baker told me in an interview that when he announced at a joint press
conference with Sheveradnadze that both countries were denouncing the Iraqi
invasion, that was the point when he was willing to say the Cold War was over.
When were you willing to say the Cold War was over?
I don’t know that I was a precise one; I had been saying since 1988 that it’s starting to
end. I gave a speech in the spring o f 1988 [1989], after I became the Forscom
commander and after I gave up the NSC post, where I tried to share with my fellow
senior Army generals the fact that I thought that this was all going to be radically
different in a few years. And I even. . . to have a little interest in my speech and to
give them something to put their teeth into, I said in that speech, and you can find it in
my book somewhere, “If tomorrow morning we opened NATO for membership, I
wouldn’t be surprised to see every member of the Warsaw Pact apply.” Well, they
didn’t know whether to put me in a loony bin or rubber room or just ignore me. But as
early as then, I could see that these changes were historic. But the end of the Soviet
Union, the end of the Cold War, I guess for me as a finite date in time was Christmas
1991 when the Soviet Union ended.
Yon made a trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991 and wrote a report
for the president stating that there was deep disaffection in the upper reaches of
the Soviet military. Would you briefly explain your findings?
He was going to be following me through the Soviet Union a few weeks later, and he
wanted my observations. . . I think it was only a couple of days behind me. You
probably know. I don’t recall off the top o f my head. . . And so after traveling across
the Soviet Union and talking to a lot of their generals, many o f whom just didn’t
understand the reality o f the situation they were i n . . . I still remember lecturing a
bunch of Soviet generals at the general staff academy, and afterwards when I was
through, my colleague, my counterpart General Moiseyev and all the others just
leaping up and not really facing the realities. I said, “You guys, you’re going to have
to cut back sharply; you’re probably going to have to go to a volunteer force,” and
they just kept dismissing i t And so there was a lack o f reality to the situation they
were in. I also could sense deep, deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior
ranks o f the Soviet military leaders. They were also very troubled over what they saw
in Desert Storm and in what they saw in terms of the sophistication o f the West and
what we could do, and we were no longer that weak sistered, soft, not terribly
competent military that they might have been counting on. And finally, I just saw
generation after generation o f Soviet weaponry abandoned in airfields. Every time
they brought in a new generation o f equipment, they just left the other generations
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laying around. And I could see that the Red Army was essentially bankrupting the
country, and it could not continue; it was not sustainable.
Did you prefer some sort of confederation or central authority to control nuclear
weapons when the breakup of the Soviet Union was coming?
Well, yeah, and I was glad that there was a central authority. I mean the Soviet rocket
forces never, they never wavered in their diligence of protecting and accounting for
their nuclear weapons. And I was very pleased when ultimately in the next
administration, American administration, all those weapons from Kazakhstan and
Belarus and Ukraine were moved back into Russia. Even though there had been
occasional reports and a lot of scary stories from time to time, nobody can demonstrate
that they have lost anyone of those nuclear weapons.
How would you describe the foreign policy legacy of President Bush in terms of
the end of the Cold War?
He is the one who guided the Cold War to its end, and he did it with great skill. The
unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union without us gloating about it
was very wisely done by the president, certain magnanimity in the manner in which he
dealt with Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, and I think that he played a key role at the end.
A lot of things came together to cause the end to come. And your last question asking
who should be given credit for the end of the Cold War. . . well, there are so many
events, people, and situations that led to the end, but I would just site two, just to be a
little provocative: One, they were living a lie. You can’t live a lie forever. So the lie
eventually caught up with them. But, two, you want to know what really broke the
Soviet Union? It was the Red Army. They bankrupted the country. They couldn’t
afford i t The Red Army continued to insist that they had to be afforded, and
Gorbachev is the one who realized this can not keep going. And he tried to reform it
but he couldn’t reform it fast enough and he turned loose forces that were
uncontainable. Remember, the reason he wanted. . . the reason he allowed Germany
unified, the reason he wanted good relations with the W est the reason he was willing
to watch the Warsaw Pact breakup is because he had to breakup the rationale for the
Red Army. Once you broke the rationale for the Red Army, you could use those
resources to do for your country what your country needed done—rebuild a society,
figure out how to make washing machines, not tanks. And so the only way he could
bring the Red Army under control and divert those resources was to get rid of the war.
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-Appendix EJack F. Matlock, Jr., Interview
I spoke with Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., in a coffee house at the Marriott
Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 6,2001. Matlock served on President
Reagan’s National Security Council, 1983-86, and as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union under both Reagan and President Bush, 1987-91.
The first thing I want to ask you about is something you referenced in your
speech, and that is you said the date the Cold War ended in you mind was
Gorbachev’s UN speech and then the Governor’s Island meeting. You said that
was primarily because the ideology of the Cold War ended.
That’s correct, and I distinguish between the ideological end to the Cold War and, as I
say, all of the cleanup diplomacy, which was important. It’s sort of like something
happening at the end of a crisis, but you don’t know if there’s going to be a relapse if
you’re speaking in medical terms. So it had to be confirmed, but it was confirmed over
the next two years. But I would say. . . another reason is that the diplomacy changed
totally because from January, from the Bush administration on, we really espoused the
same goals—we wanted peace, and we wanted to free up the countries in Eastern
Europe, and Gorbachev thought they would stay socialist even if they went free. When
they didn’t, he was willing to accept it, so he was as good as his word, so to speak,
later when the push came to shove. And German reunification. . . in the final analysis,
he didn’t stand in the way, and he even blessed it, which was something that would
have been hard to predict. So I think that, in general, we no longer had totally
antagonistic goals. After all, the Cold War was conceived as a zero-sum game—any
gain for one was [a loss for] the other—and then suddenly we started looking at how
can we disengage, how can we serve the interests o f everybody. In that sense, that’s
why I say I think it ended ideologically. That’s not to deny that there was a lot of
important diplomacy to be done to clear up the remnants o f the Cold War, the results. I
also think the Cold War started when the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded in Russia. I
don’t think it started in 1945 or 1946, only when geopolitical and in the form of a
military confrontation. But it was there inherently from the time the Bolsheviks took
over what was then Russia and turned it into the Soviet Union because their whole
philosophy was based on the class struggle—the victory o f the proletariat Even
though they didn’t talk about it that much after WWII, this was inherent in their
philosophy if you look at what they understood. So in effect, there was a Cold War.
Even when we were Allies during WWII, Stalin treated us as almost enemies in the
sense that he didn’t allow any real contact with his people. If they had contact with
westerners in Moscow, he sent them off to prison camps and so on because he wanted
to close off the country because he thought they were in a life or death struggle with
the rest of the world, and o f course, eventually they would prevail. That’s why they
never had any hesitation in using military force when they thought they could. They
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could be circumspect about it, but in Africa and other areas if it was a matter of
supporting somebody who claimed to represent sort o f the proletariat against the
imperialists, they were quite willing to support them if they thought they had any
chance at all. And, o f course, they started this in the 1920s, except at that time the
British were considered the main enemy. So, yeah, I think the Cold War started when
a political party based on a Marxist ideology took power in Russia and turned it into a
Socialist state, which was to be a vanguard of the world proletariat and the future
world state. Until that philosophy on which that rested, which was the Marxist class
struggle, was dropped, the Cold War would have been there. It could have been more
intense or less intense, but the feeling that they were in a zero-sum conflict with the
rest of the world would have persisted.
So you saw it a based on ideology. President Reagan saw the Cold War based on
ideology. But when I did an interview with Brent Scowcroft, he said that he and
President Bush did not see the Cold War as being about ideology. He pointed to
the division of Europe that George Kennan described, and he said for them that
was the basis as they saw the Cold War. So he said when they were trying to
resolve issues, that’s what they were looking at rather than the ideology. So does
that explain really the differences in philosophy between the Reagan
administration and the Bush administration? That maybe they saw the Cold War
itself as having a different definition?
There were some differences, but I’m not sure that Brent would disagree with the way
I would put it. I don’t deny that, sure, I think they could say that we’re not sure the
Cold War is over until these things happen—that is that Europe is united and what
not—but I would say that the*Cold War was not fundamentally about the division of
Europe. The division o f Europe occurred because of the Cold War, and that, sure,
people are not going to perceive that it is over until that division stops—and they were
right to concentrate on that, that’s right But what I’m saying is, and what took diem a
while to recognize—in fact they really didn’t recognize it until December when they
got to Malta, in the meeting in Malta—was, that Gorbachev had already accepted. In
other words, they didn’t really test him early on because Scowcroft still thought the
Cold War was not over. Well, you know, I would say in Gorbachev’s mind it was
over, and that was the important thing. Now, you know, that didn’t mean that
automatically we were going to be able to solve these problems, only if it turned out
that under different circumstances, in the push, he would live with what he said. But it
turned out he would. So, I’m not saying we had full confirmation that it was over.
Clearly, we couldn’t sa y. . . we couldn’t say it was over until we saw all the results
that it was over. But having seen that, you can look back and say, okay, the back was
broken at this point And after that, the diplomacy was no longer zero sum; it was how
to solve problems. And I think somewhat to Bush’s surprise and Scowcroft’s,
Gorbachev agreed with alacrity—in fact, he offered at Malta that he wasn’t going to
use force in Eastern Europe. And it rather surprised them that he would make that
commitment He would have made that commitment in February or March, but they
didn’t ask him. They kept putting off the summit for various reasons. So they didn’t
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really push things along very fast or it could’ve happened even sooner, some of these
things. But, in any event, I think what we’re saying is not necessarily contradictory. I
don’t say that all the results of the Cold War ended in December ’88. What I say is I
think that was when Gorbachev officially discarded—and this was a process, the
discarding—that ideology had happened step by step. It didn’t just happen suddenly,
but that’s when he officially confirmed that the ideology was going to be different and
that their policy was going to be based on what he called the common interests of
mankind. Now you could still argue about what the common interests were. It was still
politically difficult for him to give up Eastern Europe. He was not going to take the
initiative there. But what he could do, once East Europeans understood that the Soviet
Union was not going to intervene militarily, they could take matters into their own
hands, which is what they did. So I don’t think we’re saying different things. It’s just
that we use different words to express it. But I do think that they were a little slow on,
you might say, testing Gorbachev’s words, and they were right to say we can’t put a
lot o f stock in it until these other things happen.
How would you explain the foreign policy review at the beginning of the Bush
administration, the Pause? Would it be part of that lack of recognition or other
factors?
Partly that. I think it was largely to reassure the right wing of the Republican party,
which never really trusted Bush.
In your book you mention that during the Reagan administration there were
differences between what you call the Bush people and the Reagan people. Were
those differences in personnel or just in philosophy?
Mainly in personnel. I mean you had Jim Baker as Chief of Staff. . . but, I mean, I
was a professional, so I wasn’t really identified with either, although probably the
Bush people thought of me more Reagan than Bush simply because I was brought on
by Reagan first But I didn’t even realize that that acutely until Bush was elected and
purged almost everybody from the top ranks of the government At one point I know
Baker had told me in a private meeting, when he asked me to stay on in Moscow, that
well, you know, they had run three political campaigns and he’s got a lot of people
that he has to take care of. Now clearly he didn’t consider the people who had worked
for Reagan their people. So I think they did look at their own backers as distinct from
the Reagan backers. And their political task was not having the Reagan backers defect.
Since many o f the right-wing Republicans had thought Reagan had gone soft his last
year or so, you know Bush had to sort o f stand up and, I think, show that he was
tougher.
Why was the Malta conference Important?
Because of the understanding regarding Eastern Europe.

269

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Did it have anything to do with image?
Yeah, I think it was image also. I think that finally Gorbachev convinced Bush that he
wasn’t going to intervene in Eastern Europe, and Bush convinced Gorbachev that he
wasn’t going to make political hay out of it—dance on the wall—and that was very
important
It was important to have a face-to-face meeting where they could really
understand each other.
Right. And they had this discussion—I told about it in my book—not to talk about
Western values, but to talk about democratic values. That was very important because,
one thing, I think the Bush people generally—somehow they never asked me, I guess I
would have explained it to them—they didn’t quite grasp Gorbachev’s point that
Western values made things seem as if he was the loser. Whereas, since the Soviet
Union had claimed to be democratic, even though it wasn’t, you could use the term
democratic values, and it was actually Jim Baker that came up with that suggestion.
It was important to Gorbachev to present the image of a mutual understanding
rather than of a winner and a loser.
That’s right. . . absolutely. And I think that wasn’t fully grasped by the Bush people
because I think, you know, they understood that. . . they would have understood that
theoretically, yeah, you don’t want to make him seem the loser. But somehow they
didn’t grasp as instinctively as Reagan would have—he had a much more instinctive
feel o f these things, you know the professional relations and how another politician
feels. And I think it took Gorbachev to tell them, and then when they thought it
through, they understood and went on. Yes, absolutely because that did set the course
for the liberation o f Eastern Europe.
In your book you mention that the four-part agenda of the Reagan
Administration did not include an economic side. When Bush came to power, you
felt that it was time to implement an economic side, but he didn't. Could you talk
a little bit about the failure you saw in the Bush administration for not doing
that?
I think at first, in ’89, there was a fear, particularly on Baker’s part, that the Soviets
would simply get into the international financial and other organizations as
troublemakers, as spoilers, and he didn’t want to let them in. And it was true that many
of these organizations were setup for market economies, and they did not have a
market economy. But I think that’s also a reflection of the fact that Baker hadn’t quite
grasped that the Cold War really was over and they were looking for advice and help
on how to become a capitalist society, though they didn’t want to use that word. And I
think they were very slow in grasping that But I thought in that first group o f cables,
which have been declassified and actually are available to researchers, that I wrote that
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I knew he would want something new, and I thought that given his background in
business and whatnot, to make economic cooperation to bring the Soviet Union into
the world economy and to create a market economy there could be, you might say, the
watchword o f the Bush administration. So I was trying to give him something new.
But I think they didn’t really grasp the potential until too late. They began to talk
about it by the fall of ’90—particularly after the invasion o f Kuwait and so on when
Gorbachev went along, and then that’s when Bush sent down the businessmen and so
on—but this was without any strategy and without any real briefing about what we
wanted to encourage. They hadn’t really given any thought to that, and whereas
Gorbachev never came up with something worthy o f support, at the same time we
never gave him any coherent advice either. And the time to give him that advice was
’89, and ’90 at the very latest. By 1991 it was too late—things had fallen apart too
much. But there could have been a lot more direct support for the reformers there if
we’d have gotten involved earlier. So I think this was a case that probably—again who
could know for sure—if Reagan in his prime had still been president, he probably
would have been willing to take that risk, particularly if he could handle the Rightwing, whereas Bush, I think, either because he didn’t fully understand how far
Gorbachev was probably willing to go or else he just didn’t have the imagination to
see the potential. He said it himself he really didn’t have that vision thing, whereas he
had a lot more facts at his command than Reagan did, but Reagan had a vision—that
was the difference in the two of them.
You mentioned that many of Gorbachev’s concessions—going along with the
Gulf War, allowing Germany to be reunified in NATO—were directly or
indirectly linked to economic aid. Near the end, was obtaining economic aid the
thing most important to Gorbachev?
It was. And what he was offering, as I said, wasn’t worthy of it, but we hadn’t given
him any real help in formulating i t I tried to give my idea of what was going through
his mind in that imaginary dialogue.
Considering the huge budget deficits, could the Bush administration have
provided Gorbachev with the level of economic aid that he needed. Could they
have found the money if they wanted to?
I think they could have found the money if they wanted to. Obviously this made it
more difficult that there were budget deficits. But I think they could have, and this is
what Thatcher, in effect, when she was no longer Prime Minister in her conversation
with me and I’m sure others, she was pressing them to do: You know, George, we
need to do it and you don’t have to do it all. But, you know, press the Germans. And,
by the way, Major was willing to give that very substantial support in January and
February ’92 after the Soviet Union collapsed. It was no longer Gorbachev, and it was
Bush who turned it down. And it was finally Richard Nixon who had to make an issue
o f this in 1992. Yeah, I mean they had their problems and he had raised taxes and they
had the recession. But, you know, I think the running scared is what did him in in that
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election. If he had shone a little more leadership—to say, yeah, these are not easy
times but look at what the stakes are; we have to make that investment. I think he
could have carried it if he had done the leadership. But if instead, you know, your
concept is just simply to manage a corporation so to speak and you’re not willing to
take risks, then I think it was that—it wasn’t just this issue—but that inability to take a
risk for something that might prove to be unpopular that people saw as a weakness
eventually and gave Clinton his opening.
Could you explain the reason for Bush’s reluctance to provide economic aid?
Was he fearful of change?
No, he was not comfortable with change if he wasn’t sure what it was going to be. But
I think. . . first of all, what Gorbachev was asking for was not rational. And you
couldn’t place a lot of aid on that. Where the failure was was the failure to see earlier
on that this guy needed some help and you had to find a way to help him whether he
asked for it or not in putting together an organization. Now I would have thought if,
for example, you say: Look, the world doesn’t really need the OECD the way it’s
currently constituted. Why don’t we get an agreement to change this into an
international organization to back transition economies—all of them, Eastern Europe
and the others that had been Communist—to a market system, and we’ll have their
representatives, we’ll have others, and a number of countries will put some solid funds
in it to help this process. Now, if we had started that late ’89 early ’9 0 ,1 think we
would have had much more substantial thing than saying: OK, IMF do it or World
Bank. They were set up for different purposes and more limited purposes. And nobody
had a road map. You couldn’t . . . you really had to put a lot of heads together and you
had to have some way to provide political and, if need be at times, financial support to
do things that were going to be difficult politically, as we’ve seen in Russia. I just
think there wasn’t the imagination to do that at a time when it would have worked. By
’90, late ’91, it was late, but in ’92 he could have helped the reformers a lot by going
along with the money they needed then, and I think that would have passed in the
United States. It was not unpopular. People understood, you know, they were no
longer an enemy; we had spent hundreds of billions on arms—we didn’t need to do
that anymore. . . OK, it’s tough but let’s find a way to do it And it seems to me that
ways could have been found, and you could have pressed the Japanese and Germans
also to do a lot.
In your speech you said the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable, and in
your book you said the reasons why it collapsed were all internal. Do you think
the U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union merely guided or perhaps
affected the timing of the collapse of the Soviet Union?
Well, I think. . . obviously, some of the things we pushed for to end the Cold War,
such as opening up the country, bringing in democratic processes, supporting the
election process, were things that made the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union
possible. I mean, as long as the Communist party was in power and we certainly
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favored steps to take them out o f power, though we didn’t do it, and if we’d tried to do
it with pressure, it wouldn’t have worked. You open up a country and this tends to
bring the dictators down—something we didn’t learn in regards to Cuba and we
haven't learned regarding Iran and Iraq. But you’re much more apt to bring them
down if you open up the country in Iraq. So in that sense, by opening up the country,
encouraging them to open up and so on, we created conditions under which when they
could not deal with these other pressures, the state collapsed. So I’m not saying that
none of our policies had any relevance. I’m just saying we didn’t bring it about. We
didn’t have die power to bring it about It was brought about internally. Some of these
internal forces had been encouraged by the United States and the West in general, not
so much by a direct action, although by that to, but by our very existence. After all, as
long as we existed as free societies and democratic societies with economies that
seemed to work, we were a threat to the Soviet system. And what their task was to try
to be more like us without admitting it And we were really in favor of that. It turned
out that they couldn’t. Well, that was their problem, and that’s what I was trying to say
in the book.
You said that President Bush and Gorbachev were both in favor of a
confederation, a democratic Soviet Union. Why were they not successful in
pushing forward that type of Soviet Union?
Well, there were several reasons. One was that the nationalists in several of the
republics wanted independence for their own reasons, and the Communists in other
republics, once they saw that the Communist party was losing power, wanted
independence in order to save themselves and stay in power. This happened in central
Asia. You ended up with five dictators in central Asia in those five central Asian
countries and keeping the old system primarily open; therefore, with all of their talk of
opening up the economies, they were basically a totalitarian political system in the
way they controlled things. I think that is why I think Bush was right when he said
don’t confuse independence with freedom. In other words, if you have freedom and
you want independence, eventually you’re going to get i t But if you take
independence under conditions before you get freedom, you could be deprived of
freedom for a long time, and that’s happening in a lot of the republics. In fact in all of
them, except the Baltic states, it’s happening. Now, I think we understood that we
couldn’t do it for them. It’s something they had to do for themselves. And I’m just
saying from the standpoint of U.S. interests that I think it was accurate to feel that it
was easier to deal at least with a well disposed Soviet Union that had a monopoly on
nuclear weapons than a lot of states, several of which might have gotten them
separately. O f course, our big push after it broke up was to make sure that all the
nuclear weapons went to one country, that is to Russia. It took a lot of pressure in
Ukraine to achieve that and in general the pressure is much more. . . and I think that
that also recognizes something we haven’t been clear about since then that, you know,
it’s not in our geopolitical interests to vie with Russia for influence in these other areas
o f the Soviet Union; it just isn’t It’s just going to create problems. And, you know, if
you could be democratic and accepted and Moscow has a certain hegemony and, you
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might say, benign rule over these, I don’t think it bothers us at all. In fact, I think the
present world where you’ve got so many small states, many of which are not
democratic, there is a much greater problem in the long run.
You said ending the Cold War could not be attributed to any single one person,
so how would you just briefly define the role of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush?
What credit should each be given for the end of the Cold War, if any?
Well, I think that Reagan in setting up conditions, which were fair and not against the
interests o f a peaceful Soviet Union, and refusing to reduce arms and end the arms
race until the country began to reform, he created conditions that encouraged
Gorbachev. In fact, he gave him little choice, if he wanted to reform, but to open up
the country and start the reform. Gorbachev deserves the credit for understanding this
had to be done and that it was in the interest of his country that it could be done and
for having the political skills to pull it off. Bush deserves credit for some very fine
clean-up diplomacy in cleaning up the remnants of the Cold War, but not for breaking
the back of it
Thank you.
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